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DEFAULT RISK IN EQUITY RETURNS 
- AN INDUSTRIAL AND CROSS-INDUSTRIAL STUDY 
YI WANG 
ABSTRACT 
The relationship between default risk and equity returns is investigated in this study from 
an industrial and economic cycle decomposition point of view. The portfolio approach 
and Fama-MacBeth regression are used in the analysis. This dissertation provides 
evidence that investors charged a premium for stocks with both lower and higher credit 
risks. However, the specific relationship is different across industries and economic 
cycles. This study also notices two unique patterns of the banking industry when it comes 
to default risk. First, higher default risks are more likely to be compensated by higher 
returns. Second, as compared to other industries, the higher default risk of the banking 
industry is accompanied with larger banks; furthermore, this positive relationship only 
exists during the post-1980 period. The Granger Causality tests suggest that the default 
risk of the banking industry is more likely to cause the default risk of other industries, not 
vice versa. The significance of this causality is related to an industry’s dependence on the 
banking industry. This study further explores the possibility whether the change of bank 
default risk is a systematic risk. The empirical results from the Fama-MacBeth approach 
show that the change of bank default risk affects the equity returns of other industries 
only during the economic contraction stages. In addition, this effect is slightly negative, 
indicating that during the economic contraction periods the increase of bank default risk 
actually drives funds to flow from the banking industry to other industries in a period as 
short as one month.  
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CHAPTER 
 
CHAPTER I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
     1.1. Motivation of This Study  
Starting from Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966), it became well 
accepted in modern finance that investors should be compensated only for bearing 
systematic risk, i.e. the risk that affects the entire market and cannot be reduced through 
diversification. In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), “market risk” is the only 
systematic risk. However, empirical studies have identified more anomalies that the 
CAPM model could not explain adequately. Fama and French (1993, 1996) summarized 
numerous studies about the equity anomalies and proposed a three-factor model, in which 
two more factors are included besides the market-risk premium. The two Fama-French 
factors include the difference between the average return on the value portfolios and the 
growth portfolios (HML hereafter) and the difference between the average return on the 
small portfolios and the big portfolios (SMB hereafter). The HML factor is constructed 
using the return of six value-weighted portfolios formed by book-to-market ratio (BM 
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hereafter)1. According to Fama and French (1995), HML could be used as a proxy for 
relative distress. Fama and French claimed that the three-factor model is consistent with 
Merton’s intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) (Merton, 1973) and Ross's arbitrage pricing 
theory (APT) (Ross, 1976). The SMB and the HML can be interpreted as two underlying 
risk factors or state variables of special hedging concern to investors. Skeptics argue that 
the statistical significance of SMB and HML factors are due to survivor bias or data 
snooping. Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995) found a reliable book-to-market effect 
by forming a dataset of large firms that is free of survivorship bias for the 1968-1991 
periods. Davis (1994) confirmed the book-to-market effect using large U.S. industrial 
firms’ data from year 1940 to 1963, a period poorly covered by the COMPUSTAT 
database. Barber and Lyon (1997) found a reliable book-to-market effect for the 1973-
1994 period among financial firms, a sector not extensively explored by previous studies. 
International evidence of the book-to-market effect was found by Fama and French (1998) 
and Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993). The studies mentioned above indicated that 
distress risk, which is proxied by the book to market ratio, does include pricing 
information.   
It is necessary to further understand why the relative distress risk is a special 
hedging concern to investors. Fama and French (1996) indicated that distress risk might 
be correlated with declines in unmeasured components of wealth such as human capital2. 
                                                   
1 The construction of the Fama-French factors can be found on 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html   
2 Fama and French (1996) argued that “One possible explanation is linked to human capital, an important asset 
for most investors. Consider an investor with specialized human capital tied to a growth firm (or industry or 
technology). A negative shock to the firm's prospects probably does not reduce the value of the investor's human 
capital; it may just mean that employment in the firm will expand less rapidly. In contrast, a negative shock to a 
distressed firm more likely implies a negative shock to the value of specialized human capital since employment 
in the firm is more likely to contract. Thus, workers with specialized human capital in distressed firms have an 
incentive to avoid holding their firms' stocks. If variation in distress is correlated across firms, workers in 
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The declines of this unmeasured wealth component in turn affects the expected returns of 
a stock.   
The most direct proxy for distress risk is default risk. If default risk is systematic, 
investors should demand a positive risk-premium for bearing this risk. Actually, the 
impact of default risk on the value of securities has been a major concern of investors as 
well as researchers. Better understanding the link between default risk and the expected 
returns can provide insights into our understanding of the asset pricing mechanism. 
Default risk tends to be considered as a diversifiable risk. However, historical data 
shows that the aggregate default risk level is related with economic cycle. Figure 1 
graphs the annual issuer-weighted corporate default rates from year 1920 to 2006 by 
investment grade as reported by Moody’s in 2007. For the speculative grade and all rated 
issuers, there are four main default peaks registered in years 1933, 1970, 1991 and 2001. 
These default peaks are consistent with the troughs of business cycles defined by 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBRR). The figure shows that default rates on 
the corporate bond market are highly dependent on the stages of business cycles, 
suggesting that there may be an important systematic component of default risk in the 
corporate sector that must be priced in security returns besides bond securities (See 
Appendix A, Figure 1 for detail).  
Many studies have focused on the relationship between default risk and debt 
pricing, but much fewer have focused on the relationship between default risk and equity 
returns. For the limited studies about the effect of default risk on equity returns, the 
empirical findings are unclear. 
                                                                                                                                                       
distressed firms have an incentive to avoid the stocks of all distressed firms. The result can be a state-variable 
risk premium in the expected returns of distressed stocks.” (P77)    
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According to the efficient market theory, higher risks should be compensated by 
higher returns in an efficient market. A positive relation between default risk and equity 
returns would thus be expected under the theory. However, some empirical studies have 
documented a statistically insignificant or even negatively significant relationship 
between default risk and equity returns. For example, Arbel, Kolodny and Lakonishok 
(1977) found little evidence of any default risk effect in the residual terms of the CAPM 
model.  Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) and 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) have documented an abnormal negative equity return 
followed bond downgrades, and a non-significant equity return reaction subsequent to 
upgrades. Dichev (1998) used Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1969) and Ohlson’s O-score 
(Ohlson, 1980) as proxies for bankruptcy risk and showed that firms with higher 
bankruptcy risk earned abnormally low returns during the 1981-1995 period. The Griffin 
and Lemmon (2002) study confirmed Dichev’s results. Employing a hazard rate model, 
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005) constructed a default proxy using financial ratios 
(leverage, profitability and cash holdings), market information (market capitalization, 
equity return and equity volatility) and market to book ratio. They showed that since 
1981, financially distressed stocks had earned statistically significant negative returns.  
The insignificant or even negative relationship between default risk and equity 
returns seems to suggest that the equity market is inefficient in processing information, or 
at least inefficient in processing default risk information. However, using different 
default risk or expected return proxies and different sample periods, other researchers 
concluded that default risk is priced in equity returns. Vassalou and Xing (2002) adopted 
an option-pricing approach to construct the default risk proxy - default likelihood 
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indicator (DLI hereafter). After adjusting for the variation in default risk around the 
downgrades, they found that firms whose default risk increased earned higher subsequent 
returns than firms whose default risk decreased during the 1971 to 1999 period. In a 
subsequent study, Vassalou and Xing (2004) found that small size firms with high book 
to market ratio earned significantly higher returns when using DLI as a proxy of default 
probability. Da and Gao (2006) found similar results as to the Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
study and they documented that the positive relation between default risk and equity 
returns disappeared after the first subsequent month. George and Hwang (2007) believed 
that it is financial distress costs that are priced in equity returns, rather than the 
occurrence of financial distress itself. They documented a negative relationship between 
both the raw and the risk adjusted returns and leverage, which was used as a proxy for 
financial distress costs. This result is at odds with the findings of Bhandari (1988), who 
documented a positive relationship between financial leverage and average returns even 
when size and beta were included in the tests during a different testing period. Chava and 
Purnanandam (2007) argued that the negative relationship between default risk and 
equity returns was a short-term effect. They did not find such a negative relation when 
focusing on a longer sample period. Furthermore, when using implied cost of capital 
computed from analysts’ forecasts as a measure of expected returns, they found a positive 
relationship between default risk and expected returns. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova et al. 
(2007) showed that it was only in periods of financial distress around credit rating 
downgrades that low-credit-risk firms realize higher returns than high-credit-risk firms do.  
This brief introduction shows that there are certain glaring voids in the empirical 
studies of the relationship between default risk and equity returns. For example, only few 
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studies have been devoted to reconciling the controversial results drawn by different 
studies on the relationship between default risk and equity returns. Moreover, previous 
studies tend to mix industrial firms together. Few have considered the fact that different 
industries feature different leverage and asset volatility. Nor have they addressed the 
inter-relation of default risk and equity returns among different industries. This paucity 
provides motivation for this dissertation. 
     1.2. Objective of This Study 
The objectives of this dissertation are three-fold.  
First and most important, this study explores the relationship between default risk 
and equity returns from an industrial and business cycle decomposition point of view. 
Previous studies usually pooled industrial firms together. However, different industries 
tend to feature different financial leverage. This is partially due to the fact that different 
industries rely on different levels of operating leverage, and partially due to the 
possibility that firms choose less financial leverage if their operations expose them to 
high financial distress costs (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Since a firm’s financial 
leverage is positively related to its default possibility3 and the leverage is partly affected 
by the firm’s industry, the study on the relationship between default risk and equity 
returns should consider the industry factor.  
In addition, one of the possible reasons4 causing the inconclusive empirical results 
of the effect of default risk on equity returns may be the different mixtures of the sample 
                                                   
3 A firm’s default probability may also affect its financial leverage due to the moral hazard problem. For 
example, a depressed firm is more likely to take more debt if possible, hoping that it could survive the bad 
time.  
4 Other possible reasons include the different sample period covered and different methodology used in 
previous studies.  
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firms in existing studies. If the empirical studies had employed the same sample firms, 
the inconsistency problem mentioned above might have been reduced. An industrial 
decomposition on the issue provides another angle to look at the relationship between 
default risk and equity returns. The industrial decomposition method has the weakness of 
neglecting the diversification effect across different industries. However, it provides a 
clearer picture for each industry on the relationship between default risk and equity 
returns. This industrial stand-alone analysis can be used as a cornerstone for further 
portfolio analysis across industries.  
 The industrial and economic cycle decomposition approach also indirectly 
considers another dimension of default risk, the loss given default (LGD), when studying 
the default risk effect because industry and business cycle are two important determinants 
of the LGD, a dimension poorly covered in the studies of the default risk effect because 
of the data limits.  
The second objective of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between 
default risk and equity returns of the banking industry. The interest in the banking 
industry is due to the important role this industry plays in the real economy and the little 
coverage of the topic in literature.   
The third objective of this study is to explore whether default risk will spillover. 
This study will focus on the spillover effect from the banking industry to other industries 
in particular because the banking industry is closely related with other industries by 
lending and borrowing activities.  
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     1.3. Summary of Methodology and Results  
This dissertation is an empirical study on the relationship between default risk and 
equity returns from an industrial and business cycle decomposition point of view. It also 
covers the spillover effect of default risk from the banking industry to other industries. A 
modified Merton model similar to the one used by Moody’s KMV is used to derive the 
default risk measure – the default likelihood indicator (DLI). A sorting approach is then 
used on the portfolio analysis while the Fama-MacBeth approach is used on the 
regression analysis to analyze the relationship between default risk and equity returns. A 
dependence of bank (DB) measure is calculated. It is used together with the Granger 
Causality test to investigate the possible spillover of default risk from the banking to 
other industries. After the Granger Causality test, the Fama-MacBeth approach is used in 
exploring the pricing effect of the change of the banking default risk on the returns of 
other industries.  
The main data used in this study includes the intersection of stocks in the CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT North America databases from 01/1971 to 12/2006. The stocks are 
divided into 13 industries, which include the banking, business equipment, chemicals, 
durable, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, nondurable, non-bank financial, other, 
shopping, telecommunication and utility industries. 
For most industries, this study demonstrates a U-shape relationship between 
default risk and equity returns during the economic expansion periods. The pattern 
indicates that investors of these industries charged a premium for stocks with both lower 
and higher credit risk. However, higher default risk is more likely to be compensated by 
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higher returns during the economic contraction periods. The specific relationships 
between default risk and equity returns are different across industries.  
This study also shows some interesting findings of the banking industry. First, a 
U-shape relationship between default risk and equity returns of the banking industry is 
documented during the economic expansion periods; the relationship is however positive 
and linear during the whole sample period and the economic contraction periods. This 
positive and linear relationship means that banks with higher default risk are 
compensated with higher returns. Second, different from other industries, the higher 
default risk of the banking industry is related to larger banks. This positive relationship 
between default risk and bank size only existed during the post-1980 period. The pattern 
indicates that “Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF)” has been a problem since the 1980s. Third, the 
empirical results convey that firms in most industries demonstrate more variation in terms 
of default risk during the economic contraction periods, but not firms in the banking 
industry. During bad economic periods, banks are more likely to experience higher 
default risks as a group.  
This study further proves that default risk is likely to flow from the banking 
industry to other industries, especially to those industries with higher dependence on 
banks. However, a change of bank default risk is not a significant pricing factor during 
periods of economic expansion. During the economic contraction times, the increase of 
bank default risk may however drive funds into other industries in a period as short as 
one month.      
The current financial crisis starting from 2007 is not included in this dissertation 
for two main reasons. First, the data in this dissertation was collected at the beginning of 
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year 2008 and the data related with current crisis was not available at that time. Second, 
the current crisis is still under evolvement. Radical changes are underway to prevent 
another crisis like this one. These changes will bring permanent repercussions effect to 
the whole economy, a structural transformation unseen after the great depression of the 
1930’s. Therefore, excluding the current crisis assures a cleaner dataset. However, the 
methodology used in this dissertation can be easily transformed to analyze the current 
financial crisis.  
     1.4. Contributions of this Study 
There are four main contributions of this study.  
First, this study provides an industrial and business cycle decomposition of the 
relationship between default risk and equity returns. Existing studies on the topic usually 
pooled sample firms together, regardless of the industry to which the sample firms belong. 
Usually, the pooled firms were then grouped into different portfolios either by size or by 
the ratio of book-to-market value. However, it is possible that firms in some industries 
have a propensity to be small while some industries are more likely to have a higher 
book-to-market ratio. In this case, the portfolio grouped by size or/and the book to market 
ratio may be weighted more toward a certain industry. Besides pooling sample firms from 
different industries together, previous studies also paid little attention to the possible 
influence of business cycles on the default risk effect. This dissertation will try to fill the 
gap.    
Second, this thesis is one of the few studies that indirectly examine the effect of 
the loss given default (LGD) factor when studying the relationship between default risk 
and equity returns. Factors that affect the LGD include the presence and the quality of 
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collateral, the seniority of debt, industry, and the timing of business cycle. It is however 
hard to find public information about the collateral information and it is also too complex 
to collect detailed information of thousands of firms about the seniority of debt. For this 
reason, little research incorporates the LGD factor while studying the relationship 
between default risk and equity returns5. Not only is the LGD determined or affected by 
collateral and debt seniority but also by industry and business cycle. For this reason, the 
industrial and business decomposition approach employed in this study actually indirectly 
considers the LGD information.  
The relationship between default risk and equity returns is a relatively new topic. 
The published papers as well as unpublished working papers in progress on the topic 
generally focus on industrial firms. For the most part, banking firms have been either 
neglected or mixed with industrial firms. This dissertation will fill this gap by exploring 
in depth the relationship between default risk and the equity returns of the banking 
industry. This study is the first to point out that bigger banks actually are taking more 
credit risk after the 1980’s, a side effect of the “Too-Big-To-Fail” policy formalized from 
the resolution of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company (CINB) in 1984. 
This is in turn the third contribution of this dissertation.   
Fourth, this thesis contributes to the research on the cross-industrial relationships 
in terms of default risk spillover. Few attempts have been made to investigate default risk 
spillover and its effect on equity returns. Yet the complex relationship among participants 
in modern economy makes such spillover a possibility. The spillover is quite likely 
                                                   
5 The few papers that actually considered the LGD only indirectly incorporated this factor. Arbel, Kolodny 
and Lakonishok (1977) for example used bond ratings of unsecured debt to eliminate the effects of specific 
collateral on ratings. A study by Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2006) used the shareholder advantage to indirectly 
incorporate the LGD factor in their study since shareholders with more advantage may suffer less in the 
case of default. 
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between banking institutions and firms in other industries, since banking institutions have 
complex relationships with firms in other industries through lending and borrowing 
activities. Banking firms also have numerous business activities among themselves. Such 
complex relationships imply that in the aftermath of a bank failure, the effects can easily 
spillover to other banks as well as other industries. The recent subprime loan crisis is a 
good example6. However, this study will not address the crisis because it does not happen 
during the sample period of this thesis. Nevertheless, the method used in this dissertation 
could be easily transferred to study the subprime loan crisis in future studies.  
 
                                                   
6 The subprime loan crisis started from early 2007. It was first triggered by a dramatic rise in mortgage 
delinquencies and foreclosures in the United States. The burst of the housing market in the U.S. led to 
major adverse consequences for banks and financial markets around the globe because the mortgage 
backed securities and their derivatives were widely hold by financial institutions around the world. The 
crisis caused panic in financial markets and trillions of dollars were fled from risky mortgage bonds and 
shaky equities. Some of the money had been invested into food and raw materials, contributing to the world 
food price crisis and oil price increases. The increased food and raw material prices caused supply-driven 
inflation and posed much pressure on the real economy. At the same time, with the worsening of the 
subprime mortgage market, financial firms around the globe had to continue writing down their holdings of 
subprime related securities. These losses have wiped out much of the capital of the world banking system 
and forced banks to seek additional funds and reduce lending to businesses and households to maintain its 
minimum capital adequacy. When Lehman Brothers and other important financial institutions failed in 
September 2008, the subprime loan crisis finally evolved into a credit crisis. The money market was subject 
to a bank run and the interbank lending yield soared. This credit freeze brought the global financial system 
to the brink of collapse and spread to the business and household by much less credit and much higher 
borrowing costs.   
 13
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
     2.1. Empirical Results Regarding Default Risk and Equity Returns 
As noted earlier, the finance literature contains a long list of studies attempting to 
analyze the relationship between default risk of bonds and bond pricing. In contrast, the 
impact of default risk on equity values is not as thoroughly investigated. Moreover, the 
empirical conclusions of these studies have been at odds with each other and often 
confusing.   
One of the earliest published studies on the relationship between default risk and 
equity returns can be traced to Altman (1969). He created a Stockholder Profitability 
Index (SPI) to analyze the effect of bankruptcy on shareholders’ wealth. The nominator 
of the index is the future returns of the securities discounted by the shareholders’ 
opportunity costs. The denominator is the value of the investment. The index explicitly 
considered time and opportunity cost variables. An SPI of unity (1.0) indicates that an 
investor has achieved returns exactly equal to his investment. An SPI score below unity 
indicates below investment returns, and a score of zero indicates a complete loss of the 
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investment. He analyzed the corporations that had petitioned the courts to reorganize 
under the rules of the National Bankruptcy Act between 1941 and 1965. The study 
documented that a higher default risk was compensated by higher equity returns during 
the sample period.  
However, Arbel, Kolodny, and Lakonishok (1977) rejected the hypothesis that 
default risk is priced. They tested the impact of default risk on the value of equity 
securities in the context of the CAPM model. The study sought to determine whether the 
beta in the CAPM model incorporated default risk that could not be diversified away. If 
systematic default risk were included in the beta, the residuals after fitting the CAPM 
model would be a function of default risk, which was measured by unsecured debt rating 
in their paper. To test their hypothesis, the authors divided their sample firms into 
portfolios with different default risk by bond ratings. In order to eliminate the effects of 
specific collateral on ratings, only companies in the CRSP database with a rating for 
unsecured debt were included in their sample, which ranged from 1967 to 1973. They 
further created portfolios with specific betas by assigning weights to the securities in the 
portfolios according to a linear programming model to create a number of iso-beta 
portfolios. The iso-beta portfolios enable the direct comparison of the residuals of 
portfolios with identical betas but different credit ratings. They then computed the 
average excess returns of these iso-beta portfolios based on the CAPM model. The study 
did not find that the mean abnormal returns of the iso-beta portfolios with higher default 
risk were greater than the lower default risk iso-beta portfolios.   
Best (1992) stratified his sample firms into different portfolios by bond ratings 
and used the yield spread of the portfolios as measures of default risk. The study found 
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that default risk was priced. Best’s study ranged for the 11-year period from 01/1979 to 
12/1989. He introduced a simple risk-neutrality-based model to study the role of default 
risk in determining security returns. He assumed that investors are risk neutral, so that in 
equilibrium the expected returns on all securities equals the risk-free rate. He then 
expressed the excess returns of an equity as a function of the yield spread of its debt. If 
default risk is priced in the excess equity returns, then the coefficient of the yield spread 
of debt should be significantly different from zero after adjusting for the systematic 
market risk. This study found that the yield spread of risky versus riskless bonds explains 
a significant portion of the variation of the observed risk premiums for the equity with 
AA to CCC ratings. 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) studied the effect of the changes of bond rating 
on equity returns using a sample of 637 ratings changes by Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s from 1977 to 1982. They documented a negative abnormal stock return in a two-
day window after a rating agency downgraded a stock. The negative abnormal returns 
were found to be significant even after controlling for the possible effect due to 
concurrent bad news. However, there was little evidence of abnormal performance on the 
announcement of an upgrade. Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) found similar 
results using daily equity market data on the warnings of possible rating changes, which 
are from both the additions to Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List between 1981 and 
1983, and the actual rating changes announced by Moody's and Standard and Poor's 
between 1977 and 1982. Employing a sample group that comprised almost all of the 
Moody’s bond rating changes during the 1970-1997 period, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) 
studied the long-run stock returns after the change of a bond rating, including three 
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months, six months, one year, two years and three years abnormal stock returns after the 
bond rating change. They found no statistically significant abnormal returns after the 
upgrade of the bond rating but significantly negative abnormal returns after the 
downgrade of the bond rating, especially at the first month. The magnitudes of the 
negative abnormal returns were about -10% to -14% at the one-year horizon.  
It is interesting to understand more why some studies found that the low-credit-
risk firms realized higher returns than did the high-credit-risk firms. Vassalou and Xing 
(2002) argued that the anomaly of the negative relation between default risk and 
abnormal returns was due to the methods used in previous studies. They employed the 
Merton model to calculate the default risk of firms each month using the data of publicly 
listed firms during the 01/1971 to 12/1999 period. The default risk measure in their study 
is the default likelihood indicator (DLI), which is a measure of default risk based on the 
normal distribution of distance to default, a measure derived from the Merton model. 
They showed that firms with increasing DLI earned higher subsequent returns than firms 
with decreasing DLI. In order to explain the results of previous studies which showed 
that the downgrades of firms’ bond ratings are related with negative abnormal equity 
returns, Vassalou and Xing first replicated the empirical studies by Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986), Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992), and Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001). They confirmed the results of these studies.  They then showed that the DLI for 
the downgrades started increasing about two to three years prior to the downgrades, and 
reached their peak at the date of the announcement of the downgrades. After reaching the 
peak around the downgrade announcement date, the DLI started decreasing at about the 
same rate at which it increased in the first place. Therefore, the equity returns following a 
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downgrade were lower since after the downgrade, the DLI began to decrease, and the 
firm’s default risk was in fact reducing. They further showed that if the equity returns 
were adjusted not only for size and BM but also for the DLI, the short-horizon negative 
abnormal equity returns found in Dichev and Piotroski (2001) disappeared. Vassalou and 
Xing also documented that many of the firms that experienced a downgrade were bound 
to be downgraded again in the three-year period following the initial downgrade. When 
this fact is taken into account, any abnormal negative returns in the two to three year time 
horizon also disappeared. 
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova et al. (2007) explained the puzzled relationship 
between the lower credit risk and the higher returns from the aspects of performance 
momentum and market friction. Based on a sample of 3578 NYSE, AMSE, and 
NASDAQ firms rated by Standard and Poor’s over the July 1985 to December 2003 
period, they showed it was only in periods of financial distress that low- credit-risk firms 
realized higher returns around credit rating downgrades than high-credit-risk firms. They 
believed that the different response of high- and low-credit-risk stocks to rating change 
might contribute to the negative relation between credit risk and stock returns. More 
specifically, during the economic contraction periods, low-grade firms tend to have 
considerably worse profits in the future, but this does not exist among high-grade firms. 
However, the participants in the financial market do not anticipate the deteriorating 
performance of the low-grade firms when the downgrades happen. Therefore, low-rated 
firms experience considerable price drops even after the downgrades because of the 
further deteriorating performance. Furthermore, the selling pressure from the institutional 
investors further worsens this price decrease. There may thus be mispricing existing in 
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the market. However, it is difficult to arbitrage any mispricing away because low-rated 
stocks tend to be small, highly illiquid, and covered by very few analysts. The incomplete 
arbitrage leads to the possible persistent mispricing of the low credit firms.  
Dichev (1998) investigated whether the distress risk factor was priced and the 
relation of the default risk factor to size and book-to-market using industrial firms listed 
on the NYSE, AMSE, and Nasdaq from 1981 to 1995. Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1969) 
and Ohlson’s O-score (Ohlson, 1980) were used as proxies for bankruptcy risk. Both the 
portfolio and the regression results were reported. For the portfolio analysis, sample firms 
were sorted into ten sub-portfolios each month by their Z-score or O-score, respectively. 
The one year-ahead monthly returns, market capitalization, and BM were reported for 
each sub-portfolio. The regression model includes Z-score or O-score, market 
capitalization, and BM. The regression was run each month across the sample period. The 
coefficients reported were the average of the coefficients of the regression results each 
month. The study showed that firms with higher bankruptcy risk earned abnormally low 
returns during the 1981-1995 period. The paper also found that the distressed sample 
firms tended to have high book-to-market ratios, but the most distressed firms had low 
book-to-market ratios.  In addition, the paper pointed out that the size effect almost 
disappeared after the 1980s. The author further claimed that mispricing is the reason for 
the negative relation between default risk and equity returns. Using industrial firms listed 
on NYSE, AMSE, and Nasdaq from 1965 to 1996, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) also 
documented a negative relation between default risk and equity returns employing O-
score as the proxy of default risk.  
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Vassalou and Xing (2004) explored whether default risk is priced in equity returns 
by employing a proxy of default risk calculated from the Merton model. They argued that 
as compared with yield spreads, bond ratings, and accounting models, the default risk 
measure from the Merton model is better in that it is forward looking, can be updated 
frequently, and considers the asset value volatility. Sorting method was used in their 
paper on the sample firms from the CRSP and the COMPUSTAT sources from 01/1971 
to 12/1999. They found that a typical stock with higher default risk tends to be small and 
have higher book to market ratios. They also found that small size firms with high book 
to market ratios earned significantly higher returns when they had higher default risk. In 
the end, they explored the pricing effect of default risk. They included the default risk 
measure in the CAPM model and the Fama French three-factor model respectively to test 
whether default risk is priced and whether the FF factors (SMB and HML) measure 
default risk. The testing results indicated that stocks with high default likelihood earned 
abnormally high returns in a one-month window. Furthermore, SMB and HML did 
contain some default-related information, but they also appeared to contain other 
information, which is unrelated to default risk.  
Employing a similar method and sample period to that used by Vassalou and Xing, 
Da and Gao (2006) extended the equity returns from the next one month up to the next 
six months. They showed that the positive relation between default risk and equity returns 
documented by Vassalou and Xing (2004) are mostly significant in the first-month of 
default risk shock. However, the difference between the returns of the high default risk 
portfolios and the low default risk portfolios are not that significant after the first month. 
They further argued that the sharp rise of a firm’s default risk would trigger a clientele 
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change in its underlying stockholders because institutional shareholders are restricted to 
invest only in better quality stocks. As a result, the increased default risk would force 
institutional investors to sell stocks in a short period. However, it is unlikely to find ready 
buyers for those high-risk stocks. The imbalance between supply and demand results in a 
temporary liquidity shock. They claimed that the first-month abnormal returns 
documented in Vassalou and Xing (2004) is largely due to the temporary liquidity shock.  
Employing the hazard rate model similar to the one used by Shumway (2001), 
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005) explored the determinants of corporate failure.  
The sample firms in the study included default data of the U.S. firms over the 40-year 
period from 1963 to 2003.They found that firms with higher leverage, lower profitability, 
lower market capitalization, lower past stock returns, more volatile past stock returns, 
lower cash holdings, higher book-to-market ratios (BM), and lower prices per share were 
more likely to default. These variables are used as the independent variables in the 
forecasting model. They calculated the default probability using the model and the 
calculated probability of default was then used to test the pricing of financially distressed 
stocks. The study showed that since 1981, financially distressed stocks had earned large 
negative returns. The authors interpreted the negative relation between default risk and 
equity returns as the evidence of market inefficiency.  
Chava and Purnanandam (2007) tested the pricing effect of default risk by using 
default risk proxy derived from various models, including the Merton model, the 
leverage-volatility model and the O-score model. They restricted the sample to the firms 
listed on AMSE, NYSE, and NASDAQ stock exchanges and with shares coded 10 and 11 
in the CRSP database. The sample period ranged from 1953-2006. They first replicated 
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the study by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2005) using the post-1980 data. They then 
tested the pre-1980 samples and the whole sample period. Different from the results 
drawn by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005),   Chava and Purnanandam (2007) did 
not find reliable evidence of under-performance of high distress risk stocks. They further 
defined a proxy of expected returns using implied cost of capital and earnings forecast 
available from the I/B/E/S database. They documented a significant and positive default 
risk premium using this proxy of expected returns. In addition, they found that if 
investors buy and hold distressed stocks for five years, rather than annual re-balancing, 
the negative abnormal returns disappeared. 
The rapid development of the credit derivatives market and increased availability 
of secondary market prices of credit derivatives provides researchers an alternative 
approach to construct default risk measures. Using the price information from credit 
derivatives prices, Chan-Lau (2006) found that systematic default risk is an important 
determinant of equity returns. 
     2.2. Why Industrial and Business Cycle Factors Matters 
One common aspect of default proxies used in previous studies is that they mostly 
only considered the probability of default (PD) of a company. However, default risk is at 
least two-dimensional, including both the probability of default (PD) and the loss given 
default (LGD). The PD is the likelihood that a borrower will default over a certain period. 
The LGD refers to the loss as a percentage of the exposure at the default point. The 
product of the PD and the LGD is the expected loss as a percentage of exposure at default 
(%EL).  
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The PD and the LGD are related with each other in that the better quality 
borrower (less PD) is more likely to repay its debt. Altman, Brady, Resti et al. (2005) 
provided evidence that high aggregate default rates are usually accompanied by low 
recovery rates and high LGD rates. Hu and Perraudin (2002) also documented a negative 
correlation between aggregate default rate and recovery. Although there is evidence of a 
positive relationship between the PD and the LGD, such a relationship is not an absolute 
one. While the PD measures the default probability of a borrower, the LGD measures the 
loss of debt of a borrower in the case of default. A borrower can have multiple debts and 
each one may have different level of the LGD because of different collateral conditions 
and the covenants.   
Four factors affect the LGD. They are the presence and quality of collaterals, the 
seniority of debt, industry and the timing of the business cycle (Schuermann, 2004). 
Collaterals are important because creditors have the right to sell the collaterals to pay for 
the debt in the case of default. Therefore, secured debts usually have less LGD than the 
unsecured ones. The reason that debt seniority is important in deciding the LGD is due to 
the existence of the absolute priority rule (APR). The bankruptcy laws in many countries, 
including the U.S., have an important feature called the APR, which means that in the 
case of bankruptcy, the senior creditors need to be fully paid before any distributions are 
made to the junior ones. The common shareholders are only paid after all the creditors 
and the preferred shareholders are satisfied. Although the APR rule is frequently violated 
in practice due to the compromise between creditors and shareholders, still the senior 
creditors will expect more compensation and thus less loss given default. This situation 
explains why bank loans tend to have less LGD than that of bonds since bank loans are 
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typically senior in the capital structure. However, seniority appears not to be as important 
as collateral. Business cycle is another important factor. Studies showed that recoveries 
are systematically lower in recessions, and the difference can be as large as one third 
lower in recession than in expansion (Schuermann (2004)). An obligor’s industry is the 
fourth important factor affecting the LGD.  In a late 2006 study7, Fitch pointed out that 
 “Industry characteristics, such as differences in industry-average ratios of 
secured to unsecured debt, average collateral quality, the typical length and 
severity of industry cycles, and firm-specific prospects at particular points in 
an industry’s cycle, can all contribute to divergent recovery expectations”.  
 
The LGD is mainly determined by collaterals and seniority of debts in the capital 
structure. Besides collaterals and debt seniority, the LGD is also related with industry and 
business cycle.  
The %EL is a more comprehensive measure of default risk. In practice, large 
banks employing internal risk rating models tend to use the two dimensional models, 
which include the estimation of both the PD and the LGD (Treacy and Carey, 1998). It is 
tempting to combine the PD and the LGD as the measure of default risk, but most studies 
have only used the PD as the default risk proxy. The reason is probably that finding 
public information about collaterals and debt seniority, two main determinants of the 
LGD, is difficult, not to mention we need the information for thousands of firms usually 
included in the study on the default risk effect. Even though it is hard to use collaterals 
and debt seniority information to derive a proxy of the LGD, it is possible to incorporate 
the LGD information indirectly through industrial and business cycle factors since they 
both are main determinants of the LGD and they are public information.  
                                                   
7 The title of the study is ‘Recovery Ratings Reveal Diverse Expectations for Loss in the Event of Default’ which 
can be found by the following link: 
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=304814 
 24
Not many studies were focused on studying the role of industry and business cycle in 
deciding the LGD. Among the limited ones, Gupton and Stein (2005) showed that the 
industry factor and the macro-economy factor 8are two main factors to predict a company’s 
LGD in the LossCalc™ model, a Moody's KMV model to predict the LGD. The other 
important factors include collaterals, debt seniority, and firm status. Altman and Kishore 
(1996) found evidence that some industries, such as the utility industry, usually have lower 
LGD than others do. Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2003) found that the recovery rate of 
a distressed industry is 10% to 20% lower than that of a healthy industry. They suggested that 
in order to capture recovery risk, credit risk models require an industry factor in addition to 
the factor representing a firm’s value. Frye (2000), using Moody’s data, showed that in 
recessions, recovery is about a third lower than that in expansions. The above studies provide 
evidence of the importance of the industry and the business cycle factors in predicting the 
LGD. 
Only a few studies of the default risk effect considered the LGD factor. Garlappi, 
Shu and Yan (2006) were among the first to acknowledge the importance of 
incorporating the LGD in studying the default risk effect. They first tested the 
relationship between the PD and stock returns by directly employing the Expected 
Default Frequency (EDF), a proprietary PD measure, from Moody’s KMV. They found 
that the relationship between the default risk measure and equity returns are mostly 
significant in the first month after a default risk shock, a result similar to the one 
documented by Da and Gao (2006). They further proposed that the potential recovery for 
                                                   
8 According to Gupton, G. M. and R. M. Stein (2005), industry factor includes two sub-factors: (1) Historical 
average of industry recoveries, and (2) the average distance-to-default across many firms at the industry and 
regional level. The purpose of the first sub-factor is to set a base level. The second sub-factor is to provide a 
forward-looking indication of the direction of the credit cycle. Macro-economy factor also includes two sub-
factors: (1) Regional flags (i.e., Asia, Canada, Europe, Latin America, United Kingdom, and United States), and 
(2) the average distance-to-default across many firms at the industry and regional level.  
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shareholders should be considered when studying the default risk effect. They also 
suggested that shareholders’ advantage in renegotiating with debt-holders in the event of 
financial distress incorporates the recovery information. According to the study, a 
shareholder with more bargaining power have the following characteristics: a larger asset 
base, lower R&D expenditures, higher liquidation costs proxied by asset specificity, and 
a lower book-to-market ratio. Using the above variables as proxies for shareholder 
advantage, they showed that default risk positively relates with stock returns for 
distressed firms where shareholders could extract little benefit from renegotiating with 
the debt holders; the relationship is not significant for distressed firms with stronger 
shareholder advantage. Although the study by Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2006) implied that 
the LGD is important, it did not explicitly acknowledge the importance of the LGD in 
studying the relationship between default risk and equity returns. In fact, the low book-to-
market ratio and the high asset specificity used in the study to measure shareholders’ 
advantage may have an adverse effect on the LGD of a company because a low book-to-
market ratio and high asset specificity are related with less available collaterals and a 
higher haircut9 applying to the collaterals. 
George and Hwang (2007) argued that the negative relation between default risk 
and equity returns is spurious. “The risk that is priced in equity markets is related to 
financial distress costs, rather than the occurrence of financial distress itself.” They 
suggested that leverage ratio can be used as an indicator of the extent of exposure to 
financial distress costs. The lower the leverage ratio, the higher a firm’s financial distress 
costs would be because the firm is more likely to choose lower leverage if it faces high 
                                                   
9 In finance, a haircut is a percentage that is subtracted from the par value of assets used as collaterals. The size 
of the haircut reflects the perceived risk associated with holding the assets. 
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financial distress costs. The authors documented a negative relationship between 
raw/risk-adjusted returns and leverage ratio. However, leverage ratio may be a noisy 
proxy for financial distress costs because it is also related with probability of default. The 
noise may explain why the conclusion in George and Hwang (2007) is contrary to what 
was found by Bhandari (1988), who documented a positive relationship between financial 
leverage and average returns during a different testing period. Nevertheless, the study by 
George and Hwang (2007) did indicate that the LGD is important in the relationship 
between default risk and equity returns since the LGD is an important determinant of 
financial distress.  
This dissertation will use the PD as a proxy of default risk, but it will also 
incorporate the LGD information indirectly by grouping the sample firms into different 
industries and dividing the sample period into the economic expansion and the economic 
contraction stages.  
     2.3. About the Merton Approach 
There are a number of ways to estimate the PD. Moody’s KMV, for example, uses a 
modified Merton model; Vassalou and Xing (2004) adopted a similar model to the one used 
by Moody’s KMV; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2005) employed a hazard model to 
estimate default risk. Researchers also map agency rating or the results from credit scoring 
models to the empirical PD. This thesis will use the modified Merton model similar to the 
one used in the paper of Vassalou and Xing (2004)  .  
Black and Scholes (1973) proposed an innovative work of the option-pricing theory, 
in which a firm’s equity can be seen as a call option on the firm’s assets. Black and 
Scholes (1973)’s work was further elaborated by Merton (1973), Merton (1974), Black 
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and Cox (1976) and Ingersoll (1977) and has come to be called “the Merton model.” 
Empirical studies applied the Merton model did not perform so well in predicting the 
actual default rate. In 1984, however, Vasicek (1984) took a novel approach to 
implementing the Merton model, which has proven to have considerable success in 
measuring credit risk. Different from the original Merton model, the Vasicek Model 
primary focuses on the probability of default of the company as a whole, rather than the 
valuation of debt.  KMV Corporation developed the commercialized credit risk-rating 
model based on the Vasicek-Kealhofer model in the late 1980s (Vasicek, 1984; Kealhofer, 
2003; Kealhofer, 2003). KMV maps the distance-to-default measure from the Vasicek-
Kealhofer model to an empirical distribution of probability of default to generate the 
commercially available Expected Default Frequency (EDF) measure.  
Before Moody’s acquired KMV Corporation, the researchers at Moody’s launched a 
number of attacks on the KMV model. To answer these attacks, Kealhofer and Kurbat 
(2001) compared the default prediction power of the KMV model, relative to the debt 
rating model and the accounting variable model which were used by Moody’s at that time. 
They showed that the KMV approach had better prediction power in measuring default 
risk. Arora, Bohn and Zhu (2005) compared the predicting power of the structural (the 
Vasicek-Kealhofer model and the basic Merton model) and the reduced form (the Hull-
White model) default predicting models. They found that the Vasicek-Kealhofer model is 
at least as good as the Hull-White model in discriminating defaulters from non-defaulters. 
They pointed out that for the reduced-form model, “the quality and quantity of data make 
a difference”. The inconsistent results due to different specification of the reduced form 
models in the previous literature approve the statement.  
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Moody’s acquired KMV in April 2002 and the KMV model is now sold to 
subscribers by Moody’s KMV. The very fact that Moody’s adopts the Merton model 
probably suggests that the Merton model is appropriate in measuring default probability.  
One major advantage of the Merton model relative to the reduced form model is that 
the default probability measure derived from the Merton model is forward-looking 
because it uses the market value of a firm’s equity to calculate its default probability. 
Market prices contain forward-looking information of the firm, which reflects investors’ 
expectations about the firm’s future performance.  
The above section briefly introduced the history of the modified Merton model. 
Chapter III will detail the derivation of the model.  
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CHAPTER III 
III. MODEL AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
  
 
 
     Three questions are addressed in this chapter: first, how to measure default risk; 
second, the industrial decomposition of the relationship between the default risk measure 
and equity returns; and third, the spillover effect of default risk.  
     3.1. Measure of Default Risk - The Merton Model 
This dissertation employs a modified Merton model similar to the one used by 
Moody’s KMV. The model is widely used in academic studies and practice to estimate 
the default probability of a company (Vassalou and Xing, 2002; Crosbie and Bohn, 2003; 
Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Arora, Bohn and Zhu, 2005; Bharath and Shumway, 2004; 
Chan-Lau and Sy, 2006; Chen and Chollete, 2006; Da and Gao, 2006; Garlappi, Shu and 
Yan, 2006; and other studies). For a better understanding of the mechanism of the 
modified Merton model, this thesis details the derivation process of the model.  
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          3.1.1. Derivation of Distance to Default (DD) 
Equity holders are only entitled to the residual interest of a firm at any time, with 
respect to the income statement as well as the balance sheet. A call option on the 
underlying assets has the same property as the rights equity holders own. Black and 
Scholes (1973) actually demonstrated that a firm’s equity could be seen as a call option 
on the firm’s assets. In the framework of option pricing model, shareholders are the 
buyers of the call option and creditors are the underwriters of the call option; The book 
value of the firm’s liabilities is the strike price of the option. If the value of the firm’s 
assets is insufficient to meet its liabilities, the shareholders will not exercise their options 
and instead they will turn over the assets of the firm to their creditors. On the other hand, 
if the value of the firm’s assets exceeds its obligations, the shareholders will exercise 
their option by paying off the debt holders and keeping any excess value for themselves. 
Merton (1974) generalized the option pricing process, on which KMV Corporation 
developed its proprietary default forecasting model in the late 1980s, where the default 
probability is defined as the probability that the market value of a firm’s assets falls 
below its default point.  
According to the Merton model, the probability of default of a firm can be written 
mathematically as:  
 
, ,0 , ,0Pr[ | ] Pr[ln ln | ]t A t t A A A t t A Ap V X V V V X V V= ≤ = = ≤ =  (3.1) 
Where 
tp : probability of default by time t; 
,A tV : the market value of the firm’s assets at time t 
tX : the book value of the firm’s liabilities mature at time t 
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ln: the natural log.  
The weak efficient market hypothesis suggests that present price of an asset fully 
reflected the past information and the market responds immediately to any new 
information about the asset. Under the weak efficient market hypothesis, the 
unanticipated changes in the asset price follow a Markov process. A Wiener process10 is a 
type of the Markov process, which is commonly used in modeling the stochastic 
processes in finance. It decomposes a stochastic process into two parts. One part is 
predictable, deterministic, and anticipated and the second part models the random change 
in the stochastic process in response to external shocks.  
It is tempting but not appropriate to assume the stock price itself follows a 
generalized Wiener process because a change of 1 point is much more significant when 
the asset price is 10 points than when it is 200 points. It is more reasonable to assume that 
the expected returns of a stock follow a Wiener process because investors are more 
concerned about the expected percentage returns, which is independent of the stock’s 
price. Mathematically, the expected returns on a firm’s underlying assets follow a 
generalized Wiener process of the following form:  
 A A
A
dV
dt dW
V
µ σ= +  (3.2) 
Where VA is a firm’s asset value; AdV is the change in the firm’s asset value; µ is the 
firm’s asset value drift, a measure of the average rate of growth of the firm’s asset value; 
Aσ  is the firm’s asset volatility and dW is a standard Wiener process. Equation (3.2) 
                                                   
10 A Wiener process is a type of Markov stochastic process with a mean change of zero and a variance rate of 1.0. 
It is also known as a Brownian motion. The process has been used in physics to describe the motion of a particle 
that is subject to a large number of small molecular shocks.    
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implies that the expected return has a constant expected drift rate and a constant variance 
rate.  
Equation (3.2) can be rewritten to the form:  
 A A A AdV V dt V dWµ σ= +  (3.3) 
As per the above equation, the change of asset value is composed of two parts: a 
predictable and a deterministic component related to time t ( AV dtµ ) and a random change 
in the asset value in response to external shocks, which is assumed to follow a Wiener 
process ( A AV dWσ ).   
The stock price is commonly modeled as a lognormal distribution rather than a 
normal distribution. Itô’s lemma can be used to derive the process followed by ln AV  
when AV  follows the process in Equation (3.3). 
 Itô’s lemma relates the small change in a function of a random variable to the small 
change in the variable itself. It can be written as the following form.  
1. One independent variable: Suppose that ( )f S  is a function of a stochastic process 
S; σ  is the standard deviation of S; µ  is the drift of S. Itô’s lemma is: 
 
2
2 2
2
1
2
df df d f
df S dW S S dt
dS dS d S
σ µ σ
 
= + + 
 
 (3.4) 
2. Two independent variables: Suppose that ( , )f S t is a function of stochastic 
process S and of time t; σ  is the standard deviation of S; µ  is the drift of S.  Itô’s 
lemma is:  
 
2
2 2
2
1
2
f f f f
df S dW S S dt
S S S t
σ µ σ
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 (3.5) 
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Assuming ( ) lnA Af V V= . Using Equation (3.4), ( )Af V  can be written as:  
 2
1
ln
2A A A
df d V dW dtσ µ σ = = + − 
 
 (3.6) 
The item df means the small change of f. Since dW follows a normal distribution, 
df is also normally distributed. The function f can be seen as the sum of many small 
changes of df . In the limit, the sum becomes an integral. Since the sum of normal 
variables is also normal, , ,0( ) ( )A t Af V f V− is also a normal distribution. The term 
, ,0( ) ( )A t Af V f V− has mean 
21
2 A
tµ σ − 
 
 and variance 2Atσ . The term , ,0( ) ( )A t Af V f V− can 
be expressed as: 
 
2
, ,0 , ,0
2
, ,0
1
( ) ( ) ln ln
2
1
ln ln
2
A t A A t A A A
A t A A A
f V f V V V t t
V V t t
µ σ σ ε
µ σ σ ε
 − = − = − + ⇒ 
 
 = + − + 
 
 (3.7) 
Where ε ~N(0,1).  
Substituting Equation (3.7) into Equation (3.1) can get the theoretical default 
probability: 
 
, ,0
2
,0 ,0
,0 2
Pr[ln ln | ]
1
Pr[ln ln | ]
2
1
ln
2
Pr
t A t t A A
A A A t A A
A
A
t
A
p V X V V
V t t X V V
V
t
X
t
µ σ σ ε
µ σ
ε
σ
= ≤ =
 = + − + ≤ = 
 
  + −  
  = ≤ −
 
 
 
 
(3.8) 
The residual term ε  in Equation (3.8) is often assumed to follow a normal 
distribution in the academic studies. Vassalou and Xing (2004) name the default 
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probability in Equation (3.8) as the default likelihood indicator (DLI). This dissertation 
will follow their convention.   
Equation (3.8) can be defined in terms of the cumulative normal distribution, N(.).   
 
,0 21ln ( )
2
A
A
t
t
A
V
t
X
p N
t
µ σ
σ
 
+ − 
 = −
 
 
 
 (3.9) 
The distance-to-default (DD) is defined by Equation (3.10).  
 
,0 21ln
2
A
A
t
t
A
V
t
X
DD
t
µ σ
σ
 + − 
 =  (3.10) 
The DD is simply the number of standard deviations of a firm that is away from the 
default point within a specified time horizon. It is an ordinal measure of the firm’s default 
risk. The DLI ( tp ) is the cumulative default probability within a given time period under 
normal distribution assumption. It is a monotone function of the distance to default. The 
adjustment term “ 2
1
2 A
tµ σ − 
 
” is the increase in the natural log of the asset value from 
time 0 to t.  
 Crouhy, Galai, Mark (2000) provided a wonderful graphic demonstration of 
distance of default, which is shown in Figure 2 (See Appendix A, Figure 2 for detail).   
It is worth pointing out that the real default probability does not follow a normal 
distribution. Assuming a normal distribution to derive default probability neglects the 
nonlinear relationship between the distance-to-default measure and default probability. 
That is why Moody’s KMV does not assume a distribution of PD at all in its model. 
Rather, it maps the calculated distance to default to actual default probability derived 
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from the thousands of default cases in its database11. However, this study neither has 
access to the empirical default distribution nor needs the empirical information because 
what this dissertation is interested in is to rank firms by their relative probability of 
default, not the actual probability of default. Thus, neglecting the nonlinear relation will 
not affect our analysis.  
 Chan-Lau and Sy (2006) proposed the distance-to-capital as an alternative tool to 
forecasting bank default risk. The distance-to-capital is constructed the same way as the 
distance-to-default except that the default point is proposed as the capital thresholds, 
which is defined by the prompt-correction-action (PCA) frameworks. PCAs are typically 
rules-based frameworks, where rules are based on specific levels of a bank’s risk-
adjusted capital. The most commonly used capital threshold is the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio defined by the Basel II. This study uses the distance-to-default to derive 
the PD measure for two reasons: First, this thesis is a study on different industries. 
Adopting the same method to calculate the PD will facilitate the comparison across 
industries; second, the effectiveness of the distance-to-capital measure depends to a large 
extent on whether the bank regulators comply with the prompt-correction-action (PCR) 
framework or not. In reality, the political or the too-big-to-fail concern often prevents 
bank regulators from closing a poorly capitalized bank. From this aspect, the distance-to-
default measure may be a more objective proxy to rank the default risk of the banking 
firms.   
                                                   
11 The database of Moody’s KMV includes over 250,000 company-years of data and over 4,700 incidents of 
bankruptcy. A lookup table can be generated from the data. The lookup table relates the likelihood of default to 
various levels of distance-to-default. - Crosbie, P. and J. Bohn (2003). Modeling Default Risk. Moody's KMV.   
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          3.1.2. Estimating the Parameters to Calculate Distance to Default  
To empirically calculate the DD of a firm, one needs to know or estimate t , tX ,µ , 
,0AV , and Aσ . The letter t  stands for the time horizon to forecast the DD; tX is the default 
point of the firm, which is defined as the book value of the firm’s liabilities due at time t; 
µ is the drift of the firm’s returns on assets; ,0AV is the present value of the firm’s assets; 
Aσ  is the asset volatility of the firm.  
Time t is assumed to be one year from the present in this thesis. The default point, tX , 
is defined as the sum of a firm’s current liabilities plus 50% of the long-term debts. The 
rationale for including the long-term debts is that firms need to continuously service the 
interest payment of their long-term debts, and the size of the long-term debts will affect 
the firms’ ability to roll-over their short-term liabilities. According to Moody’s KMV, 
50% is a reasonable choice which captures adequately the financing constraints on firms. 
This study does not consider the off-balance-sheet liabilities. According to Moody’s 
KMV, the revised Merton model is still effective, with the off-balance-sheet liabilities 
excluded.  
Someone may argue that the default point proxy used in this study neglects the fact 
that in reality the default point itself may be a random variable. For example, financial 
institutions often decrease their liabilities as they approach default because creditors 
would push them to do so out of the concern that the financial institutions do not have 
enough assets for liquidating in the case of default. Moreover, financial institutions may 
also decrease their leverage ratio on their own initiative to help themselves avoid high 
financial distress costs (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Although liabilities are random, it is 
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hard to model the path of liabilities. Using the book value of a firm’s liabilities due at 
time t as the proxy of default point is generally adopted in research studies as well as in 
practice.  
The difficulty in calculating the DD arises from the difficulty in estimating AV , 
µ and Aσ . The asset value ( AV ) is unobserved, creating problems for estimating the drift 
(µ ) and the volatility ( Aσ ) of the asset value.  
The Black-Scholes model is employed in this study to estimate  ,0AV and Aσ . While 
the model needs a number of assumptions12, it is easy to understand and provides a useful 
framework to study the research question in this study.  
Assuming the equity price VE follows the following function: 
 ( , )E E AV V V t=  (3.11) 
Equation (3.11) indicates that the equity price is a function of the underlying asset value 
and time t. Using Itô’s lemma (Equation (3.5)), the above equation can be written as:  
 2
2 2
2
1
2
E E E E
E A A A A A
A A A
V V V V
dV V dW V V dt
V V V t
δ δ δ δσ µ σ
δ δ δ δ
 
= + + + 
 
 (3.12) 
Since equity can be seen as a call option on a firm’s asset, the equity price of the firm can 
also be interpreted as the price of a call option. To avoid confusion, “option price” is used 
hereafter to refer to the equity price. Equation (3.12) is composed of two parts: a 
predictable and deterministic part related with time t 
                                                   
12 The main assumptions include: a firm has only equity and debt; the debt is a zero coupon bond, which has a 
face value of X and maturity of T; the capital market is frictionless; there are no restrictions on short sales; the 
asset trading is continuous and all asset prices follow continuous and stationary stochastic processes; the risk-free 
rate is constant over time and the firm pays no dividend.  
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) and a random change ( EA A
A
V
V dW
V
δ
σ
δ
) which 
gives the random walk followed by the option price EV .  
It is generally assumed that the change of the underlying asset price follows the 
following Wiener process:  
 
A A A AdV V dt V dWµ σ= +  (3.3) 
The two random walks in AV (Equation (3.3)) and EV  (Equation (3.12)) are both 
driven by the same random variable - dW . This fact can be exploited to construct a third 
variable π to eliminate the stochastic process - dW .  In this case, a portfolio with a share 
of stock held in a short position and a E
A
V
V
δ
δ
share of a corresponding asset value held in a 
long position would eliminate the stochastic process - dW . The value of the portfolio can 
be written as: 
 E
E A
A
V
V V
V
δ
π
δ
= − +  
(3.13) 
The change in the portfolio’s value in a short time period can then be written as:  
 E
E A
A
V
d dV dV
V
δ
π
δ
= − +
 
(3.14) 
By substituting Equation (3.3) and Equation (3.12) into Equation (3.14) and 
rearranging the items we can get:  
 2
2 2
2
1
2
E E
A A
A
V V
d V dt
t V
δ δπ σ
δ δ
 
= − − 
   
(3.15) 
The change of the value of the portfolio ( dπ ) in Equation (3.15) is deterministic in a 
short time period - dt .   
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Assuming no transaction costs, the returns on the amount π invested in riskless assets 
would see a growth of r dtπ  in a short time period, where r is the risk free rate. That is,  
 d r dtπ π=  (3.16) 
From Equation (15) and Equation (16) the following arbitrage condition could be 
achieved: 
 
2
2 2
2
1
2
E E
A A
A
V V
r dt V dt
t V
δ δπ σ
δ δ
 
= − − 
   
(3.17) 
If the right-hand size of the above equation (the change in value of the portfolio in a 
short period - dt ) is larger than the left-hand side (the profit from investing amount π in 
riskless assets), an arbitrager could borrow money to invest in the portfolio to make a 
riskless profit 
2
2 2
2
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2
E E
A A
A
V V
V dt r dt
t V
δ δ
σ π
δ δ
  
− − −  
  
. On the other hand, if the right-hand 
side is less than the left-hand side, the arbitrager could make a riskless profit by shorting 
the portfolio and investing the funds in the riskless assets.  
Substituting Equation (3.13) into Equation (3.17) and dividing both sides by dt , we 
can get: 
 
2
2 2
2
1
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E E E
E A A A
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rV V rV
t V V
δ δ δσ
δ δ δ
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(3.18) 
Equation (18) is the Black-Scholes partial differential equation. The market value of 
equity, EV , will then be given by the Black and Scholes (1973) formula for a call option:  
 1 2( ) ( )
rT
E AV V N d Xe N d
−= −  (3.19) 
where  
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   = , 2 1 Ad d Tσ= − , and r is the risk free interest rate. In the 
above equation EV  can be observed in the market. The variables AV  and Aσ  are still 
unknown and need to be estimated.  
Three approaches have been used to handle the problem in literature.  
The first approach is to impose another restriction on the arbitrage-free equilibrium 
condition of Equation (3.19). This approach was first employed by Jones, Mason and 
Rosenfeld (1984). and has also been advocated in a textbook by Hull (2006). 
The restriction is as follows:  
 AE
E
V
V
σ = ∆ Aσ  (3.20) 
where 
Eσ  is the volatility of a firm’s equity returns, and 
∆ is the hedge ratio in Equation (3.19), ∆ 1( )
E
A
V
N d
V
∂
= =
∂
 
A
E
V
V
is the firm’s market leverage. 
There are two unknowns, AV  and Aσ  in the Equations (3.19) and (3.20). 
Simultaneously solving the two equations can get AV  and Aσ  straightforwardly. 
The advantage of the above method is that it is based on the framework of arbitrage 
and is easy to understand. However, such a framework may cause the estimation of 
default probability to the undesired direction (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). More 
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specifically, when stock prices soar up, the default likelihood will be overestimated; 
when stock prices plunge, the likelihood will be underestimated.  
The default Equation (3.10) and Equation (3.21) can show this point more clearly.  
Equation (3.10) takes the following form: 
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 =  (3.10) 
Equation (3.20) can be rewritten as: 
 E E E AA E
A A E
V V V
V V V
σ
σ σ
∂
= =
∆ ∂
 (3.21) 
Equation (3.21) shows that if the stock prices soar up and E
A
V
V
goes up quickly, the 
asset volatility would be overestimated. Equation (3.10) shows that the overestimated 
asset volatility causes the distance to default to be understated and thus the DLI will be 
overstated. On the other hand, if the stock prices plunge, E
A
V
V
decreases quickly and the 
asset volatility will be underestimated. In this case, the firm’s distance to default will be 
overstated and the DLI will be underestimated. The soaring-up or plunging stock prices 
tend to be overshooting in short period and are usually followed by subsequent price 
adjustments to the opposite direction. If the next month’s returns is used as the proxy of 
the expected returns, such adjustments would cause current period high default risk 
(when the stock prices soar up) is related with negative returns and current period low 
default risk (when the stock prices plunge) is related with positive returns. Using the 
Merton model to derive a default risk measure, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2005) 
documented lower returns for distressed stocks, which is contrary to the findings of 
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Vassalou and Xing (2004). This is probably because Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi 
(2005) calculated the distance-to-default measure by the arithmetic approach discussed 
above.    
The second estimation is the maximum likelihood method proposed by Duan (1994) 
and Duan, Gauthier, Simonato et al. (2003). The method involves two steps. First, a 
likelihood function based on the observed equity values is derived. Second, with the 
likelihood function in place, the maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the 
mean, volatility parameters and asset value for the Merton’s model. According to Chan-
Lau (2006) there are two advantages of the maximum likelihood method over the option 
pricing model. First, the maximum likelihood method provides an estimate of the drift of 
the unobserved asset value process (µ ). Second, the method allows statistical inference 
to assess the quality of parameter estimates and/or perform testing on the hypotheses of 
interest. However, Vassalou and Xing (2002) showed that the properties of the DLI, and 
its ability to capture default risk do not depend on the estimate of µ. Besides, according to 
Chan-Lau (2006),  the option pricing model turns out to produce the point estimate 
identical to the maximum likelihood estimate.  
The third approach is based on an iterative scheme proposed by the KMV 
Corporation13. According to Moody’s KMV’s technical paper prepared by Crosbie and 
Bohn (2003),  
“The procedure uses an initial guess of the volatility to determine the asset 
value and to de-lever the equity returns. The volatility of the resulting asset 
returns is used as the input to the next iteration of the procedure that in turn 
determines a new set of asset values and hence a new series of asset returns. 
The procedure continues in this manner until it converges”.  
 
                                                   
13 Now is Moody’s KMV. 
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Crosbie and Bohn (2003) did not specify how to guess the initial value. This thesis 
follows the following iterative procedure to estimate AV  and Aσ . First, daily data from the 
past 12 months is used to estimate Eσ , which is proposed to be the initial guess of the 
asset volatility ( Aσ ) at time t. The assumed initial asset volatility Aσ  is then used in the 
Black-Scholes formula to determine the asset value AV  at time t. In this manner, a time-
series of AV  is obtained from a time-series of the Black-Scholes equations by adding and 
dropping a day in turn. This thesis will calculate the implied log returns on assets each 
day, and use that returns series to generate new estimates of Aσ  and µ. The calculated 
asset volatility will be used as the value of σA for the following iteration procedure that in 
turn determines a new set of asset values. The procedure is repeated until Aσ  converges. 
The tolerance level for convergence will be 0.001. Once the converged value of Aσ  is 
obtained, Equation (3.19) can be used to back out AV . The converged Aσ  and the 
corresponding AV  are then used in Equation (3.9) to obtain the DLI.   
This thesis will use the modified Merton model to estimate AV  and Aσ  because it is 
widely used in academic study and is a common practice adopted by banks in daily 
operation as well14,   
As mentioned above, µ is the firm’s asset value drift, a measure of the average rate of 
growth of the firm’s asset value. Vassalou and Xing 92004) employed the mean of the 
log returns, calculated by ,
,0
ln A t
A
V
V
, as a proxy forµ . This thesis adopts the Vassalou and 
                                                   
14 Numerous banks employ Moody’s KMV model in credit risk management. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision also considers exploiting the KMV-Merton model a viable practice. 
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Xing convention. It is worth pointing out that the arithmetic mean of ,
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approximation ofµ . The reason is that the distribution of ,
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and the standard deviation A tσ
15. Thus, the expected value of 
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 rather thanµ . There is no universally satisfactory practice to 
estimate the term µ in literature. According to Vassalou and Xing (2002), the properties 
of the theoretical default probability and its ability to capture default risk do not depend 
on the estimate of µ.   
     3.2. Default Risk and Equity Returns 
This study analyzes the relationship between equity returns and default risk, 
which is derived from the Merton model using market price information. Someone may 
argue that even though there is a positive relationship between default risk and equity 
returns, the relationship is questionable as the default risk measure, which is calculated 
using equity price information, automatically introduces a positive relationship between 
equity returns and default risk from the beginning. More specifically, when stock prices 
go up the equity returns will go down. Furthermore, the total asset will increase when 
stock prices increase and the distance-to-default measure will become larger and the 
default risk will thus decrease. Therefore, there is an introduced positive relationship 
between equity returns and default risk.  
                                                   
15 See Equation (3.7) for detail. 
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However, the criticism does not hold if we accept that the equity market is at least 
weak form efficient in that investment strategies based on historical share prices can not 
consistently generate excess returns. This study uses historical equity price information to 
derive the distance-to-default measure at month t and then analyzes the relationship 
between the distance-to-default measure and the equity returns at month t+1. Under the 
weak-form efficient market hypothesis, the historical stock prices do not include 
information about future stock prices. Therefore, this study does not have the alleged bias.  
Two issues will be addressed first before presenting the model to analyze the 
default risk effect on equity returns: first, how to define industry; and second, how to 
define different business stages.   
          3.2.1. Defining Industries  
 
This dissertation will group sample firms into different industries by the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. The SIC code was originally developed in the 1930s. 
Its purpose is to classify companies by their primary activity to facilitate the 
comparability of data across companies. Over the years, it was revised periodically to 
reflect the change of the U.S. economy's industrial composition and organization. The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) last updated the SIC in 1987 and the 1987 SIC 
system assigned companies into ten different divisions16. The North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) was adopted in 1997 to replace the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system. SIC and NAICS industry groupings are not directly 
                                                   
16 The ten divisions include: Division A - Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing ; Division B - Mining; Division C -
Construction; Division D - Manufacturing; Division E - Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And 
Sanitary Services; Division F - Wholesale Trade; Division G - Retail Trade; Division H - Finance, Insurance, 
And Real Estate; Division I - Services; Division J - Public Administration (Source: NAICS Association. 
http://www.naics.com/search.htm)   
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comparable since some SIC groups have been split in NAICS to allow for a high level of 
comparability in business statistics among the North American countries. There are two 
reasons why this dissertation adopts the SIC code rather than the NAICS code to define 
industry. First, using the SIC code to define industry is a common practice in empirical 
studies. Second, the data of this study ranges from 1971 to 2006, a period covered by the 
SIC system rather than the NAICS, which was adopted in 1997.  
However, the SIC code can be problematic17. The main problem is that the SIC 
codes collected by different agencies may be different. According to Kahle and Walkling 
(1996), nearly 80% of the SIC codes are classified differently within the CRSP and the 
COMPUSTAT databases at the four-digit level; while over 20% of the classification is 
different at the one-digit level. The SIC codes in the CRSP database are assigned mainly 
by the segment generating the most income. By contrast, Standard & Poor’s, the owner of 
the COMPUSTAT database, analyzes the product line breakout in a company’s 10-K or 
annual report and assigns the company a SIC code that it believes best describes the 
company’s business, services, or products. This thesis will group the sample firms into 
different industries by their SIC codes in the COMPUSTAT database, which provides 
better categorization of industry. Second, the SIC code of an individual company may 
change with the change of its business. To deal with the problem, the sample firms in this 
study are assigned to a certain industry at the end of year t based on their four-digit SIC 
code at year t-1 in the COMPUSTAT annual file. Yet, the cleaned data used in this study 
shows that such concern is unnecessary since the cleaned data includes no company with 
a changed industry classification during the sample period.   
                                                   
17 Similar problems exist for the NAICS code.  
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Another problem related with the 1987 SIC system is that the SIC codes tend to 
be configured more by similar manufacturing processes, rather than aggregate things that 
have competitive products, or compete for similar human resources. A petroleum- 
products-related firm, for example, gets a different code depending on whether it explores 
crude petroleum (mining), refines petroleum (manufacturing) or sells petroleum 
(wholesale trade) according to the 1987 SIC code. To deal with the problem, this thesis 
bases its industry definition mainly on the twelve-industry portfolio definition suggested 
by Fama and French18.  
In the Fama-French twelve-industry classification, both the banking industry and 
the non-bank financial industry are included in the money finance section. Although the 
non-bank financial industry is competing more and more with the banking industry 
nowadays in the traditional banking businesses, the most significant difference between 
the banking industry and the non-bank financial industry still exists. That is, the banking 
industry is highly regulated by national or even international banking regulatory agencies. 
Different from the banking industry, the non-bank financial institutions need to comply 
with much less regulations. For this reason, this thesis further divides the money finance 
sector defined by Fama and French into the bank and the non-bank financial sectors.  
There are thirteen industries considered in this thesis. The definitions and the 
four-digit SIC codes of these industries are listed in Table I (See Appendix B, Table I for 
detail).  
                                                   
18 More information can be found at:  http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html   
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          3.2.2. Defining Business Cycles 
This thesis uses the business stages defined by the NBER (National Bureau of 
Economic Research). Table II lists the economic expansion and the economic contraction 
stages of business cycles starting from 01/1971 to 12/2006.   
The “expansion” in this study is defined as the period from the previous trough to 
this peak and the “contraction” is defined as the period from this peak to the next trough. 
There are 432 sample months, 378 expansion months and 54 contraction months (See 
Appendix B, Table II for detail).  
          3.2.3. Industrial Decomposition of Default Risk and Equity Returns  
               A. Portfolio Analysis 
It is a generally accepted rule in investment that higher-risk assets would be 
compensated by higher portfolio returns. If default risk were important for the pricing of 
equities, we would expect that portfolios with different level of default risk would have 
significantly different returns.  
Results from portfolio analysis are presented to study the effect of default risk on 
equity returns. Portfolio analysis is important in studying the default risk effect in that it 
does not need any assumptions on the residue terms.   
As this dissertation discussed before, both industry and economic factors include 
important LGD information of default risk. This study therefore first divides the sample 
firms to thirteen industries based on their four-digit SIC code in the COMPUSTAT 
database at the beginning of  each month and then reports the portfolio results on the 
relationship between default risk and equity returns during the total sample period, the 
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economic expansion periods and the economic contraction periods. The aggregate DLI 
(ADLI) and the average returns of each portfolio across certain sample period are 
calculated as follows. At month t, the firms in an industrial group are assigned to one of 
the quintile portfolios based on the magnitude of their DLI estimation. Then the 
portfolios’ DLI and expected returns at month t are calculated by equally weighting DLIs 
and the subsequent realized monthly returns of individual stocks in the portfolios. The 
same calculation processes are repeated each month during the sample period. The 
aggregate portfolio DLI and returns are then calculated as the average DLI and returns 
across certain sample period(s), including the whole sample, the economic expansion 
periods, and the economic contraction periods. Besides the average portfolio DLI and 
returns, the average market value (MV), book-to-market (BM) value of each portfolio are 
calculated in a similar way. Size (MV) and book-to-market ratio (BM) are included as 
well because of their simplicity and the popularity in literatures as proxies of distress risk. 
The average standard deviation (SD) and the coefficient of variation (CV) 19 of the 
subsequent realized returns of a portfolio are also included. They provide the variation 
and the return adjusted variation information of the expected returns. The average 
standard deviation is calculated by first estimating the SD of the expected returns of a 
portfolio each month and then averaging the SD across the corresponding sample period. 
The reported CV is calculated by dividing the mean returns into the average standard 
deviation.   
                                                   
19 CV is the coefficient of variation, which is calculated as
s
CV
X
= , where s is the sample standard deviation 
and X is the sample mean.  
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               B. The regression analysis 
 
This study also presents the results from the regression analysis using the 
expected returns as the dependent variable and the DLI, size, BM and their squared terms 
and interaction terms as the independent variables. The model is consistent with that used 
in the Vassalou and Xing (2004) study. The main reason to include DLI, size and BM is 
that they are all widely documented in previous literature as proxies of distress risk.  
Two steps are involved in estimating the regression coefficients. In the first step, 
this study estimates an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression each month using all 
individual firm observations in a portfolio. The subsequent realized monthly stock returns 
(R) is used as the dependent variable and size (MV), square of MV (MV2), book-to-
market value (BM), square of BM (BM2), default risk measure (DLI), square of DLI 
(DLI2) and the interaction terms of MV and DLI (MVDLI) and of BM and DLI (BMDLI) 
are used as the independent variables. The regression model takes the following form:  
 
2 2 2
, 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 1          
i t t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t t
R MV MV BM BM DLI DLI
MVDLI BMDLI
α γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ ε
+
+
= + + + + + +
+ + +
 (3.22)
The estimated coefficients in the regression model vary stochastically through time. The 
expected values of the estimated coefficients suggest whether an independent variable is 
important in explaining the dependent variable in the equation. Therefore, in the second 
step, the coefficients are calculated as the averages of the coefficients across sample 
months. The t statistics of the coefficient is equal to the coefficient divided by its time-
series standard error. The method is actually a simplified form of the Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) regression and is used in Dicheve (1998).  
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 An alternative approach to the two step method is to pool together the time series 
of different companies and then run regression to estimate the coefficients using the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) or the panel data analysis. However, such practice may not 
be appropriate in this study for two main reasons. First, the regression in Equation 3.22 
intends to identify factors known at time t that can be used to explain the expected returns 
at time t+1. This equation indicates that the analysis is cross-sectional in nature. Second, 
the OLS or the panel data analysis may not be appropriate to apply to the data in this 
study. The OLS requires that error terms are uncorrelated or independent with each other. 
However, this assumption is often violated by time series data, which is used in this study. 
The violation of the serial correlation assumption will lead to biased estimation of 
coefficients in the OLS analysis. It seems that a panel data analysis is more suitable to 
apply to the pooled data in this study. In the panel data analysis, assumptions about the 
error terms have to be made to decide whether fixed effects or random effects should be 
used in the analysis. The slopes remain constant in both fixed and random effect models. 
That is, only intercepts and error variances matter in both fixed and random effect models. 
However, it is possible that the slope of the regressions are different over time in this 
study because of the change of market risk preference over time. Actually, the results 
from the poolability test does show that it is not appropriate to pool together the data in 
this study20.   
                                                   
20 The poolability test in this study answers the question whether the slopes are the same over time. The 
null hypothesis of the poolability test over time is H0: βtk = βk, where k is the number of regressors 
excluding dummy variables and intercept. The F-test is used to construct the test statistics. It takes the 
following form.  
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' is the SSE of the OLS regression at time t; T is the number of time period; 
K equals k+1, which is the number of regressions excluding dummy variables but including the intercept; n 
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This study reports three groups of regression results: results during the whole 
sample period, the economic expansion periods, and the economic contraction periods. 
For each group, regression results based both on all sample firms and on firms in the 
same industry are reported.  
The problem of dividing sample period into the economic expansion and contraction 
periods is that we cannot compare the estimated coefficients of the regression during the 
economic expansion periods and those during the economic contraction periods. If the 
data were pooled together for analysis, it is possible to introduce dummy variables for the 
economic expansion or the economic contraction period and the estimated coefficients 
can be compared directly for different economic stage. However, such dummy variable 
method can not be applied in a cross sectional analysis because perfect multicollinearity 
between variables.    
     3.3. Spillover of Default Risk 
 The next question of interest in this thesis is whether default risk spills over from 
the banking industry to other industries. Such a spillover is possible because of the 
complex relationship between banks and firms of other industries. This section is 
interested in two questions: first, whether the default risk of the banking industry will 
affect the default risks of other industries. Second, if such causality exists, whether the 
change of default risk in the banking industry affect the equity returns in other industries. 
A Granger Causality test is used to explore the first question and a Fama-MacBeth 
regression approach is used to analyze the second one.  
                                                                                                                                                       
is the number of firms used in regression at time t. More information about the test can be found at: 
http://www.indiana.edu/~statmath/stat/all/panel/panel3.html 
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The problem related with a Granger Causality test, and the regression analysis is 
that these tests only tell whether one time series is useful in forecasting another, not the 
actual relationship. To provide a “stronger” causality, a bank dependence variable is first 
calculated. It is reasonable to hypothesize that industries depending more on the banking 
industry react more to the change of the default risk of the banking industry. 
          3.3.1. The Dependence on the Banking Industry  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) studied whether industries requesting more external 
finance develop faster. They defined a firm’s dependence on external finance as the ratio 
of the difference between capital expenditures and cash flow from operations divided by 
capital expenditures.  
The DB definition in this study is a modified version of the dependence on 
external finance defined in Rajan and Zingales (1998). I define a firm’s dependence on 
the banking industry (DB) as the ratio of the change of debt (the sum of long-term debt 
issuance (COMPUSTAT # 111) and change in current debt (COMPUSTAT # 301))21 
divided by capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT # 128). The mean DB of firms in an 
industry is used as the proxy of the bank dependence measure of the industry.  
There are two reasons that I do not adopt the external finance defined by Rajan 
and Zingales. First, this study is more interested in the banking industry, rather than the 
financial market as a whole. Since banks are the main source of debt financing for most 
companies for short term financing, the DB definition in this dissertation focuses on debt 
financing rather than the external finance. Second, the COMPUSTAT items used to 
                                                   
21 The change of debt may not be solely financed through banks although banks are a major source of long term 
and short term corporate financing. However, it is difficult to find detailed information about the exact sources of 
debt financing. Therefore, the change of debt is used here without further differentiate the precise sources.  
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calculate the external dependence are different among different format code. When it 
comes to evaluating (change of) cash flow, which is used in the definition of dependence 
on external finance by Rajan and Zingales (1998), we first need to consider the format 
code (data item #318) in the COMPUSTAT database. Prior to the adoption of Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards #95 (SFAS #95) by U.S. companies, the format code 
may change from one year to the next22, depending on how a company reports its data. 
Effective for fiscal years ending July 15, 1988, the SFAS #95 requires U. S. companies to 
report the Statement of Cash Flows (format code = 7). The sample used in this study 
includes the prior-1988 period. This fact indicates that we have to adjust cash flow items 
case by case if we use the cash flow item. The time that needs to be spent on the practice 
is paramount and the benefit is minimal. For this reason, this study does not consider the 
cash flow item. The variables I use to define dependence on the banking industry 
(COMPUSTAT #128, #111 and # 301) are included in the statement of all the format 
codes although the definition of COMPUSTAT #301 is slightly different for different 
format codes.  
          3.3.2. The Causality Test 
The Granger Causality test will be used to analyze the possible causality 
relationship between the default risk of the banking industry and the default risk of other 
industries. This study uses a vector autoregression (VAR) approach, which treats all 
variables symmetrically, without making reference to the issue of endogenous versus 
                                                   
22 The following reporting formats are identified on the Compustat database: format code = 1 (Working Capital 
Statement); format code = 2 (Cash Statement by Source and Use of Funds); format code = 3 Cash Statement by 
Activity; format code = 5 (Net Liquid Funds/Net Funds Classified by Source and Use of Funds (Canadian File 
Only)); format code = 7 (Statement of Cash Flows).  
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exogenous, to explore the possible spillover effect. A two-equation VAR is specified as 
follows: 
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Where: 
 tbx , / tiy ,  = the default risk measure of the banking industry / industry i at time t; 
0α / 0β  = the intercept terms; 
iα  / iβ  (i=1 to 12) = the coefficient of the lagged tbx , / tiy , . Lag 12 is used 
because monthly data is used in Granger Causality analysis; 
L = the lag operator; 
tbe ,  / tiv ,  = the residual terms, which may be correlated to each other.  
The matrix can be written as a system of the following two equations:  
 
tbx , = 0α + 1α 1, −tbx + 2α 2, −tbx +…+ 12α 12, −tbx + 1β 1, −tiy + 2β 2, −tiy +…+ 12β
12, −tiy + tbe ,  
tiy , = 0β + 1α 1, −tbx + 2α 2, −tbx +…+ 12α 12, −tbx + 1β 1, −tiy + 2β 2, −tiy +…+ 12β
12, −tiy + tiv ,  
(3.24) 
   The variable x is said to Granger causes variable y if one or more iα  (i=1 to 12) 
is significantly different from zero. It is expected that industries whose default risk is 
Granger-caused by the default risk of the banking industry are probably the ones with 
higher bank dependency.   
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          3.3.3. Is the Default Risk of the Banking Industry a Systematic Risk? 
The second question investigated is whether the change of the default risk of the 
banking industry affects the expected returns of other industries. As mentioned before, 
the default risk of the banking industry may have ripple effects on the risk of other 
industries because of its role as the central fund conduit in real economy. Such ripple 
effects may give rise to a systematic component in the default risk of the banking 
industry. A Fama-MacBeth approach is used to estimate the pricing effect of the default 
risk of the banking industry. The approach is conducted in two steps. First, the systematic 
risks ( 41 ~ ββ  in the following equation) of different risk factors of a stock is estimated 
by regressing the stock’s subsequent realized returns on the excess market return, the two 
Fama-French factors (HML and SMB23), and the average change of bank default risk 
using time series data. The following stochastic generalization is employed in this step.  
 , 1 1 , , 2 3 4 1( )i t t m t f t t t t tR R R HML SMB DDLIBKα β β β β ε+ += + − + + + +  (3.25)
where: 
1, +tiR = the realized equity returns at time t+1; 
tα =intercept term; 
)( ,, tftm RR − = the excess return on the market at time t.  
tHML (High Minus Low) = the average return on value portfolios minus the average 
return on growth portfolios; 
                                                   
23 The excess return, HML and SMB data are all from Kenneth French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. The excess return is the value-weighted return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from the CRSP database) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (from 
Ibbotson Associates). The Fama/French factors are constructed using the six value-weight portfolios formed on 
size and book-to-market. SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the 
average return on the three big portfolios. HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value 
portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios.  
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tSMB (Small Minus Big) = the average return on small portfolios minus the average 
return on big portfolios; 
tDDLIBK = the average change of the aggregate bank default risk from time t-1 to t. 
The default risk of the banking industry at time t is calculated as the equally 
weighted average DLI of all banks included in the cross-section of the CRSP 
database and the COMPUSTAT annual data at time t.  
1 4~β β = the coefficients of the independent variables, which is the quantity of risk; 
1+tε = the residual terms.  
The coefficients 1 4~β β  reveal the quantity of the corresponding risk of a stock. In 
the estimation process, 1 4~β β  are “rolling” betas. For month t, tt 41 ~ ββ  are estimated 
using time series data of the stock from month t-50 to t. For month t+1, data of month t-
50 is deleted and data of month t+1 is added to estimate 1411 ~ ++ tt ββ of the stock.  
In the second step, stock returns are regressed on the estimated tt 41 ~ ββ  in a cross-
sectional regression as follows:  
 1443322111, ++ +++++= tttttttttttiR µβλβλβλβλα  (3.26)
where tt 41 ~ λλ are the risk premium of different risk factors, including )( ,, tftm RR − , 
tHML , tSMB , and tDDLIBK respectively. 1+tµ is the residual term. To avoid the cross-
sectional correlation and heteroscedasticity problem,  Fama and MacBeth (1973) suggest 
to first estimate the cross-sectional regression in equation (3.26) for each month in the 
sample period and compute the sample mean of the estimated slope coefficients tt 41 ~ λλ . 
Then the average monthly slope coefficient is tested to decide whether they are 
significantly different from zero. Shanken (1992) argues that the OLS estimates can be 
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used because the cross-sectional estimates are not heteroscedastic. To reduce the 
estimating error of betas, the portfolio betas are used in the cross-sectional regression 
rather than the betas for individual stocks. The specifics of the approach are as follows. 
Each month, all stocks are independently sorted by DLI, size, and BM respectively and 
the stocks at time t are thus divided into 27 portfolios through this three-way independent 
sorting. The portfolio betas and the expected returns are calculated as the equally 
weighted values of individual stocks in the sorted portfolios. These 27 portfolio betas and 
expected returns at month t are then used to estimate tt 41 ~ λλ  in Equation (3.26).  
 Regressions at both the economic expansion periods and the economic contraction 
periods are analyzed. This thesis expects that the change of bank default risk during the 
economic contraction periods may affect the equity returns of other industries more than 
during the economic expansion periods. Private companies usually have more difficulty 
in funding their operations during bad economy and central banks usually encourage 
lending expansion during economic contraction period. However, banks are probably 
reluctant to do so because of risk concern. The increase of bank default risk will probably 
suppress more of banks’ lending activity since an increased loan loss reserve due to the 
default risk increase means less lending ability. During economic contraction, the default 
risk of banking industry usually increases and the credit availability to the economy thus 
decrease. The worsened situation of credit availability will directly hurt the real economy. 
Therefore, the increase of bank default risk during economic contraction will affect more 
of private companies than during economic expansion. Nevertheless, it takes time for the 
financial economy to affect the real economy. In addition, this dissertation uses market 
data to derive DLI, a forward-looking default risk measure, which may be leading the real 
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default risk. Therefore, it is possible that the effect of the bank default risk on the equity 
return of other industries is not significant in a period as short as one month. This 
dissertation does not address the default risk of banking industry on the equity returns of 
other industries for a longer period. It will be interesting to expand such analysis in future 
study.     
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CHAPTER IV 
IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
 
The sample period in this study ranges from 01/1971 to 12/2006. However, the actual 
period included in this study is from 01/1971 to 01/2007 because the subsequent realized 
monthly returns are used in this dissertation as the proxy of the expected returns.  
I retrieve the data of the sample firms from the COMPUSTAT and the CRSP 
databases. Firms missing the following information are excluded from the sample: debt in 
one year (DATA34) or long-term debt (DATA9) from the COMPUSTAT, price 
information, shares outstanding or monthly returns from the CRSP database.  
The following data are extracted from the COMPUSTAT North America annual file:  
• Common equity (DATA60), which is used to measure book value (BV);  
• Debt in current liabilities (DATA34) 
• Long-Term Debt (DATA9) 
• Industry classification code (DNUM) 
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• Long-term debt issuance (COMPUSTAT # 111) 
• Change in current debt (COMPUSTAT # 301) 
• Capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT # 128) 
The financial information above has the report-delay problem. More specifically, 
the COMPUSTAT database extracts its financial information disclosed by publicly traded 
companies mainly from Forms 10-K and 10-Q, which are the annual and the quarterly 
reports required by the SEC. The current deadlines for filing periodic reports are 
implemented on Nov. 15th, 2002.  These deadlines are reported in Table III (See 
Appendix B, Table III for detail).   
Prior to the change, a domestic reporting company must file a quarterly report no 
later than 45 calendar days after the end of each of its first three fiscal quarters, and an 
annual report no later than 90 calendar days after the end of its fiscal year. In the new 
ruling, the filers are grouped into three groups - large accelerated filers, accelerated filers 
and non-accelerated filers. The deadlines for the non-accelerated filers have not changed. 
The deadlines of the 10-Q for the accelerated filers are shorten from 45 to 40 days. The 
deadline of the 10-K for the large accelerated filers is reduced to 60 days and for the 
accelerated filers to 75 days.  
Since there can be a delay of up to 90 days for the 10-K form, I use the annual 
financial information at year t four months after its reporting calendar date to calculate 
the distance-to-default measure to make sure that all information is available to investors 
when the default measure is calculated. For example, the 2005 fiscal year-end data from 
the COMPUSTAT database will be used to match the CRSP data from May 1st, 2006 to 
April 30th, 2007 in calculation.  When  calculating the book to market ratio, the book 
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value used is from the annual financial information at year t six months after its reporting 
calendar date.  
The CRSP monthly file is used for the following variables:   
• Monthly price  
• Holding period returns (including dividend) 
• Shares outstanding 
• Delisting price 
• Delisting returns (dividend included) 
• Delisting date 
• Shares outstanding when de-listed.  
Monthly equity returns used in portfolio and regression analysis are from the CRSP 
monthly file, which also contains delisting information.   
As the returns of the distressed stocks are directly related to the delisting returns, the 
empirical study needs to carefully consider the delisting of stocks. In many cases, the 
CRSP monthly file reports delisting dates and delisting returns. This study has 15,937 
delisting returns available in the sample, including delisting due to performance-related 
reasons (The CRSP delisting code between 400 and 599) and those due to the other 
reasons, including mergers and change of exchanges. In the case of the delisting stocks 
without the available return information in the CRSP, the last available full-month returns 
were used.  
The following data are from the CRSP daily file:  
• Daily equity price (dividend adjusted)  
• total number of shares outstanding 
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The price and shares outstanding used to calculate DLI is mostly from the CRSP daily 
file. In addition, this study adjusted the delisting returns according to the delisting date 
and return information from the CRSP monthly file. The annual equity volatility ( Eσ ) is 
calculated using the adjusted daily historical data from the CRSP database. More 
specifically, the following procedures are used.  
Assuming the number of observations is n+1; iEP , ,E iV is the stock price at the end of 
the ith interval, with i=0,1,…, n+1 
And let  
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The volatility per annum can be calculated from the volatility per trading day using 
the following formula: 
Volatility per annuam Volatility per trading day Number of trading datys per annum
s 252
= ×
= ×
  
Market value (MV) is defined as the product of price at time t and the corresponding 
shares outstanding; book-to-market ratio (BM) is defined as book value (BV) divided by 
market value (MV). Firms with negative book values are excluded from the sample.   
Monthly observations of the one-year Treasury bill rate obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Board Statistics will be used as the risk-free rate in calculating DLI.  
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The historical data of Fama-French three risk factors, including the excess return, 
SMB, and HML are from Kenneth French’s website24.  
The aggregate default likelihood measure (ADLI) at time t is defined as a simple 
average of the default likelihood indicators of all firms in a portfolio.  
Table IV summarizes the descriptive statistics of ADLI, size and BM. The table also 
includes the summary statistics of the Fama and French factors (HML and SMB). Panel 
A reported the summary statistics of the time series. Panel B is the correlation matrix 
among the aggregated variables and Fama and French factors. To calculate the values in 
Table IV, this thesis first calculates ADLI, size and BM measure each month as the 
simple average of all firms in that month to get the time series of these variables. The 
time series are then compared with the Fama and French factors (See Appendix B, Table 
IV for detail).  
The relationships between ADLI, size and BM are quite interesting. The correlation 
table shows a significant positive correlation (0.098) between ADLI and BM and a 
significant negative correlation (-0.548) between ADLI and size, which are consistent 
with our intuition.  However, there was a positive correlation (0.211) between the market 
value and BM, which is in conflict with my expectation of a negative relationship 
because cēterīs paribus, the increase of market value would decrease BM. The significant 
positive concurrent  correlation between size and BM suggests that the book value may 
increase/decrease more than the increase/decrease of the market value. This increasing 
book value can be seen as an increasing safety cushion of higher market risks due to high 
stock prices. Furthermore, there is no significant correlation between ADLI and the Fama 
French factors, which suggests that ADLI may incorporate different information from 
                                                   
24 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/  
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HML and SMB. The two Fama French factors are significant and negatively correlated 
with each other (-0.227), which is what I expected because larger book-to-market ratio 
and smaller size are related to higher default risk.  
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CHAPTER V 
V. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH RESULTS I – INDUSTRIAL DECOMPOSITION 
OF DEFAULT RISK AND EQUITY RETURNS 
 
 
 
     5.1. Replication of Previous Studies 
Before starting to analyze the relationship between default risk and raw returns by 
industry, I first mixed all the sample firms together and compared the results with those 
reported by Vassalou and Xing (2004). The purpose of this step is to identify the possible 
differences between this study and the previous ones.  
   Table V reports the results of this dissertation by grouping the sample firms into 
deciles (See Appendix B, Table V for detail).  
 Table VI reports the results by grouping the sample firms into quintile (See 
Appendix B, Table VI for detail).  
The values reported in both Table V and Table VI were calculated in a similar 
way and covered the same sample period as did in Vassalou and Xing (2004). For each 
month from 01/ 1971 to 12/1999, all sample firms were sorted into deciles/quintiles by 
their DLIs. The average subsequent realized returns were calculated for each group. The 
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current period’s ADLI, MV and BM ratios of the firms in each portfolio were also 
calculated. The same steps were repeated each month for the sample period. The numbers 
reported in both tables are the average values across the sample months. A similar 
method will be used in other empirical tests of this study. 
 The findings of this study in Tables V and VI suggest that when default risk 
increases, the returns decreased at first and then increased when default risks reach 
certain level. It suggests that market participants paid a premium for seeking higher 
default risk. However, it is difficult to explain why investors do so. When default risk 
exceeded a certain level, such as in this study, when it reached the DLI-portfolio 7, 
investors began to charge a premium for the higher default risk, which leads to a positive 
relationship between default risk and equity return.  
The results of this study reported in Table V and Table VI do not exactly follow the 
patterns of those reported in Vassalou and Xing (2004). Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
reported a linearly positive relationship between ADLI and the next month’s return, 
which indicate that high default risk is compensated by higher returns. However, this 
study shows that the relationship is not linear.  
My concern is why the results in this study did not show the same pattern as previous 
studies did. By comparing the statistics in Panels A and B of Tables V and VI, it seems 
that the statistics in this study have more variation in ADLI, and book-to-market ratio. 
For example, the DLI portfolios in this study have the lowest ADLI as 0.00 and the 
highest one as 97.41 but the DLI portfolios in Vassalou and Xing study show the lowest 
ADLI as 0.01 and the highest one as 31.74. The BM ratio in the present study ranges 
from 0.55 to 23.21. In Vassalou and Xing (2004) study, the ratio ranged from 0.61 to 2.01. 
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Da and Gao (2006) study claimed the similar ADLI to the one in Vassalou and Xing 
(2004). However, the market value (MV) in Da and Gao study is quite different from that 
in Vassalou and Xing (2004) study. In Vassalou and Xing (2004) study, the MV of the 
lowest DLI portfolio has a MV 5.78, which is 2.58 times the MV of the highest DLI 
portfolio. However, Da and Gao found that the average MV of the lowest DLI portfolio 
(2189.97 ($million)) is 53.85 times the value of the highest DLI portfolio (40.67 
($million)). For this study, the multiplier is 5.91. Table VI reports the comparison 
between Vassalou and Xing (2004) study with the present study by dividing sample firms 
into quintile portfolios. Similar results are shown in Table V.  
All in all, I suspect that the main reason for the difference is probably due to the fact 
that this study might include more sample firms. Table VII summarizes the firms covered 
in this dissertation from 1971 to 2006. I also listed the number of firms included in 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) from 1971 to 1999. Table VII illustrates that Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) only included a sub-set covered in this study. It’s impossible to exactly 
replicate Vassalou and Xing (2004) since their paper recognized that only sample firms 
are selected by did not describe the criteria to choose the sample firms in the study (See 
Appendix B, Table VII for detail).  
     5.2. Default Risk and Returns 
To investigate the relationship between default risk and equity returns, this study 
first sorted the sample firms into deciles according to the DLI measures from 01/1971 to 
12/2006. Table VIII reports the ADLI, capitalizations, book-to-market ratios and the 
subsequent realized returns of the portfolios. The statistics are calculated in a similar way 
to those in Table V and Table VI (See Appendix B, Table VIII for detail).  
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The results are different from those in Table V, which are based on data ranging 
from 01/1971 to 12/1999. The ADLI figures are slightly lower for each DLI portfolio. 
The market capitalizations are higher, which indicates that more funds flow to the stock 
market from year 2000. The BM ratios are lower for low DLI portfolios (Portfolio 1st to 
7th) but higher for high DLI portfolios (Portfolio 8th to 10th ). The subsequent realized 
returns are relatively stable for low DLI portfolios (Portfolio 1st to 7th ) but they increase 
dramatically for high risk portfolios (Portfolio 8th to 10th ). In comparison with the values 
in Table V, the values of the realized returns are lower for lower risk portfolios (Portfolio 
1st to 4th ) but are higher for higher risk portfolios (Portfolio 5th to 10th ) in Table VIII, 
which include extra data from year 2000 to 2006. The possible reason underlying the 
return difference between Table V and Table VIII is that after the collapse of the year 
2000 dot-com bubble, funds favor more of the lower risk portfolios, which drive down 
both the BM ratio and the subsequent realized return of lower risk portfolios.  
Table VIII mixed different industrial firms together as in the previous studies (for 
example, Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Da and Gao, 2006; Dichev, 1998). However, it is 
possible that firms in some industries have higher average distance-to-default measure; 
some have a propensity to be small in size and some are likely to have higher book-to-
market ratios. In this case, the portfolios grouped by DLI, size or the BM ratio may be 
weighted more toward certain industries.  
Tables IX and X suggest that the specific industrial composition of different 
sample groups may influence the final results on the relationship between default risk and 
equity returns. Table IX provides evidence of the possible over-weight of certain industry 
by mixing industrial firms together. Panel A of Table IX reports the average subsequent 
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realized returns of all sample firms and of different industries in the quintile portfolios 
sorted by DLI. The returns based on all sample firms show a U-shape relationship 
between the default risk measure (DLI) and the subsequent realized returns, with the 
return for both the lowest risk (low DLI portfolio) and the highest risk stocks (high DLI 
portfolio) higher than the return of the average stocks. The U-shape is asymmetric, with 
the riskiest DLI portfolios showing the highest average return. To a large extent, the 
average returns of different industries in the sorted portfolios do not show the U-shape 
pattern. There is actually no clear pattern seen in different industries. Panel B reveals the 
possible reason underlying the lack of the return pattern in different industries. The panel 
discloses that the percentages of different industries vary greatly across the DLI-sorted 
portfolios. For example, the business equipment industry and the manufacturing industry 
tend to dominate all the DLI-sorted portfolios except for the riskiest one, which is 
dominated by banking firms and those classified as other industry. Firms in banking, 
other, communication, and utility industries tend to be in high DLI portfolio. Firms in 
business equipment, chemicals, healthcare, manufacturing and non-durable industries 
tend to be in low DLI portfolio.  Firms in durable and shopping industries tend to be 
relatively evenly distributed across different DLI portfolios. Firms in the energy industry 
tend to focus at the middle DLI portfolios and firms in the non-bank financial tend to 
focus at either low DLI or high DLI industries (See Appendix B, Table IX for detail). 
Table X provides further evidence by sorting the individual stocks into deciles. 
Panel A presents the average returns of all sample firms and of different industries in the 
DLI-sorted portfolios and Panel B is about the average percentage of different industries 
 71
in the sorted decile portfolios. The results in Table X show patterns somewhat similar to 
those exhibited in Table IX (See Appendix B, Table X for detail). 
Tables IX and X suggest the importance of sample composition in studying the 
default risk effect. Portfolio managers probably do not worry so much about the 
inconsistent empirical results on default risk effect based on vaguely defined sample 
groups. What is more useful to them is a clearer picture of the default risk effect of 
individual industries. This is what the present study offers.     
Table XI presents the characteristics of quintile DLI-sorted portfolios during the 
whole sample period, the economic expansion periods, and the economic contraction 
periods. The average default likelihood indicator (ADLI) is calculated as a measure of 
default risk of different portfolios. Market capitalization (MV) and book-to-market ratio 
(BM) are included because of their popularity in previous literature as proxies of distress 
risk. The subsequent realized returns (Ret) of each DLI-sorted portfolio is estimated in 
order to investigate the possible relationship between default risk and equity returns.. The 
standard deviation (SD) and the coefficient of variation (CV) of the returns are reported 
to provide more information about the variation of the returns. The standard deviation of 
a portfolio at month t is defined as the standard deviation of the returns of the stocks in 
the portfolio. The DLI, MV, BM, Ret and SD are calculated in a way similar to Table VI. 
The CV measures standard deviation by the mean returns. Panel A presents the results of 
the whole sample period. Panel B is for the economic expansion periods and Panel C is 
for the economic contraction periods (See Appendix B, Table XI for detail).  
Panel A covers the whole sample period from 01/1971 to 12/2006.  A similar table is 
reported in Panel A, Table VI using data ranges from 01/ 1971 to 12/1999. Comparing 
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with Panel A, Table VI, the ADLI in Panel A, Table XI is slightly lower; the MV is 
larger, which suggests a more conservative market after the collapse of the dot-com 
bubble. In comparison with the pre-2000 period, there is a more obvious asymmetric U-
shape relationship between default risk and equity returns, with both the safest and the 
riskiest portfolios earning above-average returns. The average standard deviation of 
returns show that the total risk increases with the increase of default risk. However, the 
CV indicates that there is an inverted U-shape pattern between default risk and return-
adjusted variation, with both the safest and the riskiest stocks showing a below average 
CV values. Panel B covers the economic expansion periods as defined in Table II. This 
Panel shows a pattern similar to that found in Panel A. Panel C summarizes the data 
during the economic contraction periods. In comparison with the economic expansion 
periods, the ADLI is much higher for different DLI-sorted portfolios and the average 
market values of different portfolio are smaller than the ADLI and the average market 
value of their peers during the economic expansion periods. The average subsequent 
realized returns and the standard deviation of the returns are higher than the returns and 
the standard deviation of their peers during the economic expansion periods. The patterns 
are consistent with the deteriorating economic environment during the contraction 
periods. Some interesting patterns are shown during the contraction periods as compared 
to those during the economic expansion periods.  First, the ADLI shows a monotonic 
negative relationship with the market capitalization of different portfolios. Second, the 
higher ADLI is generally compensated by higher subsequent realized returns during the 
economic contraction times. The different relationship of default risk and equity returns 
between the economic expansion periods and the economic contraction periods indicates 
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that investors may charge a premium for the riskier stocks as well as the safer stocks 
during the economic expansion phases, but only charge a premium for the riskier stocks 
during the economic contraction periods.  
The premium charged for the safer stocks during the economic expansion periods 
may be due to investors’ expectation that the default risk of safer stocks are more likely 
to increase in future. The concern is valid. Figure 3 provides evidence that the default 
risks of higher quality bond tend to increase in the next 20 years. The figure uses the 
forward default risk rate data from Moody’s. It depicts the forward issuer-weighted 
global default rates for corporate bond rating from C to Aaa. Panel A shows that the 
default rates of investment grade bond, rating Baa to Aaa, tend to increase during the next 
20 years. Panel B shows that the default rates of the speculative grade bond, rating below 
Baa, tend to decrease during the next 20 years (See Appendix A, Figure 3 for detail).  
Since the industry and the economic cycle factors are important in studying the 
relationship between default risk and equity returns, this study assessed the relationship 
using an industrial decomposition approach. Table XII presents the frequency table of 
sample firms of different industries, the mean, standard deviation statistics of the DLI 
measure of these industries and the relative ranking of the mean and the standard 
deviation of the industrial DLI across the whole sample period, the economic expansion 
periods, and the economic contraction periods (See Appendix B, Table XII for detail).  
Panel A lists the frequency table of different industrial portfolios. The industrial 
portfolios are listed in a descending order of the portfolio size. Manufacturing, business 
equipment, other, shopping, durable, non-bank financial and banking industries take more 
than 70% of the total sample group.  
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Panel B reveals the mean and the standard deviation of the DLI of the industrial 
portfolios during different sample periods, including the overall sample period, the 
economic expansion and the economic contraction periods. The industrial portfolios in 
Panel B are listed in the same order as in Panel A. Two patterns are noticable in Panel B. 
First, the mean DLI during the economic contraction periods is higher than that during 
the economic contraction periods. The pattern is consistent with the definition of an 
economic cycle. Second, for most industries, the value of standard deviation of DLI 
during the economic contraction periods is larger than that during the economic 
expansion periods except for chemical, energy and banking industries. The banking 
industry shows smaller standard deviation of DLI during the economic contraction stages, 
a sign that during undesirable economic conditions, banking firms are more similar to 
each other when it comes to their default risk. Chemical and energy industries illustrate 
similar standard deviation of DLI during different economic periods. This pattern 
indicates that the firms in chemical, energy and banking industries are more inter-
dependent with each other or are more likely to be influenced by some common 
systematic factor(s) during bad economy.  
I then sorted the industries in an ascending order by the mean value and the 
standard deviation of DLI during different sample period, including the whole sample 
period, the economic expansion periods, and the economic contraction periods 
respectively. The relative rankings during the whole sample period, the economic 
expansion periods, and the economic contraction periods are also compared with each 
other. An improved ranking of an industry means the reduction of the mean or the 
standard deviation of DLI of the industry. A worsened ranking indicates the opposite. 
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The change of the ranking of the mean DLI of an industry during different economic 
stages indicates the change of relative riskiness of the industry. The change of the ranking 
of the standard deviation of DLI of an industry suggests the change of the relative 
variation of the default risk in the industry. Some interesting patterns are shown in the 
ranking comparison. Panel C presents the relative rankings of the mean DLI of the 
industrial portfolios during different sample periods. The relative rankings of the ADLI 
are similar for different industries during the whole sample period and during the 
economic expansion period. During the economic contraction periods, the ranking varies 
slightly except for “other” and utility industries. The “other” industry sees an improved 
DLI ranking. This is probably due to the diversification effect. The utility industry 
witnesses a worsened ranking of the ADLI during the economic contraction periods. 
Panel D presents the relative rankings of the standard deviation of DLI of the industrial 
portfolios during different sample periods. The standard deviation of the DLI shows the 
variation of the DLI across sample firms of an industry during different sample periods. 
The industrial ranking of the standard deviation of the DLI is similar during the whole 
sample period and during the economic expansion stage. However, the ranking of 
healthcare, business equipment and utility industries have worsened during the economic 
contraction periods. So is the telecommunication industry. The pattern indicates that 
firms in these industries are less inter-dependent with each other. Well-managed firms in 
these industries tend to have a relatively lower default risk, and conversely poor-managed 
firms in these industries tend to have a relatively higher default risk during the economic 
contraction periods. Chemical, shopping, other, energy, non-bank and banking industries 
show improved ranking during the economic contraction stages. The pattern suggests that 
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firms in these industries are more dependent on each other or are more likely to subject to 
the same macro economic factors. Therefore, the DLI of firms in these industries tend to 
move at the same direction, and the management quality of individual firms plays a less 
important role in differentiating the default risk of these firms.   
Table XIII presents the portfolio results on the relationship between the default risk 
measure and the subsequent realized monthly returns for different industries across the 
whole sample period. Firms in each industry are sorted into quintile portfolios by DLI 
from 01/1971 to 12/2006. Three default risk proxies are shown in the table: DLI, size 
(MV) and book-to-market ratio (BM) (See Appendix B, Table XIII for detail).  
Some interesting results can be found in Table XIII. First, the ADLIs for the DLI-
sorted portfolios of different industries tend to differ from each other. Among all the 
industries, the banking industry has the highest ADLI for each DLI-sorted portfolios, 
followed by the non-bank financial industry. The unusually high ADLI associated with 
financial industries does not mean that default risk is particularly high in these industries. 
It is just the result of the high leverage featured financial industries. A number of 
previous studies have noted that larger size or lower book-to-market ratio (BM) can be 
viewed as proxies for lower distress risk. These studies include but are not limited to 
Chan, Chen, and Hsieh (1985), Fama and French (1992), Dichev (1998), Vassalou and 
Xing (2004), and other studies. For most industries, we see a monotonic negative 
association between ADLI and MV. However, such negative association does not hold 
for banking, durable and non-bank financial industries, which take 19.72% of the total 
sample size. Surprisingly, the banking industry presents a positive relationship between 
the default risk measure and the market capitalization. The positive association indicates 
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that that bigger banks have been adopting riskier portfolios and assuming higher leverage. 
Further analysis in the next section illustrates that the positive relationship between 
default risk measure and bank size is a phenomena only existing after the 1980s, a period 
coincident with the booming of derivatives and the deregulation in the financial industry. 
Both durable and non-bank financial industries show a negative association between MV 
and ADLI for the first four DLI-sorted portfolios, but the relationship reverses for the 
riskiest one, suggesting that some bigger firms in the industries have been taking riskier 
investment. The BM ratio shows a consistently positive relationship with the default risk 
measure for all the covered industries.      
Table XIII also shows that most industries demonstrate an asymmetric U-shape 
on the relationship between the ADLI and the subsequent realized returns, which is 
similar to the pattern when all the industrial firms are mixed together. However, the 
asymmetric U-shape pattern does not hold for the banking, energy, non-bank financial 
and telecommunication industries. For these industries, the riskier portfolios are more 
likely to be compensated by higher returns.  
 The average standard deviations of returns (SD (Ret)) of the DLI-sorted portfolios 
also demonstrate a consistently positive association with the default risk measure. This 
pattern shows that the return of the portfolio with higher default risk is more variable than 
the one with lower default risk, indicating that the market does incorporate at least part of 
default risk information in its pricing process, if not all of it. The business equipment and 
healthcare industries show the most volatile returns and the utility and the banking 
industries show the least volatile returns. To further analyze the return volatility, I 
calculate the coefficient of variation (CV). CV is defined as the per unit variation of 
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return. The values in the table show that for most industries, either the safest portfolio or 
the riskiest portfolio demonstrate the smallest CV value, indicating that either the safest 
portfolio or the riskiest one has lower standard deviation of returns for per unit of returns. 
For nondurable, non-bank financial and shopping industries, the safest two portfolios 
have the smallest return CV values. For the utility industry, the two riskiest portfolios 
have the smallest CV values.    
Table XIV reports the relationship between default risk and raw returns of sample 
firms of different industries during the economic expansion and the economic contraction 
stages. For the convenience of comparison, Panels A and B are displayed side by side 
(See Appendix B, Table XIV for detail).  
Panel A demonstrates the relationship between default risk and equity returns of 
different industries during the economic expansion periods. The relationships among 
ADLI, MV, BM, return, standard deviation and CV during the economic expansion 
periods are similar to the ones showed in Table XIII, which are based on the whole 
sample period. For most industries, there is a U-shape pattern between ADLI and returns 
and a positive relationship between ADLI and standard deviation of returns. The 
relationship between ADLI and CV shows an inverted U-shape pattern.  
Table XIV, Panel B shows that during the economic contraction stages, the ADLI 
tends to be larger and the MV tends to be smaller for DLI-sorted portfolios of different 
industries as compared to their peers during the economic expansion periods. As 
compared to the economic expansion periods, six patterns stand out during the economic 
contraction stages. First, in general, there is a positive, rather than U-shape pattern, 
between default risk and equity returns. Second, as compared to their peers during the 
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economic expansion periods, the BM tends to be higher for most DLI-sorted portfolios. 
However, if we back out the book value (BV) using the BM ratio and the corresponding 
MV, we will find that 86% of portfolios experienced decreased book values (BV) during 
the economic contraction times. Third, as compared with the economic expansion stages, 
the standard deviation of returns is larger, suggesting more volatile returns within a 
portfolio. Fourth, the inverted U-shape pattern between ADLI and CV does not always 
hold for different industries during the economic contraction periods. The CV values 
actually do not exhibit a uniform pattern. For example, the banking portfolios show a 
decreasing CV with increasing ADLI. The non-durable industry shows a increasing CV 
with increasing ADLI. Energy, healthcare, manufacturing, and other industries show an 
inverted U-shape pattern. The utility industry shows a U-shape pattern. Business 
equipment, chemicals, durable, non-bank financial, shopping, and telecommunication 
industries do not show a specific pattern at all. Fifth, most industrial portfolios show a 
smaller return adjusted return variation (smaller CV) during the economic contraction 
periods than their peers during the economic expansion periods. The smaller CV implies 
that investors are more risk adverse during the economic contraction times. However, 
there are some exceptions, which include banking, manufacturing, non-bank financial, 
and utility industries. The CV of these industries during the economic contraction periods 
is higher than during the economic expansion periods. To conclude that investors in these 
four industries are less risk averse is difficult since signs during the economic contraction 
stages indicate that investors do prefer less risk. The higher CV of these industries are 
more likely due to the interaction of an increased standard deviation of returns and the 
decreased subsequent realized returns. Sixth, the returns of the safest portfolio of banking 
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and utility industries during the economic contraction periods are actually lower than 
their peers are during the economic expansion periods, indicating a flying-to-quality 
behavior within these industrial portfolios during the economic contraction periods.   
Several industries show some unique patterns different from other industries in 
Table XIV.  
The first industry showing unique patterns is the banking industry, which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter VI. The energy industry is another industry of interest. 
Different from other industries, the ADLI of the DLI-sorted energy portfolios during the 
economic contraction times are smaller than that of during the economic expansion stages, 
indicating that the energy industry may be a safe haven for investors during bad 
economic conditions. Further evidence from MV, BM and returns provide additional 
evidence for the speculation. The market values of the portfolios show a U-shape pattern 
during the economic expansion periods but the MV decreases with the increases of ADLI 
during the economic contraction periods. The MV for the riskiest portfolio during the 
economic contraction phases is much smaller than that during the economic expansion 
periods, yet the MVs of the safest three portfolios are larger than those of the economic 
expansion stages. The larger MV of the safer energy portfolios suggests that investors 
may have transferred funds from smaller energy firms and from other industries to the 
less risky energy portfolios. The BM values of the energy portfolios during the economic 
contraction phases are smaller than during the economic expansion periods for most 
portfolios except for the riskiest portfolio. A comparison of the estimated book values of 
different economic stages reveals that the book values of the safer three portfolios 
increase and for the riskier two portfolios decrease during the economic contraction 
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periods. The lower BM during the economic contraction times suggests that the increase 
of MV is larger than the increase of the corresponding BV. The energy industry is the 
only industry that witnesses negative returns for different DLI sorted portfolios. The 
negative returns imply that at the beginning of the economic contraction stages, investors 
treat the energy industry as a safe haven to avoid the higher default risk of other 
industries. However, as the economic contraction evolves, funds flow out of the energy 
industry, resulting in negative equity returns. Further empirical tests need to be designed 
to prove the dynamic process of capital flow. The standard deviations of returns of 
different portfolios are higher during the economic contraction periods, reflecting a more 
volatile stock price of firms in the energy industry.  
     5.3. The Regression Analysis  
Table XV presents the regression results of returns of individual stocks on their 
past month’s size (MV), BM, and DLI characteristics. The squared characteristics (MV2, 
BM2, DLI2)  are included in the regression to consider the nonlinear relationships. In 
addition, there are interaction terms represented by the product of MV with DLI (MVDLI) 
and BM with DLI (BMDLI). The cross sectional realized returns are regressed on the 
independent variables of the previous month’s value each month. The regression 
coefficients reported in the table are the average of the coefficients in the monthly cross 
section. The t-statistics are calculated as the average coefficients divided by the time-
series standard error. The table reports the regression results of all firms and different 
industrial portfolios. Panel A covers period across the whole sample period; Panel B is 
about the economic expansion stages and Panel C considers the economic contraction 
periods (See Appendix B, Table XV for detail).  
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Panel A is based on the sample period ranging from 01/1971 to 12/2007. The 
regression results show near zero coefficients of the size related variables (MV, MV2 and 
MVDLI), confirming that size (MV) has minimal explanatory power of the expected 
returns. The BM ratio (BM) is positive and significant for all the regressions except for 
that of the telecommunication industry. The coefficient of the DLI is negatively 
significant for the overall firms, manufacturing, other, shopping and non-durable 
industries. For other industries, the coefficients are not significant. This is probably 
caused by the nonlinear effect of default risk on equity returns. The positive and 
significant coefficient of DLI2 for most regressions confirms the guess. Nevertheless, the 
regression results do not show significant coefficients of both the DLI and the DLI2 
variables for healthcare, energy, durable, chemical and telecommunication industries. 
These industries happen to be the ones with the least observations (Panel A, Table IX). 
The regression results also show that for those industries with a significant coefficient of 
DLI or DLI2, the coefficient of BM is also significant, suggesting that the BM and the 
DLI variables may incorporate different default information. Since both the higher DLI 
and the higher BM are related with higher default risk, we may expect that the coefficient 
of the interaction term between the two (BMDLI) is positive. However, BMDLI shows 
negative and significant coefficients for most industries, indicating that the higher/lower 
BM and the higher/lower DLI are related with the lower returns; the higher/lower BM 
and the lower/higher DLI are related with the higher returns. The multi-dimensional 
feature of default risk may explain the intriguing results. The DLI measures the 
probability of default of a company but the BM ratio not only is a proxy of default risk 
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but may also incorporate the loss given default information of the company. When a firm 
has higher DLI (higher probability of default) but lower BM (higher loss given default), 
shareholders will suffer more in the case of default and will thus command a higher risk 
premium. A similar explanation can apply to lower DLI and higher BM combination. The 
multi-dimensional feature can also explain why the coefficient of both BM and DLI (or 
DLI2) are significant in regression. The panel also shows that the same explanatory 
variable tends to have dissimilar coefficients in different regressions attributed to 
different industries. The phenomenon confirms that the industry factor plays a role in 
explaining the relationship between default risk and equity returns.   
Panel B is based on the economic expansion periods. The results in Panel B are 
similar to those in Panel A. Panel C is based on the economic contraction periods. Panel 
C shows that the absolute values of most significant coefficients are larger than those in 
Panel B. The result indicates a different effect of default risk on equity returns during 
different stages of economic cycles.  
The three panels of Table XV have something in common. In most cases, what 
explains the subsequent realized returns are the current default risk of securities, the BM, 
or the interaction of default risk and BM. Size and the interaction of default risk and size 
appear to play a minimal role.  
Panel D lists the Welch-Satterthwaite t test value. The null hypothesis tested is 
that the coefficients corresponding to the economic expansion and contraction periods are 
equal. ThIS test assumes that the sample variances during different economic periods are 
different. The test results show that except the healthcare, non-durable and non-bank 
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financial industries, the coefficients related with BM, DLI are significantly different for 
different economic stages, although not all of them.    
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CHAPTER VI 
VI. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH RESULTS II – DEFAULT RISK IN THE 
BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
The industrial decomposition shows that the default risk of the banking industry 
bears a positive relationship with the size measure. The pattern is at odds with the widely 
accepted wisdom documented in previous studies that larger size can be viewed as a 
proxy for lower distress risk. These studies include but are not limited to Chan, Chen, and 
Hsieh (1985), Fama and French (1992), Dichev (1998), Vassalou and Xing (2004), 
among others. The year 2008 witnessed America's largest financial companies — 
WAMU, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Wochovia, AIG, Fannie Mae and Citigroup 
— bankrupted, bailed out or bought out. The unique pattern documented in the industrial 
decomposition test and reality provide the incentive of this dissertation to further explore 
the default risk of the banking industry using the market data. Before I discuss the 
empirical results of the default risk of the banking industry, it is worthwhile explaining 
why studying the equity market is important for the industry.  
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     6.1. Why Studying the Equity Market is Important to the Banking Industry  
The capital structures of most firms include both debt and equity. Usually, both 
the lenders and the equity holders of the firm have an incentive to monitor its operation. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the debt holders of a firm face an agency cost 
because the shareholders may abuse the funds they borrow from the debt holders. In 
order to reduce the agency costs, the debt holders have to monitor the firm by using 
various types of protective covenants and monitoring devices. As compared to the 
internal shareholders (for example, managers), the external equity holders also face an 
agency cost because of the information asymmetry between the insiders and the outsiders. 
Therefore, the external shareholders will also have to incur monitoring costs in one form 
or the other.  
A banking firm is different from an industrial firm in that the depositors as debt 
holders may have much less incentive to monitor its operation at least as compared to 
their peers in an industrial firm. This is because banks have special expertise in reducing 
transaction costs (Gurley and Shaw, 1960), alleviating information asymmetry (Diamond, 
1996), managing risk and reducing participation costs (Allen and Santomero, 1998). In 
the case of banks, even business depositors may not know how to assess a bank’s 
operation. Besides the expertise advantage, a bank also is highly regulated and has 
explicit deposit insurance protection or implicit protection from government due to too-
big-to-fail concern. The regulation and the protection will also make the depositors, 
especially the individual depositors under the cover of deposit insurance, be less worried 
about their banks’ operation.  
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 Banking firms also issue subordinated notes and debentures (SND hereafter), 
which is suggested by Basel II as a potential way to enhance market monitoring of the 
banking industry. SND has received wide attention in academic studies. However, 
whether SND effectively imposes market discipline on banking firms is still needed to be 
further explored. The report submitted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury to the Congress 
pursuant to section 108 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (2000) summarized the 
primary roles of the SND and doubted the necessity of requiring banks to issue 
mandatory subordinated debt. According to the report: 
“… a mandatory subordinated debt policy applied to the largest U.S. banking 
organizations would be likely to help achieve to some degree the primary 
objectives of such a policy. These objectives include (1) improving direct 
market discipline, (2) augmenting indirect market discipline exerted by 
government supervisors and private secondary market participants, (3) 
encouraging transparency and disclosure by banking organizations, (4) 
increasing the size of the financial cushion for the deposit insurer, and (5) 
possibly reducing regulatory forbearance. However, the uncertainties 
regarding these benefits are considerable, implementation of even the most 
straightforward mandatory policy (e.g., only a required amount outstanding) 
would impose some costs on banking organizations, and more complex 
policies (e.g., those with issuance at regular intervals, restrictions on 
instrument characteristics, rate caps) could impose quite substantial costs. On 
balance, the net benefits of even the most straightforward policy are less clear 
than what is necessary to justify a mandatory policy (p56)”. 
 
The report shows that the potential benefits of market discipline of issuing SND 
may be offset by the uncertainties and execution costs related with the issuing.  
Evanoff and Well (2000) argued that SND could provide workable signals in 
financial market if it is structured flexibly to catch up with the evolvement of ongoing 
market development. However, they also admitted that the continuing market innovations 
are undercutting the effectiveness of both market and supervisory discipline.   
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003) reached a similar 
conclusion after surveying banks across ten developed countries from 1990 to 2001. The 
similar results were reported by Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2005), who did not 
find evidence of SND changing the risk-taking behavior of a bank. However, there were 
also many papers supporting the viewpoint that SND imposes market discipline on banks 
management. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003) provided a good 
summary of the papers for and against the role of SND as a market discipline mechanism. 
Overall, the not-so-consistent empirical testing results seem to suggest a limited role of 
SND as a monitoring mechanism on bank management.  
 The external equity holders also monitor a firm’s management. The information 
included in a bank’s equity price sends out important signals regarding the bank’s 
management. However, compared to the SND, equity markets have received much less 
attention in the academic research of banking. Yet, most of the studies on equity market 
support the proposition that the equity price of a bank does include important information 
about the bank’s risk. For example, the study by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2003) claimed that the signals of the secondary equity market can be more 
useful in monitoring the risk-taking behavior of banking firms than that of the SND due 
to ample liquidity of the secondary equity market in the case of major banking 
institutions. The report also concluded that the indicators derived from equity market data, 
including the distance-to-default and implied volatility, are quality signals in the risk 
monitoring process. Using 914 US bank holding companies’ (BHCs) data from June 
1996 to March 2000, Gunther (2001) found that the default probability extracted from the 
distance-to-default measure could help to predict the supervisory ratings of individual 
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banking organization. Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2002) found similar results based on a 
sample of 84 European Union (EU) banks from 1990 to 2000. Besides the distance-to-
defaultindicator,  Davies (1993) found that the market-to-book ratio factor can help 
predict bank insolvency of BHCs. Pettway (1980) and  Pettway and Sinkey (1980) 
documented that investors’ perceptions, as reflected in bank equity prices, contain useful 
information for early warning purposes. He and Reichert (2003) found similar results 
using annual data of US financial institutions from 1972 to 1995. Based on the data of 87 
banks of Japan from 1989-1997, Oda (1999) found that deposit insurance premium 
derived from stock prices would more accurately reflect banks’ risk compared to other 
methods.  
 Then, there were a few studies which provide no evidence of equity market 
discipline. For example, using data of 184 large BHCs from the fourth quarter of 1989 to 
the second quarter of 1992, Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) found that supervisory 
assessments and equity market indicators are not related to each other.  Their results 
indicated that supervisors and bond rating agencies focus more on bankruptcy risk while 
shareholders tend to care more about future earnings. The results are at odds with Krainer 
and Lopez (2003), who reported that changes in stock prices tend to precede changes in 
supervisory BHC ratings by at least nine months. The conclusion that equity investors 
focus more on earnings rather than risk is also against our intuition that what a rational 
investor cares about is risk-adjusted returns.  
 The above-mentioned studies suggest that equity market have useful information 
regarding financial institutions’ risk. The risk information included in equity prices is 
comprehensive, which includes not only default risk, but also market risk, operational 
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risk and others. There is no published paper, which focuses specifically on credit risk and 
equity returns of financial institutions. The present thesis attempts to fill this void in 
literture. The exploration on the relationship between credit risk and equity returns of 
financial firms would shed lights on our understanding of the pricing of financial 
institutions.  
     6.2. Further Investigation of Default Risk in the Banking Industry 
Descriptive statistics of the test variables of the banking industry are shown in 
Table XVI. Panel A provides the empirical distributions of the test variables. Panel B of 
Table XVI exhibits the Pearson correlation coefficients, which offer preliminary evidence 
regarding the relations between the test variables using all the observations across sample 
period. The size (MV) is negatively related with the subsequent realized one-month 
returns, which is consistent with the size effect documented in previous literature. The 
default risk measure (DLI) is positively related with the returns, which implies that a 
higher default risk is rewarded by higher returns. The correlation between the subsequent 
realized returns and BM is not significant although there is a significantly positive 
relationship between BM and DLI. The positive association between BM and DLI is 
related to some form of firm distress documented in Fama and French (1992): Firms with 
higher default risk tend to have higher book-to-market ratios. Surprisingly, the correlation 
between default risk measure (DLI) and size (MV) is significantly positive, which 
indicates that larger banks might have higher default risk (See Appendix B, Table XVI 
for detail).  
Table XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX and XXI present the main results for the association 
between default risk, size, BM and subsequent realized returns for the whole sample 
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period, the economic expansion, and the economic contraction periods and the pre- 1980 
period and the post- 1980 period respectively.  
Table XVII offers the portfolio results and the regression results concerning the 
relation between default risk, size, BM and subsequent realized returns for the whole 
sample period. An examination of the portfolio results in the left column of panel A 
reveals that larger banks tend to have higher DLI, indicating that bigger banks may 
possess riskier portfolios. In the meanwhile, the riskier banks display higher book-to-
market ratios and earn higher returns, suggesting that the banking industry investors do 
consider and price the default risk factor. The results pertaining to the portfolios sorted on 
the basis of size also show that the largest two bank portfolios have the highest DLIs. In 
addition, the average BM decreases with the increasing of bank size and so do the 
average subsequent realized returns. The portfolio results show a positive association 
between DLI and size, but the ADLI is positively related with expected returns and size is 
negatively related with returns. Higher BM is always found to be related with higher 
returns, either in the quintile sorted by DLI or by size. These patterns indicate that the 
interaction terms among DLI, and size may be important factors in explaining the 
expected returns.  
The regression results confirm that the interaction terms (including SDLI, BMDLI) 
are important factors affecting expected returns: the coefficients on both variables are 
highly significant (t-statistics of -2.048 and -4.977 respectively). The interesting thing is 
that the coefficients of both SDLI and BMDLI are negative. The negative coefficient of 
SDLI indicates that all else being equal, the higher a bank’s default risk and the larger the 
bank is the lower will be its return. However, the absolute value of the coefficient on 
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SDLI is virtually not much different from 0. The negative coefficient of BMDLI is 
somewhat more confusing since both BM and DLI are positively related with expected 
returns. A comparison of univariate and multivariate regression results demonstrates that 
the size and the default risk effects or their squared and interaction terms do not subsume 
the explanatory power of BM. In fact, the coefficient and the t-statistics of BM increase 
from the univariate to the multivariate regressions, suggesting that the common variation 
of BM has little relation to the expected returns. Therefore, the negative coefficient of 
BMDLI is probably due to the potential nonlinear relationship between DLI and the 
expected returns.  
A comparison of the univariate and multivariate regression results in Panel B 
demonstrates that the default risk effect is positive and significant in both the univariate 
regression and the regression including the size and the book-to-market effect. However, 
the explanatory power of DLI is subsumed by the size and the book-to-market effects: the 
coefficient of DLI reduces from 0.004 (t-statistics of 2.83)  to 0.003 (t-statistics of 1.93), 
suggesting that the common variation of DLI has important relation to the returns. This is 
confirmed by the multivariate regression with the squared terms and the interaction terms. 
In the regression, the coefficient on DLI is insignificant, but the coefficient on DLI2 is 
positive and significant, suggesting that the rising DLI is accompanied by reducing the 
expected return at first and then increasing default risk is compensated by the higher 
returns beyond a certain point. The coefficient on size (MV) is insignificant in the 
univariate and significant at a 10% level in the multivariate regressions but has minimal 
value in the multivariate regressions. This is probably due to the fact that size contains 
conflicting information of distress risk (See Appendix B, Table XVII for detail).  
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Table XVIII presents the portfolio and the regression findings concerning the 
relation between default risk, size, BM and subsequent realized returns during the 
economic expansion periods. The results in Table XVIII are similar to those in Table 
XVII except for two points. First, the portfolio results show a U-shape pattern between 
default risk and expected returns. More specifically, both the bank portfolios with the 
lowest default risk (lowest ADLI) and those with the highest DLI (highest ADLI) earn 
higher than average returns. However, the U-shape pattern is not symmetric. The riskiest 
banks earn substantially higher returns than the least risky ones. The asymmetric U-shape 
relationship between default risk and equity returns indicates that during the economic 
expansion periods, investors charge a premium both for both the high risk-seeking 
behavior and for the minimum risk-seeking behavior. The asymmetric U-pattern can also 
explain why the coefficient on the DLI is positive and significant in the univariate 
regression and the multivariate regression with size and book-to-market effect at one-
tailed tests. Second, the interaction term between size and DLI (SDLI) is not found to be 
significant during the economic expansion periods (See Appendix B, Table XVIII for 
detail).  
Table XIX presents the portfolio and the regression results of the relation between 
default risk, size, and BM and the subsequent realized returns during the economic 
contraction periods. The portfolios sorted by DLI (left-side table in Panel A) 
demonstrates a positive relationship between default risk and size for banking firms 
except for the portfolio with the highest default risk, whose average size is smaller than 
the next less risky portfolio. The pattern suggests that investors are concerned that small 
banks may not benefit from too-big-to-fail policy during the economic contraction 
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periods. In addition, the DLI-sorted portfolios have much higher ADLIs during the 
economic contraction periods than their peers during the periods of economic expansion. 
The higher ADLI is consistent with our intuition that default risk is higher during the 
economic contraction periods. Furthermore, the riskier portfolio is always associated with 
higher returns. In addition, as compared to the return values in Table XVIII, the return 
values are much lower for the safest portfolio (0.97 vs. 1.33) and much higher for the 
riskiest portfolio (2.49 vs. 1.64). The return differences during different economic 
conditions indicate that investors have a tendency to fly to safety and demand a higher 
risk premium for default risk during bad economic conditions.  
The size-sorted portfolios (right-side table in Panel A) also show flight-to-safety 
and charge-more-for-riskiness patterns. During the economic contraction periods, the 
largest portfolio earns much lower returns than the peer portfolios during the economic 
expansion periods (1.16 vs. 1.28) – a pattern indicating that investors buy more of larger 
banks during trying economic times due to the too-big-to-fail concern. Furthermore, the 
returns for the smallest size portfolio during the economic contraction periods are much 
higher than the corresponding returns during the economic expansion periods (3.10 vs. 
1.43) – an indication of investors’ increased risk aversion.  
In the size-sorted portfolios, the returns are found to be generally increasing with 
the decreasing bank size except for the third size-sorted portfolio, which has the lowest 
returns. To explain this abnormality is difficult. One possible explanation is the influence 
of some outliers in the sub-portfolio. The univariate and multivariate regressions provide 
some evidence for my contention. The coefficient of size (MV) in both the univariate 
regression and the multivariate regression with default risk and BM effects is not 
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significant, but the coefficient becomes significant after controlling for the DLI, BM, 
their squared terms, and the interaction terms (SDLI and BMDLI). The results indicate 
that high variation of size influences the returns considerably. In comparison with the 
regression results using the data from the economic expansion periods, the regression 
results in Table XIX show that both default risk effect and the book-to-market effect are 
strengthened during the economic contraction stages. The coefficients on BM, DLI, and 
DLI2 are positive and significant in both the univariate and the multivariate regressions 
and their explanatory power is also much higher than the corresponding variables in the 
regressions using data from the economic expansion periods (See Appendix B, Table 
XIX for detail).    
Tables XX and XXI present the portfolio and the regression findings for the 
relation between default risk, size, BM and subsequent realized returns during the pre-
1980 period and the post-1980 period. The results in Table XX (pre - 1980 period) are 
similar to those in Table XVII (the whole sample period). The more interesting results 
come from the comparison of Table XX and Table XXI, which demonstrates a dramatic 
pattern change from the pre-1980 era to the post-1980 period.  
An examination of the portfolio results in Table XX, Panel A reveals a negative 
association between default risk and bank size from 01/1971 to 12/1979, which means the 
smaller banks tend to be riskier. The relationship becomes positive during the post-1980 
period. The reversed relationship implies that larger banks might have assumed more risk 
during the post-1980 period. During the pre-1980 era, both the DLI-sorted quintiles and 
the size-sorted quintiles do not show a clear association with the returns. However, there 
is evidence of a positive relationship between DLI and expected returns and a negative 
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association between size and expected returns during the post-1980 period. The changed 
patterns indicate that investors are more likely to price default risk after 1980. In addition, 
they start to incorporate the too-big-to-fail policy, which was formerly established during 
the 1980s, into their investment decision-making process after 1980. However, the 
regression analyses do not provide support for the portfolio results. The coefficients of 
DLI and size are not significant in the univariate regression. The multivariate regression 
results show a positive and significant first order size effect, which does not exist in the 
post-1980 regression. However, the absolute coefficient of size is almost zero. The pre-
1980 period also sees a significant first and second order default risk effect. In contrast, 
the multivariate regression during the post-1980 era the period only reveals a second 
order default risk effect (DLI2 is significant) (See Appendix B, Tables XX and XXI for 
detail).   
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CHAPTER VII 
VII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS III – SPILLOVER OF DEFAULT RISK 
 
 
 
     7.1. The Relationship between Financial Economy and Real Economy 
Economists have long been arguing the relationship between the development of a 
financial economy and the growth of a real economy. Levine (1997) summarized the 
theories and the empirical evidence on the subject in previous literature. He concluded, 
“The preponderance of evidence suggests that both financial intermediaries and markets 
matter for growth and that reverse causality alone is not driving this relationship.” 
According to Levine, market frictions motivate the emergence and the development of 
financial markets and financial markets in turn play a critical role in boosting the 
economic growth by facilitating risk management, reducing information costs, exerting 
corporate control, mobilizing savings, and facilitating exchange of goods and services.  
The statistically significant relationship between economic and financial development 
may not indicate a causal relationship. A common omitted variable, such as the 
propensity of household to save, might drive both economic and financial growth. It is 
also possible that financial development is simply a leading indicator of economic growth, 
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rather than a causal factor. Rajan and Zingales (1998) partly solved the problem by 
testing whether industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external finances 
develop faster in countries with more developed financial markets. They tested their 
hypothesis using industrial data across 41 countries from 1980 to 1990. Their empirical 
results supported the hypothesis, which indicated a more convincing relationship between 
financial development and economic growth.    
Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2005) investigated the growth impact of banking 
crises on industries with different levels of dependence on external finances using the 
similar approach suggested by Rajan and Zingales. They used panel data from 41 
countries from 1980 to 2000 in their test and showed that sectors depending more on 
external finances suffered more during banking crises.  
Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) conducted a similar study to the one by 
Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan. Using financial crisis data from 38 developed and 
developing countries from 1980 to 2000, they showed that industries depending more on 
external finances tend to experience a worse time during a banking crisis.  
The above studies all focused on long-run growth. Braun and Larrain (2004) tried to 
look at the relationship between financial development and economic growth from a 
short-run aspect. They argued that, besides allocating resources for long-term investments, 
financial systems also pool and diversify risks and provide liquidity. They started from 
the fact that internal and external funds are not perfect substitutes under imperfect 
financial markets. Therefore, they hypothesized that firms depending more on external 
finances will react more to the worsening conditions of financial markets and the 
differential impact should be stronger when the financial markets are less developed and 
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financing frictions are more prevalent. Using a three-dimensional model that includes 
time, country, and industry, they tested and found evidence to support the hypothesis with 
a data set that consists of yearly production observations for 28 manufacturing industries 
in over one hundred countries from 1963 to 1999.  
The above studies focused on the financial industry as a whole, rather than 
concentrating on the relationship between the banking industry and the economy in 
particular. Furthermore, the studies are mostly cross-country in nature. People may argue 
that the banking industry may not be influential on the real economy because other non-
bank financial institutions may compete for the banks’ business and fill the banks’ void in 
the case of a banking crisis. In addition, the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth across countries may be due to some systematic differences 
between different economies. Koetter and Wedow (2006) studied the relationship 
between the quality of bank financial intermediation and economic growth in Germany. 
They used cost efficiency estimates derived with stochastic frontier analysis as a proxy of 
the quality of bank financial intermediation. They found a significant relationship 
between financial development and economic growth.  
Banking crises affect a real economy mainly through the changes in banks’ lending. 
Peek and Rosengren (2002) studied the effect of the Japanese banking crisis on the real 
activity in the U.S. real estate market. The study identified an exogenous loan supply 
shock - the Japanese banking crisis.  It then linked the shock to the activities on the U.S. 
real estate market through the Japanese bank penetration of the market. Using a panel 
data set from March 1989 to September 1996 on three large, spatially separated markets 
that had experienced the greatest penetration by Japanese banks: California, New York, 
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and Illinois, the authors documented a significant influence of the loan supply shocks 
originating from Japan on the real economic activity in the United States. 
     7.2. The Dependence on the Banking Industry  
Table XXII reports the dependence of different industries on the banking industry. 
The ranking of dependence on banking (DB) shows the relative dependence of an 
industry on the banking industry. The ranking is consistent with our intuition, with the 
non-bank financial industry having the highest DB and the utility industry the lowest. The 
non-bank financial industry and the utility industry also show the highest and the lowest 
standard deviation of DB across firms in the industries. DB in the table is based on the 
sample period from 01/1971 to 12/2006. DB during different economic stages is not 
estimated because of the constraint of available data. The ranking of DB of different 
industries is used to provide a stronger “causality” analysis for the Granger Causality 
tests and the regression analysis of default risk between banking and other industries. 
This thesis hypothesizes that the default risk of industries with higher DB are more likely 
to be affected by the default risk of the banking industry. It also presumes that industrial 
portfolios with higher DB show stronger pricing effect of the change of the default risk of 
the banking industry (See Appendix B, Table XXII for detail).   
     7.3. The Causality Test 
To explore the possible spillover effect, a VAR approach is used and Granger 
Causality tests are performed using the average monthly DLI of different industries 
across the whole sample period. The Granger-causality relationships during the economic 
expansion periods and the economic contraction periods are not tested because the 
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fragmented nature of the defined economic expansion and the economic contraction 
periods may distort the results which are derived from a time series method (See 
Appendix B, Table XXIII for detail).  
Table XXIII indicates that the default risk of the business equipment, chemical, 
durable, energy, manufacturing, non-bank financial, other, and shopping industries 
Granger-cause the default rate of banking industry. Among these industries, some have 
higher DB value, including non-bank financial, other, shopping and durable industries. 
Some have lower DB value, including business equipment, energy, manufacturing, and 
chemical industries. The test results also suggest that the default rate of banking industry 
Granger-causes all other industries except for utility and telecommunication industries, 
both of which are industries less dependent on banks. The value of the Chi-statistics 
shows that the Granger Causality is stronger from the banking industry to other industries. 
Table XXIII provides some evidence that the default risk of industries depending more 
on banks are more likely to be influenced by the default risk of the banking industry.  
Results in Table XXIII are based on monthly DLI. To provide additional evidence 
to support the proposition, a sample of annual actual default rates from Moody’s are used 
for the Granger Causality between the banking and other industries. Table XXIV lists the 
results (See Appendix B, Table XXIV for detail).  
The results in Table XXIV are based on annual data from 1970 to 2006, a 
comparable period with the main sample used in this thesis. No definitions of industries 
were found from the Moody’s website. However, we can safely conclude that banking, 
energy, financial, miscellaneous, and utility industries are roughly comparable to banking, 
energy, non-bank financial, other and utility industries defined in this paper. The 
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industrial industry and the technology industry are probably comparable to the 
manufacturing and business equipment industries. Panel A presents the industries in 
ascending order of the average annual default rate. It shows that utility, banking and 
financial industries are the three with the lowest annual default risk. This thesis shows in 
Panel B of Table XII that the banking and financial industries are the two with the highest 
DLI and the utility industry has approximately ADLI across industries. The inconsistent 
rankings based on the real annual default rate and the calculated DLI again provide 
evidence that industrial analysis is important in analyzing the default risk effect.  Panel B 
provides the results of the Granger Causality Test. The test results indicate that the 
default rates of the products and the retail industry Granger-cause the default rate of the 
banking industry; the default rate of the banking industry Granger-causes the default rates 
of products, financial (non-bank), service, media, miscellaneous, retail, and transportation 
industries. However, the default rate of the banking industry does not Granger-cause the 
default rate of energy, industrial, technology, and utility industries. Nor do the latter 
industries Granger-cause the default rate in the banking industry. The energy, industrial, 
technology and utility industries are all industries with less dependence on the banking 
industry.  
     7.4. Is the Default Risk of the Banking Industry a Systematic Risk? 
The results of the previous section imply that the default risk of the banking 
industry affects those of most other industries. This pattern indicates that the default risk 
of the banking industry might be systematic. It is possible since the default risk of the 
banking industry may have ripple effects on other industries and hence affect the returns 
of these industries. The purpose of the empirical test here is to investigate through asset-
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pricing tests, whether the default risk of the banking industry is systematic, and therefore 
whether it is priced in the cross section of equity returns.  
To minimize the estimation error of individual stock beta, portfolio betas are used 
in the regression. Portfolio betas are calculated as the equally weighted beta of the betas 
of individual stocks in the sorted portfolios. A three-way independent sorting is used to 
construct the portfolios. all stocks are sorted into three portfolios by their DLI measure; 
then each DLI-sorted portfolio is divided into three portfolios by the size of stocks in the 
portfolio; after this, the nine DLI and size sorted portfolios are each divided into three 
BM-sorted portfolios. There are 27 portfolios constructed from the intersection of the 
three-way sorting. The purpose of the practice is to maximize against all the three 
variables. Summary statistics of the 27 portfolios are provided in Table XXV (See 
Appendix B, Table XXV for detail).  
The results from the asset pricing test are presented in Table XXVI. The results 
are presented for three sample periods: the whole sample period, the economic expansion, 
and the economic contraction periods (See Appendix B, Table XXVI for detail).  
The results show that the risk premium of the change of bank default risk is only 
significant during the economic contraction times and the premium is negative, which 
indicates that funds may flow out from the banking industry to other industries when 
bank default risk increases during the economic contraction phases. However the risk 
premium is very small. Market risk premium is only important during the economic 
expansion periods, not during the economic contraction periods.  The results also 
demonstrate that the risk premium of the HML factor is consistently significant during 
different sample periods. However, the premium of the SMB factor is not significant in 
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all the sample periods. The intercept term is also significant during all the sample periods, 
suggesting that there are other important factors not included in the four-factor model.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
This dissertation uses the modified Merton model similar to the one used by 
Moody’s KMV to compute monthly DLI for individual firms. The DLI is used as a proxy 
of default risk. Then this study examines the effect that the default risk measure has on 
equity returns from an industrial and business cycle decomposition point of view. It pays 
special attention to the banking industry and examines the default risk in this industry and 
the spillover of default risk from banking to other industries. It also explores whether 
bank default risk is a systematic risk or not.  
Table XXVII provides a summary of all the major findings from Tables I to 
XXVI (See Appendix B, Table XXVII for detail).  
The analysis provides evidence that industrial and business cycle factors matter in 
assessing the relationship between default risk and equity returns. Considering the 
ambiguous empirical results from pooling sample firms together reported in the literature, 
an industrial and business cycle decomposition provides a clearer picture of different 
scenarios and offers a solid cornerstone for further portfolio analysis. This study shows a 
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U-shape relationship between default risk and equity returns for most industries during 
the whole sample period and the economic expansion periods. During the economic 
contraction periods, higher default risk is more possible to be compensated by higher 
returns. The specific relationships between default risk and equity returns are different 
across industries. The empirical pattern indicates the importance of the industrial and 
business cycle factors.   
The importance of the industrial and economic cycle factors also suggest the 
necessity of incorporating the loss given default (LGD) factor in studying the relationship 
between default risk and equity returns since they both are important determinants of the 
LGD. Further evidence from the regression analysis provides additional evidence of the 
necessity to consider the LGD factor. For example, the negative and significant 
coefficients of the interaction term between BM and DLI (BMDLI) for most industrial 
regressions indicate that higher/lower BM and higher/lower DLI are associated with 
lower returns; higher/lower BM and lower/higher DLI are related with higher returns. If 
we relate high BM with low LGD, which is very reasonable since a high BM suggests 
high book value relative to market value, the pattern mentioned above could be explained 
in a LGD context. More specifically, when a firm has a higher DLI (higher probability of 
default) but a lower BM (higher loss given default), shareholders will suffer more in the 
case of default and will thus command a higher risk premium. A similar explanation can 
apply to the lower DLI and higher BM combination. 
This study also analyzes the relationship between default risk and size in the 
banking industry in particular. The empirical tests show a positive relationship between 
default risk and equity returns in the banking industry during the whole sample period 
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and the economic contraction periods. It also illustrates that after 1980, higher default 
risk is associated with bigger banks rather than smaller ones. However, the positive 
relationship between default risk and bank size does not hold during the economic 
contraction periods. This positive association between default risk and bank size provides 
the evidence of the side effect of the Too-Big-To-Fail polity, indicating that a stricter 
regulation of larger banks might be necessary.  
The empirical results in this study also show that banks have less variation of 
default risk during the economic contraction periods. However, firms of other industries 
are more likely to differentiate from each other when it comes to default risk during the 
economic contraction phases.  
This dissertation documents a spillover effect of default risk from the banking 
industry to most other industries. The effect may not exist in industries that depend less 
on banking firms. As to the pricing effect of the average change of the bank default risk 
on the returns of other industries, the empirical results indicate that the change only 
matters during the economic contraction periods. Furthermore, in a period as short as one 
month for the sample period covered in this study, the increase of the overall bank default 
risk may actually be an incentive for funds flowing from the banking to other industries.   
 This dissertation suggests a number of areas for future studies. For example, how 
to incorporate the LGD factor more directly in analyzing the relationship between default 
risk and equity returns; how to construct a portfolio with a positive alpha using the 
default risk factor. In addition, empirical tests can also be designed to investigate the 
dynamic process of capital flow among different industries and the corresponding effect 
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on equity returns. Furthermore, the current financial tsunami starting from the sub-prime 
loan area provides rich material to study default risk in the economy.  
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A. Figures 
 
 
 1. Moody’s Annual Issuer-Weighted Corporate Default Rates, 1920-2006 
 
The figure depicts the Moody’s annual default rate of the corporate bond and loan issuers from 1920 to 
2006 by investment grades. The default rates for the investment-grade bond are relatively stable across the 
periods. For the default rate of the speculative-grade bond there were four peaks, which happened in 1933, 
1970, 1991 and 2001. The four peaks are consistent with the troughs of business cycles defined by National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBRR). 
 
20011991
1970
1933
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
D
e
fa
u
lt
 R
a
te
Inv.Grade Spec.Grade All Rated
 
Source of the Data: Moody’s Investor Services (2007) 
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 2.  Distance to Default 
 
The figure demonstrates the concept of distance to default. In the figure, STD stands for short-term debt. 
LTD refers to long-term debt. DPT is default point, which is defined as the sum of STD and 50% of LTD. 
DD is the abbreviation of distance to default. V0 refers to the current asset value. V1 is the expected asset 
value in 1 year. The shadow represents probability of default related with the specified DD in the graph. 
The graph is from Crouhy, Galai, Mark (2000).  
 
 
Source: Crouhy, M., Galai, D., Mark, R. (2000). "A comparative analysis of current credit risk 
models." Journal of Banking and Finance 24, p90. 
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3. Moody’s Average Forward Issuer-Weighted Global Default Rates, 1970-2007 
 
The figure depicts the 20 years forward issuer-weighted global default rates for corporate bonds rating from 
C to Aaa. The figure is based on data from Moody’s “Corporate Default and Recovery Rate, 1920-2007,” 
which can be found on Moody’s website. Forward default rate is defined as the expected default rate from 
year t-1 to t, where t ranges from 1 to 20. Panel A illustrates the forward default rate curve for investment 
grade bond, rating ranging from Baa to Aaa. Panel B portrays the forward default rate curve for speculative 
grade bonds, rating ranging from Caa-C to Ba.  
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B. Tables 
 
I. Definitions of Industry by the SIC Codes 
 
Table I lists the definitions and the SIC codes of industries considered in this study. This thesis bases its 
industry definition mainly on the twelve-industry portfolio definition suggested by Fama and French. This 
study further divides the money finance sector into the bank and the non-bank financial sectors because 
they are subject to different levels of regulation. There are thirteen industries considered in this thesis.  
 
 
Industry Four-digit SIC Codes 
1. Consumer NonDurables 
(NoDurables) - Food, Tobacco, 
Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys:  
0100-0999, 2000-2399, 2700-2749, 2770-2799, 3100-
3199, 3940-3989 
2. Consumer Durables (Durables) - 
Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household 
Appliances:            
2500-2519, 2590-2599, 3630-3659, 3710-3711, 3714-
3714, 3716-3716, 3750-3751, 3792-3792, 3900-3939, 
3990-3999 
3. Manufacturing (Manufacturing) - 
Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off 
Furn, Paper, Com Printing:  
2520-2589, 2600-2699, 2750-2769, 3000-3099, 3200-
3569, 3580-3629,           3700-3709, 3712-3713, 3715-
3715, 3717-3749, 3752-3791, 3793-3799, 3830-3839, 
3860-3899 
4. Energy (Energy) - Oil, Gas, and 
Coal Extraction and Products:  
1200-1399, 2900-2999 
5. Chemicals (Chemicals) - Chemicals 
and Allied Products:  
2800-2829, 2840-2899 
6. Business Equipment (BEquipment) - 
Computers, Software, and 
Electronic Equipment:  
3570-3579, 3660-3692, 3694-3699, 3810-3829, 7370-7379 
7. Tele-communications (Tele) - 
Telephone and Television 
Transmission:  
4800-4899 
8. Utility (Utility):  4900-4949 
9. Shopping (Shopping) - Wholesale, 
Retail, and Some Services 
(Laundries, Repair Shops):  
5000-5999, 7200-7299, 7600-7699 
10. Healthcare (Healthcare) - 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and 
Drugs:  
2830-2839, 3693-3693, 3840-3859, 8000-8099 
11. Banking (Banking):  6000-6199 
12. Non-bank financial (NonBanking):  6200-6999 
13. Other (Other):  All the other SIC codes. 
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II.  The Economic Expansion Periods and the Economic Contraction Periods  
 
The table summarizes the economic peak, trough and the economic expansion periods, and the economic 
contraction periods from 01/ 1971 to 12/2006. The “expansion” is defined as the period from the previous 
trough to this peak except for the beginning and the ending expansion periods. The “contraction” is defined 
as the period from this peak to the next trough. There are 432 sample months, of which 378 months belong 
to the expansion periods and 54 months belong to the contraction periods.  
 
Peak 
mm.yyy 
Trough 
mm.yyy 
Expansion 
Previous Trough to this Peak 
mm.yyy 
Contraction 
Peak to Trough 
mm.yyy 
 11/1970   
11/1973 03/1975 01/1971* – 11/1973 12/1973 – 03/1975 
01/1980 07/1980 04/1975 – 01/1980 02/1980 – 07/1980 
07/1981 11/1982 08/1980 – 07/1981 08/1981 – 11/1982 
07/1990 03/1991 12/1982 – 07/1990 08/1990 – 03/1991 
03/2001 11/2001 04/1991 – 03/2001 04/2001 – 11/2001 
  12/2001 – 12/2006**  
*   This expansion period ranges from the starting of the sample period, which is 01/1971, to the end of the 
economic peak in 11/1973.  
** This expansion period ranges from the previous trough to the end of the sample period, which is 
12/2006.  
Source: NBER http://www.nber.org/cycles.html 
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III.  The Deadlines for Filing Periodic Reports to SEC 
 
The table lists the deadlines for filing periodic reports to SEC. The information can be found on SEC’s 
website (http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10q.htm ). The ruling is effective from November 15, 2002. In the 
ruling, the filers are grouped into three groups - large accelerated filer, accelerated filer, and non-
accelerated filer. The deadlines for the non-accelerated filers are 90 days for the 10-K Form and 45 days for 
the 10-Q Form. The deadline of the 10-Q for the accelerated filers is 40 days. The deadline of the 10-K for 
the large accelerated filers is 60 days and for accelerated filers 75 days.  
 
Category of Filer Revised Deadlines For Filing Periodic Reports  
Form 10-K Deadline Form 10-Q 
Deadline 
Large Accelerated Filer 
($700MM or more) 
75 days for fiscal years ending before December 15, 
2006 and 60 days for fiscal years ending on or after 
December 15, 2006 
40 days 
Accelerated Filer ($75MM or 
more and less than $700MM) 
75 days 40 days 
Non-accelerated Filer 
(less than $75MM) 
90 days 45 days 
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IV. Summary Statistics (01/1971 – 12/2006) 
 
Table IV lists the summary statistics of the key variables in this study.  
ADLI is defined as the simple average of the default likelihood indicator (DLI) of all firms. Book 
value (BV) is measured by the common equity in million -dollar unit (DATA60). Market value (MV) is 
defined as the product of price at time t and the corresponding shares outstanding. Book-to-market ratio 
(BM) is defined as the book value divided by the market value (MV). Firms with negative book value are 
excluded from the sample.  
 ADLI, size, and BM measures are first calculated each month as the simple average of the sample 
firms in that month. The time series of these variables are thus formed across the sample period in Panel A. 
Panel B is the correlation matrix based on the time series. 
Panel A is the basic statistics of the key variables. N, Mean, Std Dev, Minimum, and maximum refer to 
the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum value, respectively. There 
are 438 months included in the sample period.  
Panel B shows the correlations of the time series of the aggregate variables. Pearson correlation 
coefficients are calculated. The letter “ρ” stands for the correlation between the row and the column 
variables. The p-values are reported against the null hypothesis (H0) that ρ =0.      
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics on ADLI, Size, BM, HML and SMB 
  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
ADLI 438 0.24 0.08 0.09 0.59 
Size 438 11.38 0.81 9.79 13.50 
BM 438 3.46 2.57 1.20 34.39 
HML 438 0.37 3.27 -20.79 14.92 
SMB 438 0.22 3.06 -11.60 14.62 
 
Panel B: Time Series Correlation between firm characteristics 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 438 
Prob > | ρ | under H0: r =0 
  ADLI Size BM HML SMB 
ADLI 
1.00 
    
    
Size 
-0.55 
1.00 
   
(<.00)    
BM 
0.10 0.21 
1.00 
  
(0.04) (<.00)   
HML 
0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
1.00 
 
(0.69) (0.59) (0.70)  
SMB 
-0.06 -0.00 0.03 -0.23 
1.00 (0.22) (0.97) (0.51) (<.00) 
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V.  Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted on DLI – Deciles (01/1971 to 
12/1999) 
 
The table lists the returns and characteristics of portfolios sorted by DLI. Panel A reports the 
results of this dissertation. It reports the equally weighted subsequent realized returns of these portfolios 
and the average size, book-to-market ratio, and DLI at the end of the first month after portfolio formation. 
Panel B is the results reported by Vassalou and Xing (2004). The sample period in the table is from 
01/1971 to 12/1999 to be consistent with the sample periods in the study of Vassalou and Xing (2004).  
“Port ID” lists the 10 sorted portfolios from the lowest DLI portfolio to the highest. “ADLI” is 
defined as the simple average of the default likelihood indicators (DLI) of all firms in a portfolio. “MV” 
refers to market value, which is defined as the product of price at time t and the corresponding shares 
outstanding. BM is the book-to-market ratio. The return section reports the subsequent realized return of 
the 10 portfolios.   
For each month from 01/1971 to 12/1999, all sample firms were sorted into deciles by their DLIs. 
The average returns for the subsequent month and the current period ADLI, size, and BM of the firms in 
each portfolio were calculated. The same calculation was repeated for each month. The numbers reported in 
Panel A are the average value across the sample period. The calculation is consistent with Vassalou and 
Xing (2004).  
 
Panel A: Results reported by this dissertation 
Port ID ADLI  
(%) 
MV 
($million) 
BM Return%     
(1 m) 
Low DLI 0.00 1990.51 0.55 1.51 
2 0.00 1217.13 0.61 1.39 
3 0.07 821.49 0.69 1.31 
4 0.59 580.60 0.74 1.34 
5 2.12 448.97 0.82 1.26 
6 6.12 349.92 0.91 1.23 
7 16.64 276.45 1.02 1.20 
8 39.91 230.37 1.18 1.28 
9 74.04 202.75 1.49 1.71 
High DLI 97.41 338.13 23.21 2.08 
 
Panel B: Results reported by Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
Port ID ADLI  
(%) 
MV * BM Return%     
(1 m) 
Low DLI 0.01 5.78 0.61 1.14 
2 0.01 5.4 0.68 1.24 
3 0.03 5.06 0.72 1.39 
4 0.06 4.73 0.75 1.37 
5 0.14 4.4 0.79 1.39 
6 0.34 4.08 0.84 1.44 
7 0.86 3.71 0.92 1.32 
8 2.35 3.32 1.05 1.25 
9 7.25 2.87 1.27 1.32 
High DLI 31.74 2.24 2.01 2.12 
* Vassalou and Xing (2004) did not report the unit of the MV in their study. 
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VI. Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted on DLI – Quintiles (01/1971 to 12/1999) 
 
  
The table lists the returns and characteristics of portfolios sorted by DLI. Panel A reports the results of this 
dissertation. It reports the equally weighted returns of these for the next month and the average size, book-to-market 
ratio, and DLI at the end of the first month after the portfolio formation. Panel B is the results reported by Vassalou 
and Xing (2004). The sample period in the table is from 01/1971 to 12/1999 to be consistent with the sample periods 
in the study of Vassalou and Xing (2004).  
“Port ID” lists the 5 sorted portfolios from the lowest DLI portfolio to the highest. “ADLI” is defined as the 
simple average of the default likelihood indicators (DLI) of all firms in a portfolio. “MV” refers to market value, 
which is defined as the product of price at time t and the corresponding shares outstanding. BM is the book-to-
market ratio. The return section reports the next month’s return of the 5 portfolios.   
For each month from 01/1971 to 12/1999, all sample firms were sorted into quintiles by their DLIs. The 
average returns of the next month and the current month’s ADLI, MV, and BM of the firms in each portfolio were 
calculated. The calculation was repeated for each month. The numbers reported in Panel A are the average value 
across the sample period. The calculation is consistent with Vassalou and Xing (2004). 
 
Panel A: Results reported by this dissertation 
Port ID ADLI  
(%) 
MV 
($million) 
BM Return%     
(1 m) 
Low DLI 0.00 1603.60 0.58 1.45 
2 0.33 701.06 0.72 1.33 
3 4.12 399.43 0.87 1.24 
4 28.27 253.42 1.10 1.24 
High DLI 85.72 270.40 12.34 1.89 
 
Panel B: Results reported by Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
Port ID ADLI (%) MV * BM Return(%)     
(1 m) 
Low DLI 0.01 5.59 0.64 1.19 
2 0.04 4.89 0.74 1.38 
3 0.24 4.24 0.82 1.41 
4 1.61 3.52 0.99 1.29 
High DLI 19.38 2.56 1.64 1.72 
* Vassalou and Xing (2004) did not report the unit of MV in their study. 
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VII. Number of Firms included in the Sample Each Year 
 
The second and the fifth columns of the table report the number of firms included in this study each year. VX 
denotes the study by Vassalou and Xing (2004). The third and the sixth columns report the number in Vassalou and 
Xing (2004). The table shows that the study by Vassalou and Xing (2004) only includes a subset of the US equity 
market.  
 
Year This Dissertation VX Year This Dissertation VX 
1971 1857 1355 1990 4610 3408 
1972 1979 1532 1991 4574 3379 
1973 2118 2347 1992 4599 3461 
1974 3444 2490 1993 4814 3570 
1975 3743 2612 1994 5813 3830 
1976 3769 2885 1995 6288 4004 
1977 3755 2952 1996 6415 4177 
1978 3754 2957 1997 6872 4462 
1979 3759 2956 1998 6918 4495 
1980 3743 2928 1999 6624 4250 
1981 3806 2958 2000 6409 - 
1982 4010 3054 2001 6176 - 
1983 4088 3083 2002 5566 - 
1984 4373 3311 2003 5204 - 
1985 4521 3386 2004 4916 - 
1986 4492 3343 2005 4712 - 
1987 4640 3425 2006 4325 - 
1988 4883 3577    
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VIII. Deciles Portfolio Results of All Sample Firms from 01/1971 to 12/2006 
 
Table VIII lists the ADLI, capitalization, BM, and the subsequent realized return of the deciles portfolios 
sorted by DLI based on all the sample firms.  
The first column in Table VIII is the portfolio ID. “Port ID” lists the 10 sorted portfolios from the lowest 
DLI portfolio to the highest. “ADLI” in both panels is defined as the simple average of the default likelihood 
indicators (DLI) of all firms in a portfolio. “MV” refers to market value, which is defined as the product of price at 
time t and the corresponding shares outstanding. BM is the book-to-market ratio. /the return section reports the 
subsequent realized return of the 10 portfolios.  
The values in the table are calculated as follows. For each month from 01/1971 to 12/2006, all sample firms 
were sorted into deciles by their DLIs. The average returns for the subsequent month and the current period ADLI, 
size, and BM of the firms in each portfolio were calculated. The same calculation was repeated for each month. The 
numbers reported are the average value across the sample period.  
 
Port ID  ADLI 
(%)  
MktCap 
($million) 
BM Return% 
( 1 m) 
Low DLI 0.00 3933.75 0.55 1.34 
2 0.00 2431.44 0.60 1.31 
3 0.06 1825.67 0.66 1.28 
4 0.49 1278.10 0.71 1.32 
5 1.85 972.23 0.77 1.32 
6 5.70 700.54 0.86 1.30 
7 15.85 569.22 0.97 1.31 
8 37.68 499.41 1.93 1.56 
9 71.54 431.61 2.04 1.94 
High DLI 97.19 456.11 44.35 2.29 
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IX. Industrial Decomposition of Quintile Portfolio (01/1971 to 12/2006) 
 
The table illustrates the industrial decomposition of the quintile portfolios sorted by default likelihood 
indicator (DLI). Panel A presents the average subsequent realized returns of different industries in the sorted 
portfolios; Panel B lists the percentage of different industries in the sorted portfolios. This study first sorted sample 
firms into quintiles by DLI for each month of the sample period. To calculate the average next period returns, this 
study first calculated the subsequent realized returns for each quintile portfolio at month t. The same steps were 
repeated each month across the sample period. The final returns reported are the average returns across the sample 
period. Similar steps were done to compute the average percentage of different industries in the sorted portfolio 
except that this paper first estimated for each quintile portfolio each month the percentage of the number of firms of 
an industry in a sorted portfolio relative to the total number of firms in that portfolio and then average the percentage 
across the sample period.  
The first column in both panels is the short name of the thirteen industries, which include banking, business 
equipment, chemicals, durable, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, nondurable, non-bank financial, other, shopping, 
telecommunication, and utility industries. Panel A also includes the return of the quintile portfolio for all the sample 
firms. The next five columns in Panel A report the average returns of the thirteen industries from the lowest to the 
highest DLI portfolios.  
 
Panel A Average Return of Different Industries in the Sorted Portfolios (%) 
Ind  Low DLI 2 3 4 high DLI 
All 1.38 1.29 1.25 1.3 1.92 
Banking 1.67 1.49 1.56 1.53 1.61 
BEquipment 1.53 1.31 1.29 1.72 3.67 
Chemicals 1.15 1.10 1.52 1.37 2.03 
Durables 1.25 1.23 1.12 1.54 1.51 
Energy 1.34 1.36 1.41 0.58 1.96 
Healthcare 1.45 1.46 1.66 1.78 3.35 
Manufacturing 1.35 1.34 1.36 1.39 2.04 
Nondurables 1.41 1.34 1.17 1.07 1.62 
NonBanking 1.38 1.33 1.20 1.47 1.81 
Other 1.28 1.12 0.98 1.02 1.97 
Shopping 1.46 1.32 1.10 1.09 1.67 
Tele 1.50 1.71 1.38 1.38 1.54 
Utility 1.10 1.15 1.23 1.29 1.45 
 
Panel B Percentage of Different Industries in the Sorted Portfolios (%) 
Ind  Low DLI 2 3 4 high DLI 
Banking 2.63 4.19 6.18 8.69 18.15 
BEquipment 16.26 16.02 14.98 13.20 7.61 
Chemicals 4.20 3.53 2.50 1.80 1.47 
Durables 3.84 3.51 3.42 3.28 3.03 
Energy 4.73 5.65 5.18 4.54 3.88 
Healthcare 9.35 7.66 6.57 5.27 3.29 
Manufacturing 16.38 17.21 15.96 14.95 12.49 
Nondurables 9.58 7.23 6.94 7.46 7.20 
NonBanking 8.28 6.42 6.30 6.03 9.44 
Other 10.63 11.36 12.64 14.40 15.03 
Shopping 10.80 10.57 10.91 11.86 11.59 
Tele 1.67 2.36 2.19 2.26 2.71 
Utility 1.69 4.30 6.26 6.26 4.11 
∑ 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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XI. Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted on DLI during Different Economic Stages 
 
The table presents the characteristics of DLI-sorted portfolios during the whole sample period, the 
economic expansion periods, and the economic contraction periods. The average default likelihood 
indicator (DLI), market capitalization (MV), book-to-market ratio (BM), the subsequent realized returns 
(Ret), the standard deviation (SD), and the coefficient of variation (CV) of the returns are reported. The 
standard deviation of a portfolio at month t is defined as the standard deviation of the returns of the stocks 
in the portfolio. The SD,  DLI, MV, BM, Ret, and SD are calculated as follows: at the beginning of each 
month of the sample period, stocks are sorted into five portfolios on the basis of their DLI in the previous 
month. Then the average values of the characteristic variables are calculated at month t. The same steps 
were repeated each month across the sample period. The final values reported are the average of the 
characteristic variables across the sample period. CV is estimated by dividing the average standard 
deviation by the mean returns. Panel A presents the results of the whole sample period; Panel B represents 
the economic expansion periods and Panel C represents the economic contraction periods.  
 
Panel A. 01/1971 to 12/2006 
Port ID ADLI 
(%) 
MV 
($million) 
BM Ret (%) SD 
(Ret)  
CV (Ret)  
 
Low DLI 0.00 2522.37 0.57 1.38 5.04 3.64 
2 0.27 1148.30 0.69 1.29 5.64 4.36 
3 3.78 669.67 0.84 1.25 5.90 4.72 
4 26.82 487.99 1.43 1.30 6.40 4.93 
High DLI 84.40 511.40 13.92 1.92 6.83 3.56 
 
Panel B. The Economic Expansion Periods 
Port ID ADLI 
(%) 
MV 
($million) 
BM Ret (%) SD 
(Ret) 
CV (Ret) 
 
Low DLI 0.00 2675.93 0.54 1.32 4.78 3.61 
2 0.04 1208.26 0.66 1.21 5.31 4.39 
3 1.85 705.12 0.79 1.16 5.48 4.72 
4 21.99 514.28 1.41 1.20 5.88 4.89 
High DLI 82.55 549.10 13.83 1.79 6.26 3.49 
 
Panel C. The Economic Contraction Periods 
Port ID ADLI 
(%) 
MV 
($million) 
BM Ret (%) SD 
(Ret) 
CV (Ret) 
 
Low DLI 0.01 1447.48 0.73 1.81 6.60 3.66 
2 1.93 728.56 0.92 1.89 7.62 4.04 
3 17.30 421.53 1.19 1.86 8.30 4.46 
4 60.59 303.96 1.61 1.96 9.29 4.74 
High DLI 97.31 247.48 14.53 2.79 9.98 3.58 
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XII. Basic Statistics of Different Industrial Portfolios 
 
The table presents the baisic statistics of different industrial portfolios. Panel A lists the frequency table of 
different industrial portfolios. Panel B reveals the mean and the standard deviation of the DLI of these 
industrial portfolios during different sample periods, including the overall sample period, the economic 
expansion and the economic contraction periods. Panels C and D are the ranking of the industries by the 
mean and standard deviation (SD) of DLI during different sample periods. The industrial portfolios are 
listed by descending order of the percentage of the industrial portfolios in the sample in all the panels. 
Thirteen portfolios are listed, including manufacturing, business equipment, other, shopping, durable, 
banking, non-bank financial, nondurable, health, energy, utility, chemistry, and telecommunication 
industries.  
 
Panel A. Frequency Table of Different Industrial Firms  
Ind Frequency Percent (%) Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent (%) 
Manufacturing 250051 13.54 250051 13.54 
BEquipment 249623 13.52 499674 27.05 
Other 225290 12.20 724964 39.25 
Shopping 190387 10.31 915351 49.56 
Durb 156555 8.48 1071906 58.04 
Banking 154300 8.35 1226206 66.39 
NonBanking 133649 7.24 1359855 73.63 
Nondurables 124638 6.75 1484493 80.38 
Healthcare 121654 6.59 1606147 86.96 
Energy 80886 4.38 1687033 91.34 
Utility 73627 3.99 1760660 95.33 
Chemicals 44564 2.41 1805224 97.74 
Tele 41688 2.26 1846912 100.00 
 
Panel B Basic Statistics of DLI 
  All Period Expansion Periods Contraction Periods 
Ind  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Manufacturing 0.22 0.08 0.21 0.07 0.33 0.09 
BEquipment 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.28 0.13 
Other 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.41 0.09 
Shopping 0.27 0.09 0.25 0.08 0.40 0.08 
Durables 0.24 0.10 0.23 0.08 0.37 0.11 
Banking 0.55 0.24 0.52 0.23 0.77 0.20 
NonBanking 0.32 0.15 0.30 0.14 0.46 0.17 
Nondurables 0.24 0.09 0.22 0.07 0.36 0.11 
Healthcare 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.22 0.11 
Energy 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.23 0.11 
Utility 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.47 0.24 
Chemicals 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.07 
Tele 0.28 0.14 0.26 0.12 0.41 0.21 
 
 
 126
Panel C Ranking of Industries by the Mean of DLI during Different Sample Periods 
 Ind All Period Expansion Periods Contraction Periods 
Manufacturing 5 6 5 
BEquipment 3 3 4 
Other 11 11 9 
Shopping 9 9 8 
Durables 7 8 7 
Banking 13 13 13 
NonBanking 12 12 11 
Nondurables 8 7 6 
Healthcare 1 1 2 
Energy 4 4 3 
Utility 6 5 12 
Chemicals 2 2 1 
Tele 10 10 10 
 
Panel C Ranking of Industries by the SD of DLI during Different Sample Periods 
 Ind All Period Expansion Periods Contraction Periods 
Manufacturing 3 2 3 
BEquipment 4 3 9 
Other 6 6 4 
Shopping 7 7 2 
Durables 8 8 5 
Banking 13 13 11 
NonBanking 11 12 10 
Nondurables 5 4 8 
Healthcare 2 1 7 
Energy 9 9 6 
Utility 12 11 13 
Chemicals 1 5 1 
Tele 10 10 12 
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XIII. Characteristics of Different Industrial Portfolios Sorted by DLI – Quintiles  
(01/1971 to 12/2006) 
 
The table demonstrates the characteristics of different industrial portfolios. Panel B shows the 
characteristics of different quintile industrial portfolios sorted by DLI, including aggregate DLI (ADLI), 
market capitalization (MV ($million)), return (Ret (%)), standard deviation of returns across sample period 
(SD) and the coefficient of variation (CV) of returns.  
The values in the table are calculated as follows: first, all the firms in an industry are grouped into 
quintile portfolios by their DLIs each month; second, the average values of the characteristic variables are 
calculated at month t; third, the same steps were repeated each month across the sample period. The final 
values reported are the average of the characteristic variables across the sample period.  
 
Ind. 
Port ID ADLI (%) MV ($million) BM Ret (%) SD  CV 
(Ret) 
Banking 
Low DLI 7.60 544.67 0.79 1.28 4.24 3.31 
2 36.01 774.55 0.88 1.30 4.78 3.67 
3 57.25 887.72 1.06 1.33 5.12 3.85 
4 77.10 1068.70 1.26 1.49 5.37 3.59 
High DLI 95.98 1591.37 10.31 1.75 5.54 3.17 
BEquipment 
Low DLI 0.00 2667.44 0.45 1.46 7.40 5.06 
2 0.32 1001.92 0.59 1.35 8.44 6.26 
3 2.30 495.57 0.69 1.54 9.22 6.00 
4 12.34 239.26 0.83 1.53 9.96 6.50 
High DLI 59.31 154.18 12.86 2.92 11.43 3.91 
Chemicals 
Low DLI 0.00 4101.93 0.41 1.24 4.92 3.97 
2 0.01 2744.94 0.58 0.93 5.42 5.82 
3 0.62 1226.64 0.72 1.26 5.70 4.53 
4 8.94 432.60 0.92 1.45 6.42 4.43 
High DLI 60.06 213.19 31.60 1.83 7.69 4.19 
Durables 
Low DLI 0.00 1167.85 0.60 1.28 5.41 4.22 
2 0.24 880.13 0.69 1.27 6.02 4.76 
3 4.75 570.09 0.85 1.05 6.74 6.40 
4 26.01 452.21 1.58 1.18 7.42 6.27 
High DLI 81.14 1129.58 47.63 1.75 8.34 4.75 
Energy 
Low DLI 0.00 7106.51 0.53 1.10 6.16 5.58 
2 0.21 2412.01 0.61 1.33 7.18 5.38 
3 3.02 1251.29 0.67 1.41 7.75 5.52 
4 18.14 499.25 0.89 1.26 8.39 6.67 
High DLI 68.01 317.81 10.51 2.40 9.13 3.81 
Healthcare 
Low DLI 0.00 4653.55 0.29 1.49 6.54 4.37 
2 0.01 1350.96 0.38 1.46 7.31 5.02 
3 0.56 503.33 0.48 1.34 8.03 5.99 
4 7.62 256.80 0.69 1.78 8.98 5.05 
High DLI 55.30 112.55 7.05 2.69 9.27 3.44 
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(Cont.) 
Ind. Port ID ADLI 
(%) 
MV 
($million) 
BM Ret (%) SD (Ret) CV (Ret) 
Manufacturing Low DLI 0.00 1777.43 0.63 1.34 4.92 3.68 
2 0.13 900.54 0.74 1.29 5.69 4.42 
3 2.54 614.75 0.89 1.36 5.95 4.39 
4 20.43 329.32 1.17 1.33 6.64 5.00 
High DLI 77.18 153.06 14.85 1.86 7.34 3.95 
Nondurables Low DLI 0.00 3714.56 0.60 1.33 4.26 3.21 
2 0.28 1574.37 0.74 1.31 4.99 3.81 
3 3.78 612.58 0.98 1.18 5.68 4.81 
4 24.73 253.22 1.26 1.10 6.42 5.84 
High DLI 81.67 97.48 27.99 1.57 7.02 4.47 
NonBanking Low DLI 0.02 1421.27 0.80 1.26 4.58 3.62 
2 3.15 1058.00 1.01 1.32 4.99 3.79 
3 14.78 754.28 1.02 1.19 5.79 4.88 
4 40.57 603.22 1.32 1.40 6.87 4.91 
High DLI 89.72 819.58 5.76 1.71 7.61 4.44 
Other Low DLI 0.00 1476.27 0.55 1.28 5.18 4.04 
2 0.47 947.45 0.67 1.15 6.27 5.44 
3 7.41 522.16 0.88 1.04 6.44 6.20 
4 38.01 637.65 1.19 1.14 7.31 6.41 
High DLI 86.69 288.96 7.69 2.07 8.13 3.92 
Shopping Low DLI 0.00 2604.43 0.55 1.40 5.49 3.93 
2 0.43 832.94 0.71 1.27 5.83 4.60 
3 5.54 379.58 0.92 1.09 6.33 5.81 
4 31.63 223.40 1.22 1.11 7.01 6.29 
High DLI 83.54 106.24 16.62 1.64 7.97 4.86 
Tele Low DLI 0.09 7203.24 0.53 1.35 6.22 4.60 
2 2.02 4453.22 0.64 1.60 6.46 4.03 
3 9.14 2113.35 0.95 1.75 8.16 4.67 
4 31.47 833.93 3.65 1.30 8.57 6.60 
High DLI 77.75 504.00 18.96 2.61 9.52 3.65 
Utility Low DLI 1.16 1690.25 0.67 1.10 3.90 3.53 
2 4.81 1594.35 0.78 0.98 3.55 3.62 
3 10.91 1623.20 0.85 1.17 3.58 3.07 
4 24.97 1363.04 1.04 1.31 3.82 2.92 
High DLI 71.72 739.15 10.72 1.49 4.67 3.14 
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2
X
V
. R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
 o
f E
xp
ec
te
d 
R
et
ur
ns
 o
n 
C
re
di
t R
is
k,
 M
V
, B
M
  
 Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
lis
ts
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 re
su
lts
 o
f t
he
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 re
al
iz
ed
 re
tu
rn
s 
(d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e)
 a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ox
ie
s 
of
 d
is
tr
es
s 
ri
sk
 
(i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
) d
ur
in
g 
di
ff
er
en
t s
am
pl
e 
pe
ri
od
s.
 P
an
el
 A
 is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 s
am
pl
e 
pe
ri
od
 a
nd
 P
an
el
s 
B
 a
nd
 C
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
pe
ri
od
s 
an
d 
th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 c
on
tr
ac
tio
n 
pe
ri
od
s,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 T
he
 ta
bl
e 
te
st
s 
th
e 
nu
ll 
hy
po
th
es
is
 th
at
 th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 c
or
re
sp
on
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 e
xp
an
si
on
 a
nd
 c
on
tr
ac
tio
n 
pe
ri
od
s 
ar
e 
eq
ua
l. 
T
he
 W
el
ch
-S
at
te
rt
hw
ai
te
 t 
te
st
 is
 u
se
d 
to
 te
st
 th
e 
hy
po
th
es
is
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 c
on
ce
rn
 th
at
 th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
va
ri
an
ce
s 
du
ri
ng
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 e
co
no
m
ic
 p
er
io
ds
 a
re
 d
if
fe
re
nt
.  
T
he
 fi
rs
t c
ol
um
n 
of
 e
ac
h 
pa
ne
l i
s 
th
e 
sh
or
t n
am
e 
of
 th
e 
th
ir
te
en
 in
du
st
ri
es
, w
hi
ch
 in
cl
ud
e 
ba
nk
in
g,
 b
us
in
es
s 
eq
ui
pm
en
t, 
ch
em
ic
al
s,
 d
ur
ab
le
, e
ne
rg
y,
 
he
al
th
ca
re
, m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
, n
on
du
ra
bl
e,
 n
on
-b
an
k 
fi
na
nc
ia
l, 
ot
he
r, 
sh
op
pi
ng
, t
el
ec
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
ut
ili
ty
 in
du
st
ri
es
. T
he
 fi
rs
t r
ow
 is
 th
e 
sh
or
t n
am
e 
of
 
th
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 s
iz
e 
(M
V
), 
bo
ok
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
t (
B
M
), 
de
fa
ul
t l
ik
el
ih
oo
d 
in
di
ca
to
r (
D
L
I)
, t
he
ir
 s
qu
ar
ed
 te
rm
s 
(M
V
2 , 
B
M
2 , 
D
L
I2
) a
nd
 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
te
rm
s 
(M
V
D
L
I a
nd
 B
M
D
L
I)
. D
L
I i
s 
de
ri
ve
d 
fr
om
 th
e 
M
er
to
n 
m
od
el
. R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 a
re
 a
 s
im
pl
if
ie
d 
Fa
m
a-
M
ac
B
et
h 
(1
97
3)
 re
gr
es
si
on
 w
ith
 
43
2 
m
on
th
ly
 c
ro
ss
 s
ec
tio
ns
 fo
r e
ac
h 
in
du
st
ry
. A
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 in
 th
es
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
s 
is
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
m
on
th
ly
 c
ro
ss
 s
ec
tio
ns
. T
he
 t-
st
at
is
tic
 is
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
its
 ti
m
e-
se
ri
es
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
r. 
T
he
 a
dj
us
te
d 
R
2 
 a
nd
 F
-s
ta
tis
tic
s 
ar
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 th
es
e 
st
at
is
tic
s 
fo
r t
he
 m
on
th
ly
 c
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
na
l r
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 c
ro
ss
 th
e 
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XVI.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Default Variables in the 
Banking Industry 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics that illustrate the empirical distributions of the test variables of the 
banking industry. Returns (R) are the subsequent realized monthly returns for the sample banks. DLI is the 
default risk measure derived from the Merton model. Higher values of DLI signify higher probability of 
bankruptcy. Size (MV) is computed as the fiscal-year-end price times the number of shares outstanding. 
Book-to-market ratio (BM) is defined as common equity divided by market value (MV). SD is the standard 
deviation for the respective variables. P5, P25, P50, P75, P95 are the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles 
of the empirical distribution of the respective variable. All the observations are included in the analysis 
except those with negative common equity. Panel B displays a Pearson correlation matrix for all test 
variables. “*” indicates that the correlation is significant at a 10% level using two-tailed tests; “**” 
suggests a 5% level significance and “***” a 1% level significance.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Test Variables 
Variables Mean SD P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 
R 0.02 0.11 -0.12 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.17 
DLI 0.42 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.97 1.00 
MV 1392.39 8656.00 12.53 49.12 129.93 445.03 3960.03 
BM 2.71 52.68 0.32 0.54 0.76 1.09 2.12 
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Test Variables 
 R DLI MV BM 
R 1.00    
DLI 0.0047 * 1.00   
MV -0.01** 0.02*** 1.00  
BM 0.001 0.05*** -0.01** 1.00 
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XVII. Portfolio and Regression Results for the Relationship between Default Risk, 
Bank Size, and Subsequent Realized Returns (01/1971 to 12/2006) 
 
For the portfolio results, banks are assigned monthly into quintile portfolios (Port) according to their 
default probability (DLI) (left-hand side of table in Panel A) or size (MV) (right-hand side of table in Panel 
A). DLI is derived from the modified Merton model. Returns (Ret) is one month ahead monthly returns (in 
percent) after the formation of the portfolios. MV is defined as the product of fiscal-year-end price times 
number of shares outstanding. Each month, the portfolio values for DLI, Rets, MV, and BM are calculated 
as means for the respective portfolio. The process is repeated for each month throughout the sample period. 
The values reported in the table are the average of the calculated values across the sample months. The 
sample has 153,067 monthly observations. Regressions are a simplified Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression 
with 432 monthly cross sections. A coefficient in these regressions is the average of the coefficients in the 
monthly cross sections. The t-statistic (in parentheses) is the average coefficient divided by its time-series 
standard error. “*” indicates that the correlation is significant at a 10% level using two-tailed tests; “**” 
suggests a 5% level significance and “***” a 1% level significance. 
 
Panel A Portfolio Results 
Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of DLI Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of Size (MV) 
Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM 
Rets 
(%) Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM 
Rets 
(%) 
Low DLI 7.60 544.67 0.79 1.28 Low MV 54.81 24.03 7.87 1.64 
2 36.01 774.55 0.88 1.30 2 54.60 83.35 2.57 1.53 
3 57.25 887.72 1.06 1.33 3 48.32 171.85 1.60 1.38 
4 77.10 1068.70 1.26 1.49 4 55.25 393.80 1.29 1.34 
High DLI 95.98 1591.37 10.31 1.75 High MV 61.46 4198.36 0.98 1.27 
 
Panel B Regression Results 
Intercept  MV MV2  BM  BM2  DLI DLI2  MVDLI BMDLI 
0.014*** 0.000               
0.010***     0.003***           
0.012***         0.004***       
0.009*** 0.000   0.003***   0.003**       
-0.004 0.000* 0.000 0.017*** 0.001 0.007 0.013*** 0.000** -0.019*** 
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XVIII. Portfolio and Regression Results for the Relationship between Default Risk, 
Bank Size, and Subsequent Realized Returns during the Economic Expansion 
Periods  
 
For the portfolio results, banks are assigned monthly into quintile portfolios (Port) according to their 
default probability (DLI) (left-hand side of table in Panel A) or size (MV) (right-hand side of table in Panel 
A). DLI is derived from the modified Merton model. Returns (Ret) is one month ahead monthly returns (in 
percent) after the formation of the portfolios. MV is market value, which is defined as the product of fiscal-
year-end price times number of shares outstanding. Each month, the portfolio values for DLI, Rets, MV, 
and BM are calculated as means for the respective portfolio. The process is repeated for each month 
throughout the sample period. The values reported in the table are the average of the calculated values 
during the sample months. The sample has 140,146 monthly observations. Regressions are a simplified 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression with 378 monthly cross sections. A coefficient in these regressions is the 
average of the coefficients in the monthly cross sections. The t-statistic (in parentheses) is the average 
coefficient divided by its time-series standard error. “*” indicates that the correlation is significant at a 10% 
level using two-tailed tests; “**” suggests a 5% level significance and “***” a 1% level significance. 
 
Panel A Portfolio Results 
Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of DLI Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of Size (MV) 
Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM 
Rets 
(%) Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM Rets (%) 
Low DLI 4.51 563.33 0.76 1.33 Low MV 51.74 24.48 7.83 1.43 
2 30.03 823.87 0.83 1.26 2 51.25 86.08 2.51 1.48 
3 53.00 940.62 0.97 1.29 3 44.55 180.71 1.61 1.43 
4 74.82 1102.55 1.21 1.43 4 52.06 417.51 1.26 1.32 
High DLI 95.58 1732.64 10.37 1.64 High MV 58.83 4459.43 0.94 1.28 
 
Panel B Regression Results 
Intercept  MV MV2  BM  BM2  DLI DLI2  MVDLI BMDLI 
0.014*** 0.000               
0.011***     0.002**           
0.013***         0.003**       
0.011*** 0.000   0.002**   0.002*       
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.014*** 0.002* 0.005 0.012*** 0.000 -0.018*** 
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XIX. Portfolio and Regression Results for the Relationship between Default Risk, 
Bank Size, and Subsequent Realized Returns during the Economic Contraction 
Periods 
 
For the portfolio results, banks are assigned monthly into quintile portfolios (Port) according to their 
default probability (DLI) (left-hand side of table in Panel A) or size (MV) (right-hand side of table in Panel 
A). DLI is derived from the modified Merton model. Returns (Ret) is one month ahead monthly returns (in 
percent) after the formation of the portfolios. MV is market value, which is defined as the product of fiscal-
year-end price times number of shares outstanding. Each month, the portfolio values for DLI, Rets, MV, 
and BM are calculated as means for the respective portfolio. The process is repeated for each month across 
the sample period. The values reported in the table are the average of the calculated values during the 
sample months. The sample has 14,154 monthly observations. Regressions are a simplified Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) regression with 54 monthly cross sections. A coefficient in these regressions is the average of the 
coefficients in the monthly cross sections. The t-statistic (in parentheses) is the average coefficient divided 
by its time-series standard error. “*” indicates that the correlation is significant at a 10% level using two-
tailed tests; “**” suggests a 5% level significance and “***” a 1% level significance. 
 
Panel A Portfolio Results 
Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of DLI Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of Size (MV) 
Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM 
Rets 
(%) Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM Rets (%) 
Low DLI 29.26 414.10 0.99 0.97 Low MV 76.29 20.87 8.14 3.10 
2 77.92 429.26 1.23 1.60 2 78.05 64.21 3.04 1.90 
3 86.97 517.42 1.67 1.59 3 74.73 109.86 1.55 1.01 
4 93.05 831.77 1.65 1.91 4 77.64 227.83 1.48 1.49 
High DLI 98.77 602.46 9.88 2.49 High MV 79.85 2370.89 1.22 1.16 
 
Panel B Regression Results 
Intercept  MV MV2  BM  BM2  DLI DLI2  MVDLI BMDLI 
0.018** 0.000               
0.000     0.012***           
0.005         0.014***       
-0.005 0.000   0.013***   0.006*       
-0.038 0.000*** 0.000* 0.041*** 0.000 0.019** 0.025*** 0.000*** -0.030*** 
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XX. Portfolio and Regression Results for the Relationship between Default Risk, 
Bank Size, and Subsequent Realized Returns (01/1971 to 12/1979) 
 
For the portfolio results, banks are assigned monthly into quintile portfolios (Port) according to their 
default probability (DLI) (left-hand side of table in Panel A) or size (MV) (right-hand side of table in Panel 
A). DLI is derived from the modified Merton model. Returns (Ret) is one month ahead monthly returns (in 
percent) after the formation of the portfolios. MV is market value, which is defined as the product of fiscal-
year-end price times number of shares outstanding. Each month, the portfolio values for DLI, Rets, MV, 
and BM are calculated as means for the respective portfolio. The process is repeated for each month 
throughout the sample period. The values reported in the table are the average of the calculated values 
during the sample months. The sample has 12,709 monthly observations. Regressions are a simplified 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression with 108 monthly cross sections. A coefficient in these regressions is the 
average of the coefficients in the monthly cross sections. The t-statistic (in parentheses) is the average 
coefficient divided by its time-series standard error. “*” indicates that the correlation is significant at a 10% 
level using two-tailed tests; “**” suggests a 5% level significance and “***” a 1% level significance. 
 
Panel A Portfolio Results 
Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of DLI Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of Size (MV) 
Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM 
Rets 
(%) Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM Rets (%) 
Low DLI 16.77 417.98 0.99 0.74 Low MV 80.20 18.92 1.74 1.25 
2 68.15 358.40 1.14 0.61 2 78.54 61.62 1.31 0.77 
3 86.96 252.68 1.35 0.91 3 66.03 108.64 1.26 0.43 
4 96.73 250.12 1.42 0.51 4 74.01 258.62 1.11 0.73 
High DLI 99.66 184.45 1.49 1.17 High MV 70.73 1011.98 0.98 0.75 
 
Panel B Regression Results 
Intercept  MV MV2  BM  BM2  DLI DLI2  MVDLI BMDLI 
0.008*** 0.000               
-0.004     0.007***           
0.006         0.002       
-0.005** 0.000***   0.009***   -0.002*       
-0.026*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.020*** 0.007*** 0.021*** 0.011* 0.000*** -0.031*** 
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XXI. Portfolio and Regression Results for the Relationship between Default Risk, 
Bank Size, and Subsequent Realized Returns (1980/01 to 12/2006) 
 
For the portfolio results, banks are assigned monthly into quintile portfolios (Port) according to their 
default probability (DLI) (left-hand side of table in Panel A) or size (MV) (right-hand side of table in Panel 
A). DLI is derived from the modified Merton model. Returns (Rets) is one month ahead monthly returns (in 
percent) after the formation of the portfolios. MV is market value, which is defined as the product of fiscal-
year-end price times number of shares outstanding. Each month, the portfolio values for DLI, Rets, MV, 
and BM are calculated as means for the respective portfolio. The process is repeated for each month 
throughout the sample period. The values reported in the table are the average of the calculated values 
during the sample months. The sample has 14,1591 monthly observations. Regressions are a simplified 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression with 324 monthly cross sections. A coefficient in these regressions is the 
average of the coefficients in the monthly cross sections. The t-statistic (in parentheses) is the average 
coefficient divided by its time-series standard error. “*” indicates that the correlation is significant at a 10% 
level using two-tailed tests; “**” suggests a 5% level significance and “***” a 1% level significance. 
 
Panel A Portfolio Results 
Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of DLI Portfolio Sorted on the Basis of Size (MV) 
Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM 
Rets 
(%) Port 
DLI 
(%) MV BM Rets (%) 
Low DLI 4.55 586.91 0.72 1.46 Low MV 46.34 25.73 9.91 1.76 
2 25.30 913.26 0.79 1.53 2 46.62 90.59 2.99 1.79 
3 47.34 1099.39 0.96 1.47 3 42.42 192.92 1.71 1.70 
4 70.56 1341.56 1.21 1.82 4 49.00 438.86 1.35 1.55 
High DLI 94.75 2060.34 13.25 1.94 High MV 58.37 5260.48 0.98 1.44 
 
Panel B Regression Results 
Intercept  MV MV2  BM  BM2  DLI DLI2  MVDLI BMDLI 
0.017*** 0.000               
0.014***     0.002*           
0.014***         0.005       
0.013*** 0.000   0.001   0.004       
0.003 0.000 0.000 0.017*** -0.001 0.003 0.014*** 0.000* -0.016*** 
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XXII. Mean Dependence on Banking (DB) across Different Industries 
 
The industries in the table are listed by the ranking of the dependence on banking (DB) measure. The first 
column is the ranking of the DB of industries; the second one is the name of the corresponding industry 
(Ind); the third column (n) presents the average DB; the fourth to the sixth show the standard deviation of 
DB (SD), minimal DB (MIN) and maximal DB (MAX), respectively. Higher DB indicates higher 
dependence on the banking industry. A firm’s dependence on the banking industry (DB) is defined in this 
study as the ratio of the change of debt (the sum of long-term debt issuance (COMPUSTAT # 111) and 
change in current debt (COMPUSTAT # 301)) divided by capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT # 128) in 
this dissertation. The data is from the COMPUSTAT Annual file. 
 
Ranking Ind  DB  SD MIN MAX 
1 NonBanking  25.79 44.79 -27.76 179.65 
2 Other  5.42 8.36 -23.46 22.29 
3 Shopping  4.80 4.35 -6.7 13.35 
4 Nondurables  4.71 6.18 -0.02 27.52 
5 Durables  3.38 4.83 0.29 23.75 
6 Healthcare  3.37 1.79 0.36 7.92 
7 Chemicals  3.05 3.03 -1.47 13.28 
8 Tele  3.00 2.73 -3.49 11.65 
9 Manufacturing  2.01 2.32 -0.39 12.77 
10 Energy  1.89 3.14 -0.68 15.68 
11 BEquipment  1.67 2.52 -7.22 5.63 
12 Utility  0.88 0.43 0.24 1.91 
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XXIII.  Granger Causality Wald Test of DLI between Banking and Other Industries 
(01/1971 to 12/2006) 
 
The table reports the results of the Granger Causality test based on the sample period from 01/1971 to 
12/2006. A vector autoregression (VAR) approach is used to calculate the testing statistics. AR(12) is used 
in the test because of the nature of monthly data. The first column lists the abbreviation of the name of the 
industries, which includes banking, business equipment, chemicals, durable, energy, healthcare, 
manufacturing, nondurable, non-bank financial, other, shopping, telecommunication, and utility industries. 
The second column presents the Chi-square statistics on the null hypothesis that the default risk of the 
banking industry is influenced by itself, not by other industries. The third column records the Chi-statistics 
on the null hypothesis that the default risk of other industries is influenced by itself, not by the banking 
industry. The triple star – “***” indicates statistical significance at 1% level; “**” indicates statistical 
significance at 5% level; and “*” indicates statistical significance at 10% level.  
 
     Chi-Square 
Industry i 
H0: The default risk of the 
banking industry is 
influenced by itself, not by 
industry i 
 
 
H0: The default risk of 
industry i is influenced by 
itself, not by the banking 
industry 
Ranking of Dependence on 
Banking (DB) 
BEquipment 27.07***  32.97*** 11 
Chemicals 18.77*  44.87*** 7 
Durables 27.93***  19.78* 5 
Energy 23.60**  35.48*** 10 
Healthcare 13.27  27.69*** 6 
Manufacturing 26.12***  38.42*** 9 
Nondurables 15.16  34.33*** 4 
NonBank 19.17*  39.59*** 1 
Other 28.51***  37.46*** 2 
Shopping 21.85**  39.36*** 3 
Tele 16.70  13.58 8 
Utility 15.58  8.01 12 
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XXIV.  Annual Default Rates of Broad Industry Groups by Moody’s, 1970-2006 
 
The table reports the results of the Granger Causality test based on an annual default rate of broad industry 
groups from Moody’s. The sample is from 1971 to 2006. A vector autoregression (VAR) approach is used 
to calculate the testing statistics. AR(1) is used in the test because of the nature of annual data. Panel A lists 
the basic statistics of the annual default rate. The first column is the name of the industries covered, which 
are listed in the order of the mean default rate. The second to the fifth columns are the mean annual default 
rate of different industries, the standard deviation (SD), minimum and maximum of the default rate. Panel 
B presents the results of the Granger Causality tests between banking and other industries. The name of the 
industries are listed in the same order as in Panel A. Two hypotheses are tested. The first is the null 
hypothesis that the default risk of the banking industry is influenced by itself, not by other industries. The 
second null hypothesis is that the default risk of other industries is influenced by itself, not by the banking 
industry. The triple star – “***” indicates less than 1% significant; “**” suggests less than 5% significant; 
and “*” less than 10% significant. The data is from Moody’s Investor Services.  
 
Panel A Basic Statistics 
Industry Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Utility       0.22 0.48 0.00 2.61 
Banking 0.37 0.85 0.00 3.47 
Financial  0.73 2.06 0.00 12.50 
Miscellaneous    0.87 1.49 0.00 6.90 
Energy 1.36 2.26 0.00 10.21 
Products 1.50 1.76 0.00 5.98 
Industrial   1.66 1.74 0.00 7.98 
Technology       1.75 2.18 0.00 10.17 
Media          2.20 2.53 0.00 9.21 
Transportation    2.32 2.97 0.00 15.58 
Retail         2.41 2.73 0.00 11.28 
Service    3.14 4.34 0.00 19.12 
 
Panel B Granger Causality Wald Test 
     Chi-Square 
Industry i 
H0: The default risk of the banking 
industry is influenced by itself, not by 
industry i 
 
 
H0: The default risk of industry i is 
influenced by itself, not by the banking 
industry 
Utilities       2.19   0.65 
Financial  0.15   2.97* 
Miscellaneous    2.13   8.23*** 
Energy 1.70   0.14 
Products 3.12*   4.56** 
Industrial   0.01   0.85 
Technology       0.11   0.00 
Media          0.69   4.80** 
Transportation    2.44   5.57*** 
Retail         7.31***  13.04*** 
Service    0.01  11.09*** 
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XXV.  Summary Statistics on the 27 DLI, Size, and BM Sorted Portfolios 
 
The 27 portfolios are constructed from the intersection by sorting all stocks independently into three default 
risks, three sizes, and three BM portfolios in turns. Default risk is measured by the default likelihood 
indicator (DLI). The second, third, and forth columns are the characteristics of each portfolio in terms of its 
DLI, size, and BM. Size is defined as market capitalization (MV). BM refers to book-to-market ratio (BM). 
Average returns are the equally weighted average subsequent realized returns. Both DLI and the average 
returns are reported in percentage terms. The values in the table are calculated as follows: first, all the 
sample firms are grouped into 27 portfolios by DLI, Size, and BM each month; second, the value of the 
characteristic variables, including average return, DLI, Size, and BM are calculated at month t; third, the 
same steps were repeated each month across the sample period. The final values reported are the average of 
the characteristic variables across the sample period. CV is estimated by dividing the mean returns into the 
average standard deviation. 
 
  DLI Size  BM  Average 
Returns 
DLI Size  BM 
1 Low Small Low 1.55 0.00 103.11 0.33 
2 Low Small Medium 1.91 0.00 100.89 0.68 
3 Low Small High 2.08 0.00 72.19 1.36 
4 Low Medium Low 1.30 0.00 623.09 0.27 
5 Low Medium Medium 1.42 0.00 592.82 0.50 
6 Low Medium High 1.75 0.00 557.99 0.85 
7 Low Big Low 1.13 0.00 12976.41 0.22 
8 Low Big Medium 1.21 0.00 7869.87 0.41 
9 Low Big High 1.38 0.00 5906.91 0.72 
10 Medium Small Low 1.07 1.84 35.35 0.39 
11 Medium Small Medium 1.92 2.12 35.32 0.83 
12 Medium Small High 2.66 2.50 29.63 1.59 
13 Medium Medium Low 1.19 1.21 206.99 0.38 
14 Medium Medium Medium 1.55 1.56 215.46 0.71 
15 Medium Medium High 2.00 2.10 195.19 1.22 
16 Medium Big Low 0.91 0.91 3932.62 0.40 
17 Medium Big Medium 1.27 1.28 2710.82 0.68 
18 Medium Big High 1.74 1.90 2485.84 1.07 
19 High Small Low 1.82 49.90 9.52 0.61 
20 High Small Medium 2.63 56.87 9.34 1.43 
21 High Small High 4.28 77.55 7.70 45.58 
22 High Medium Low 0.50 41.31 51.94 0.58 
23 High Medium Medium 1.62 47.87 53.54 1.18 
24 High Medium High 1.93 68.85 49.85 12.39 
25 High Big Low 0.91 39.91 2423.32 0.57 
26 High Big Medium 1.53 43.77 1241.47 1.01 
27 High Big High 1.74 66.47 789.53 8.29 
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XXVI. The Pricing of the Change of Bank Default Risk 
 
The table presents results of the pricing effect of the change of bank default risk  during the whole sample 
period, the economic expansion stages, and the economic contraction stages. A two-stage Fama-MacBeth 
approach is used in the estimation process. The first step involves estimating the “rolling” beta of β1~ β5 in 
the following equation: Ri,t+1=αt+ β1 (Rm,t – Rf,t) +β2 HMLt + β3 SMBt + β4 DDLIBKt +εt+1, Ri,t+1 is the 
realized equity returns at time t+1. αt is the intercept term. (Rm,t – Rf,t) is the excess return on the market at 
time t. HMLt and SMBt are the two Fama-French factors. The data of (Rm,t – Rf,t), HMLt, and SMBt are all 
from French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). DDLIBKt 
refers to the change of the average bank default risk from time t-1 to t. The default risk of the banking 
industry at time t is calculated as the equally weighted ADLI of all banks included in the cross-section of 
the CRSP and COMPUSTAT annual data at time t; β1~ β4 are the coefficients of the independent variables, 
which is the quantity of risk; and 1+tε is the residual terms. Β1~ β4 are “rolling” betas, which are estimated 
using 50 month’s data from the period preceding each month.  
In the second sage, individual stocks are grouped into 27 portfolios constructed from the intersection by 
sorting all stocks independently into three default risks, three sizes and three BM portfolios in turn. Default 
risk is measured by the default likelihood indicator (DLI). The portfolio betas are calculated for the 27 
portfolios throughout the sample period. The average subsequent realized stock returns are regressed on the 
estimates of the portfolio βp1~ βp4 in a cross-sectional regression as follows: Rpi,t+1=αt+λ1βp1 + λ2 βp2+λ3 βp3 
+λ4βp4 +µt+1, where λ1~ λ4 are the risk premium of different risk factors, including (Rm,t – Rf,t), HMLt, SMBt 
and DDLIBKt , respectively. Μt+1 is the residual term. The Fama-MacBeth method first estimates the cross-
sectional regression in the second equation for each month in the sample period and then computes the 
sample mean of the estimated slope coefficients λ1~ λ4 across the whole sample period, the economic 
expansion periods, and the economic contraction periods, respectively. Then the average monthly slope 
coefficient is tested to decide whether they are significantly different from zero. The ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimate is used.   
 
Risk Measure Coefficient All Period Expansion Contraction 
Intercept αt 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.019** 
(Rm,t – Rf,t) λ1 1.018** 1.055* 0.698 
HMLt λ2 1.060*** 0.809* 3.271*** 
SMBt λ3 0.408 0.185 2.372 
DDLIBKt λ4 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 
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XXVII. Summary of Tables I to XXVI 
 
Table Table Description and the Major Findings 
I Definitions of Industry by SIC Codes 
II Definitions of the economic expansion periods and the economic contraction periods 
III The Deadlines for Filing Periodic Reports to SEC 
IV 
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the default risk proxies, including ADLI, 
size, BM, SMB and HML. The correlation table indicates that ADLI may incorporate 
different information from the two Fama-French factors (SMB and HML).  
V 
The table compares the returns, ADLI, MV and BM of the decile portfolios in this thesis and 
in Vassalou and Xing (2004) study using sample from 01/1971 to 12/1999. The results in this 
study do not exactly follow the patterns as those reported in Vassalou and Xing (2004). 
Further analysis reveals that the variables in this study have wider variations.  
VI The table is similar to Table V except that the sample firms are divided into quintile portfolios. The results of the table are also similar to Table V. 
VII 
The table summarizes the number of firms included in this study each year from 1971 to 
2006. It also lists the number of firms included in Vassalou and Xing (2004) study from 1971 
to 1999. The comparison reveals that the Vassalou and Xing (2004) study only includes a 
sub-set covered in this thesis. 
VIII 
The table is calculated in a similar way to Table V except that the sample ranges from 
01/1971 to 12/2006. A comparison between Table VIII and Table V suggests that after the 
collapse of the year 2000 dot-com bubble, funds favor more of the lower risk portfolios, 
which drive down both the BM ratio and the subsequent realized return of lower risk 
portfolios in Table VIII.  
IX 
The table presents the industrial decomposition of the returns and the percentage of different 
industries in the sorted decile portfolios from 01/1971 to 12/2006. The table suggests that the 
specific industrial composition of different sample groups may influence the final results on 
the relationship between default risk and equity returns. 
X The table is similar to Table IX except that the sample firms are divided into decile portfolios. The results of the table are also similar to Table IX. 
XI 
The table lists the ADLI, MV, BM, returns, the standard deviation, and the coefficient of 
variation of returns of the quintile portfolios during the whole sample period, the economic 
expansion periods, and the economic contraction periods. The table shows a positive 
relationship between the default risk measure and the subsequent realized returns during the 
economic contraction periods. However, during the economic expansion periods the 
relationship between the default risk measure and the equity returns is a U-shape, with both 
the lower risk and the higher risk portfolios earning a higher subsequent realized return. The 
reason why investors charged a premium for the safer stocks during the economic expansion 
periods could be explained by the mean reversion behavior of default risk. Figure 3 provides 
some evidence of the mean reversion behavior of default risk using the forward default risk 
rate data from Moody’s.    
XII 
The table presents the frequency table of sample firms of different industries, the mean, 
standard deviation statistics of the DLI measure of these industries and the relative ranking of 
the mean and the standard deviation of the industrial DLIs across the whole sample period, 
the economic expansion periods, and the economic contraction periods. The table shows that 
during the trying economic conditions, banking firms are more similar to each other when it 
comes to their default risk. So are firms in chemical, shopping, other, energy and non-bank 
financial industries.  
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(Cont.) 
Table Table Description and the Major Findings 
XIII 
The table presents the portfolio results on the relationship between default risk measure and 
the subsequent realized monthly returns for different industries from 01/1971 to 12/2006. The 
table presents several interesting results.  
• First, the ADLIs for the DLI-sorted portfolios of different industries tend to differ 
from each other.  
• Second, most industries demonstrate a monotonic negative relationship between the 
average default risk and the average market capitalization. However, such negative 
association does not hold for the banking, the durable, and the non-bank financial 
industries. For the banking industry, the riskier portfolios tend to have larger market 
capitalization.  
• Third, most industries demonstrate an asymeetric U-shape on the relationship 
between the ADLI and the subsequent realized returns. Banking, energy, non-bank 
financial and telecommunication industries demonstrate a positive relationship 
between the two, which means that the riskier portfolios of these industries are more 
likely to be compensated by higher returns.  
• Fourth, for all the industries, the returns of the portfolio with higher default risk are 
more variable than the one with lower default risk, indicating that the market does 
incorporate at least part of default risk information in its pricing process.  
• Fifth, for most industries, either the safest portfolio or the riskiest one has lower 
overall standard deviation of returns for per unit returns.     
 XIV 
The table presents and compares the portfolio results on the relationship between default risk 
measure and the subsequent realized monthly returns for different industries during the 
economic expansion periods and the economic contraction periods. As compared to the 
economic expansion periods, several patterns stand out during the economic contraction 
stages. The main results are listed as follows: 
• In general, there is a positive, rather than U-shape pattern, between default risk and 
equity returns. 
• Most portfolios experienced decreased book value during the economic contraction 
periods. However, the BM tends to be higher for most DLI-sorted portfolios during 
the difficult economic periods because the market value decreased at an even greater 
speed than the book value.  
• The relationship between ADLI and CV of returns does not hold the inverted U-
shape pattern during the economic contraction periods.  
• The returns of the safest portfolio of banking and utility industries during the 
economic contraction periods are actually lower than their peers are during the 
economic expansion periods, indicating a flying-to-quality behavior within these 
industrial portfolios during the economic contraction periods. 
• The table shows that the energy and the banking industries show some unique 
patterns of the relationship between default risk and equity returns in comparison to 
other industries. The table shows that the energy portfolios with less default risk 
may serve as a safe haven for investors during the bad economic periods. The 
banking industry will be discussed in detail in the following tables.   
XV 
The table presents the regression results of returns of individual stocks on their past month’s 
size (MV), BM, DLI characteristics and the squared terms and the interaction terms of these 
variables during the whole sample periods, the economic expansion periods and the 
economic contraction periods.  
• The table shows that usually what explains the subsequent realized returns are the 
current default risk of securities, the BM, or the interaction of default risk and BM.  
• The two dimensional feature of default risk can explain why the coefficients of both 
DLI and BM are significant for  most industries. It also explains why the interaction 
variable, BMDLI, shows negative and significant coefficients for most industries. 
The results also suggest a different effect of default risk on equity returns during the 
different stages of economic cycle.   
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(Cont.) 
Table Table Description and the Major Findings 
XVI The table presents the descriptive statistics for the test variables of banking portfolios.  
XVII 
The table presents the portfolio and regression results for the relationship between default 
risk , bank size and subsequent realized returns during the whole sample periods.  
• The table shows that bigger banks may have been taking riskier portfolios. 
• Bank portfolios with higher ADLI tend to have higher BM ratio and earn higher 
returns, indicating investors of the banking industry do consider and price in the 
default risk factor.  
• The interaction between default risk measure and size is an important factor in 
explaining the expected returns of banking portfolios. 
XVIII 
The table presents the portfolio and regression results for the relationship between default 
risk, bank size and subsequent realized returns during the economic expansion periods. The 
results are similar to those in Table XVII except that there is a U-shape pattern between the 
ADLI and the subsequent realized returns and the interaction between default risk and size 
plays a less important role in affecting the expected returns.  
XIX 
The table presents the portfolio and regression results for the relationship between default 
risk, size, and subsequent realized returns during the economic contraction periods. The 
results in the table suggest that during the trying economic condition, investors have a 
tendency to fly to safer portfolios and charge more for riskier portfolios, pushing the returns 
of the safest portfolio lower and the returns of the riskiest portfolio higher than their peers 
during the favorable economic condition.  
XX 
The table presents the portfolio and the regression results for the relationship between default 
risks, bank size, and subsequent realized returns during the pre- 1980 period. The results are 
similar to those in Table XVII except that the table presents a negative association between 
default risk and bank size, which means the smaller banks tend to be riskier during the 
sample period.  
XXI 
The table presents the portfolio and regression results for the relationship between default 
risk , bank size and subsequent realized returns during the post- 1980 periods. The table 
shows a positive association between default risk and bank size. A comparison to Table XX 
suggests that bigger banks have been taking riskier portfolios after 1980.  
XXII 
The table reports the dependence of different industries on the banking industry. The 
dependence on banking (DB) values show that the non-bank financial industry has the 
highest banking dependence and the utility industry has the lowest banking dependence.  
XXIII The table presents the Granger Causality Wald test of ADLI between banking and other industries using the monthly ADLI from this dissertation.  
XXIV The table presents the Granger Causality Wald test of ADLI between banking and other industries using yearly default rate data from Moody’s. 
XXV The table shows the summary statistics on the 27 DLI, size and BM sorted portfolios.  
XXVI 
The table presents the results from the asset pricing test of the change of bank default risk. It 
shows that bank default risk is only significant in affecting the returns in other industries 
during the economic contraction periods.  
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